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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING AIRPORT SLOTS: 
PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 
-David M. Grether, R. Mark Isaac, 
and Charles R. Plott 
Consultants for 
Polinomics Research Laboratories, Inc. 
Box 5867 
Pasadena, California 91107 
This study analyzes alternative methods of allocating 
scarce airport capacity (slots) among competing airlines. The 
findings are as listed below. 
1. The method of allocating slots at airports can substantially 
influence the competitive structure and the efficiency of the 
air transportation industry. 
2. The current method of allocating slots at the four high-density 
airports (the slot committee process) is inadequate in almost 
all dimensions of economic efficiency. 
• The allocations are very sensitive to the regulatory 
political climate. The current climate is fostering 
the following tendencies. 
• The process places downward pressure on the carriers 
with the largest number of slots at a given airport. 
The process prevents the growth of large and medium-
sized firms even if the economics suggest growth. 
• Entry is allowed independent of the efficiency of 
the entering firms and possibly at the expense of 
more efficient firms. 
The ability of committees to coordinate operations 
at the systems level (the multiairport level) is 
not good. 
The committee allocations are generally unresponsive 
to changing economic conditions. 
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The committees provide a forum in which possible 
anticompetitive agreements can be forged and enforced. 
The committees provide no vehicle for the economic 
expansion of airport capacity. 
3. The study surveys several alternative methods of allocating slots. 
From these a proc"ss is recommended with the following features. 
A primary market for slots organized as a sealed-bid 
one-price auction operating at regular, timely intervals, 
a computerized aftermarket with "block transaction" 
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process within controlled environments suggest that the process 
will operate at economic efficiency levels near 100 percent. 
5. The above process is recommended on the assumption that some 
problems can be solved which are not addressed in this study. 
The problem of how slots are to be defined is left open even 
though some guidelines are suggested. The funds from the sale 
of slots should be used to provide additional airport capacity. 
The study makes no recommendations about how this will be 
guaranteed. While the study recommends a vehicle for the 
establishment and maintenance of service to major hubs for small 
communities, no attempt was made to define such areas. 
6. Among the options considered, aside from the one recommended, 
capabilities, the one with the second most favorable features is a slot lottery 
special provisions for small communities, 
special provisions for changes in the definition of 
a "slot,lI 
provisions requ~r~ng that the funds be used for 
expanding airport capacity, 
the possibility of "negative bids" for off-peak 
periods at airports for which a "zero-sum" feature 
is appropriate, 
sanctions to prevent the "non uset! and/or monopolization 
of slots, 
a gradual introduction. 
While this process has never been used to allocate airport slots, 
various aspects of it have been used successfully to allocate 
critica.l resources in other industries. It meets the goals of 
the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act and all experiences with the 
with an aftermarket. This process itself involves several problems 
which are referenced in the text. 

I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Slot Problem 
Four major airports, La Guardia, Washington National, 
John F. Kennedy International Airport, and O'Hare International 
have been operating in accord with a high-density rule initially 
adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1968. 
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This rule establishes operations quotas to control airspace 
congestion at these airports. The so-called airport "slot problem" 
has two parts. First, under what conditions should operations 
quotas be placed on an airport? The FAA anticipates that by 1985 
as many as thirty-five airports may have serious airspace shortages. 
In addition, other constraints (gates, ticket counters, terminal 
space, community values regarding noise, pollution, etc.) operate 
to limit the capacity of an airport to accommodate additional traffic. 
The second problem is to determine a method of allocating slots at 
airports where quotas exist, in a manner which is consistent witn the 
goals of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. These goals include 
the development of an air transportation system reliant on competition, 
and the maintenance of satisfactory air service to small communities. 
This study deals with the second aspect of the slot problem. 
Limited airport capacity has been widely recognized as having potential 
anticompetitive effects on the industry. Without access to airport 
services, firms operate at a competitive disadvantage if they operate 
at all. This problem is complicated and involves many dimensions of 
airport capacity and much uncertainty about the consequences of alternative 
methods of allocating this capacity among competing airlines. This 
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study focuses upon those methods of allocating slots which are 
"decentralized" in the sense that the decision rests with the airlines 
themselves with a minimum of governmental or administrative involvement 
in the actual allocative decisions. 
To the airline companies the airport capacity represents 
resources such as gates, customer service areas, and other facilities 
all of which are necessary for effective operation. Without these 
services at an airport, new firms will not be able to operate over 
the route on which the airport is located and existing firms will not 
be able to expand. Thus to the extent that companies desiring ent~ 
or expansion at a given airport do not have the opportunity to compete 
for these resources or are denied the use of these resources on the 
same bases as are other established companies, one of the major sources 
of competitive pressure cannot be operative in the market. The method 
of determining the utilization of airport capacity looms as a major 
factor in shaping the industry's economic efficiency. 
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B. Study Overview 
The study is, organized into ten chapters plus five appendices. 
Some of the materials are related to the structure and performance of 
the existing process of allocating airport capacity -- the slot committees. 
Other materials are related to an exposition and evaluation of alternative 
methods of allocating capacity use. Because the study utilizes experimental 
techniques as a means of demonstration and exposition, several pages of 
explanation are included in the text and the appendices. These explanations 
of the experimental techniques are almost self-contained but anyone wishing 
to replicat,e the results should contact the authors for additional'material 
regarding experimental procedures, equipment, etc. 
Since the study is an evaluative study, the criteria are set 
forth in Chapter II. These criteria are generally those used to evaluate 
the efficiency with which scarce economic commodities are allocated. 
In Chapter III is a brief outline of several alternative methods of 
allocating slots. A table there indicates a section of the study in 
which some discussion of the process can be found. 
Chapter IV reviews the structure and decisions of the existing 
process. The procedures are reviewed and the nature of the committee 
decisions are reviewed and interpreted. Chapter V continues the evaluation 
of the committee process and applies experimental techniques to demonstrate 
the nature of the conclusions. 
The study resulted in the identification of a particular process 
(or combination of processes) which seems capable of achieving the goals 
of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and of avoiding the problems inherent 
in other methods. This general process is outlined in Chapter VI. In the 
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following Chapter VII the performance of this recommended process is 
then compared with the performance of a committee process which followed 
the rules used by the existing committees. The comparison is conducted 
within a controlled environment which imposed an allocation problem 
with many of the prominent economic features of the existing slot 
problem. 
In Chapter VIII several alternative processes are reviewed. 
Some of these have features incorporated into the recommended process. 
Others could be dismissed for various reasons revealed in the chapter. 
Chapter IX is used to address some specific problems which 
seemed to fit no particular category. Chapter X is a summary of 
conclusions. The appendices contain supporting materials. 
C. Controlled Environment Processes: Structure and Interpretation 
Controlled environments can provide an opportunity for !hose 
who are not technical experts to gain experience with the predominant 
behavioral features of decision processes which operate (or will 
operate in the future) in the more complex natural social environment. 
The advantages are the same as with any application of experimental 
methodology. In controlled environments, process decisions can be 
studied~under a variety of parametric conditions, slight institutional 
variations and levels of individual motivation; and the operation of 
the behavioral principles which govern the processes can be seen without 
the aid of highly mathematical models. 
Several applications of controlled environments are included 
in the following study. They are intended to serve only as simple 
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demonstrations of the operations of the general propositions used in 
the text and the policies advanced. Naturally the examples are purposely 
simple so the relevant points can be clearly observed. For those who 
want any of the claims to be demonstrated within more complex environments 
we have the technical capabilities available. A major advantage of the 
controlled environment is that doubts or questions can be resolved by 
replications of old demonstrations and the design of new ones. 
Controlled environment studies rely upon the same financial 
incentives which are operative in the economy at large. By providing 
individuals with the opportunity to earn relatively (to their economic 
position) large amounts of money through successful dealings with each 
other in an organized way, it is possible to study the effects of the 
organization itself on the reSUlting pattern of participant income. 
Perhaps, without resort to methodological jargon, the easiest way to 
explain how such studies work is by a very simple example. 
Six individuals labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are told they 
will have the opportunity to participate in a market. Anything an 
individual earns through buying and selling activities in this market 
will be his/hers to keep. The specific terms of this opportunity are 
as follows. 
Individual 1 is told (privately) that the first unit of the 
commodity he/she acquires can be sold (redeemed) to the experimenter 
for $10 and the second unit acquired can be sold (redeemed) to the 
ex~erimenter for $6. Of course if individual 1 can acquire units at 
prices below these, a profit occurs which is his/hers to keep. Thus 
such profit opportunities generated by purchase and resale are the 
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income opportunities for the individual. The experimenter agrees to 
redeem only these two units from individual 1 and on the terms so 
designated. Individual 2 is provided with a similar opportunity only 
at $9 for the first unit and $7 for the second. Individual 3 is given 
the same deal only with redemption values of $8 and $5 respectively 
for the first and second units acquired. 
Of course these individuals are motivated to acquire units 
of the commodity on the lowest possible terms because their own earnings 
are governed by the spread between the terms on which they acquire units 
and the redemption values which they receive from the sale to the , 
experimenter. Because these individuals come to the process seeking 
to acquire units (in order to redeem them) they are called demanders. 
Indivuduals 4, 5, and 6 (called suppliers) will come to the 
process (because of the special terms offered to them individually by 
the experimenter) seeking to sell units. The experimenter (privately) 
tells individual 4 that he/she can acquire units from the experimenter 
at a specified (marginal) cost. These units can then be resold to the 
demanders on whatever terms individual 4 can obtain in the market. 
Individual 4 will keep whatever profits he/she can manage to obtain 
[marginal] profit = price paid to supplier by demander minus [marginal] 
cost of_the unit paid by the supplier to the experimenter). The (marginal) 
cost of individual 4's first unit is $4 and the second is $8. The 
example is limited to the case of two units. The costs to individual 5 
for the first and second units respectively are $5 and $7 and for 
individual 6 they are $6 and $9. 
The situation is a simple but a very real market. By replicating 
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the situation many times with the same individuals and same parameters 
it becomes analogous to markets which involve repeated purchases and 
sales over time -- a series of (almost) identical market days. For 
the participants the profits which result from trading over several 
time periods can be a very rewarding source of income. 
Many questions exist. Who trades with whom? What is the 
pattern of prices? What is the pattern of income? Could trades be 
rearranged so that the income of all participants is increased? 
What happens if the parameters (costs or redemption values) are 
changed? Are such markets governed by any systematic principles 
at all? 
The answer to the last question is "yes." The answers to 
the other questions depend upon how the market -- the decision process 
is organized. In fact the principles which underlie models of markets 
imply that the patterns of prices and income are very sensitive to the 
form of market organization. 
If the market is organized as a "double oral" auction the 
patterns are very close to those predicted by the model in Figure 1. 
The curve DD is called the demand function and it is obtained by a 
linear transformation from individual redemption values (indicated 
above the curve). The curve SS is the supply function and it depends 
After upon costs as shown (the individual index is below the curve). 
this market is repeated a few times (a series of market days with 
stationary parameters), all transaction prices will be close to Fe 
Four units will be sold at Fe by those individual sellers to the left 
of Q, and these will be sold to the individual demanders who are also 
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to the left of Q. The incomes can be calculated from this price, 
the redemption values and the costs. 
If the market were organized differently (sealed-bid, barter 
process, etc.) then predictably different patterns would emerge. If 
the allocation process were replaced by a committee which had the power 
to decide who sold to whom and at what price, the outcome would depend 
upon certain aspects of the procedur,e and voting rules. In all cases, 
however, the outcomes depend upon the mode of organization. Theories 
of why this happens are reasonably reliable and the simple controlled 
environment processes provide an inexpensive opportunity for those.who 
may be skeptical of the theories to see how they work. 

II. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
The criteria to be applied for the evaluation of various 
processes are those which are generally applied to processes used 
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for the allocation of scarce economic goods~ These are adopted in 
recognition of the fact that the airport capacity is a critical 
resource in the operation of an airline. Its equitable and efficient 
allocation is necessary for the health and competitive viability of 
the industry as a whole. Not only should the resource be allocated 
efficiently, the allocation must be flexible in response to changing 
economic conditions of carriers, the development of new competition 
and it must be reflective of economic conditions in general. 
In addition, any acceptable process must have built-in 
safeguards for the maintenance and possible development of services 
to small communities. Such communities should have continued and 
regular service to the major metropolitan airports. 
The chapter is developed in two sections. The criteria 
are listed and explained in Section A. Section B is devoted to a 
brief exposition of the application of these criteria to the performance 
of controlled environment processes. 
A. Concepts and Measurement 
Six criteria are used to evaluate alternative process 
performance. These are listed and explained in order. 
1. Service to small communities. Within some types of allocative 
processes it is possible to design institutions and procedures which 
would assure the service to small and remote communities required by 
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the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Within other processes it is not. 
All of the processes seriously considered within the body of this 
report have the necessary flexibility if properly implemented. 
2. Efficiency. Ultimately efficiency is measured in terms of the 
value delivered to the consuming public from a resource base. Since 
an airport slot is critical to the operation of air service, the 
efficiency of a slot allocation process is dictated almost directly 
by the efficiency of the air transportation system the process 
engenders. Such a measurement at both the airport or independent 
market level and the air transport systems level is natural and is 
also a major ,goal of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 
a. Carrier expansion. Within a given market carriers with efficient 
marginal operations (relative to the marginal operations of other 
carriers) should expand. Under competitive market conditions th= 
relative efficiency of marginal operations can be approximated by 
profitabili ty. Thus because a slot is a critical resource for flight, 
those carriers which have relatively high profit opportunities for 
additional slots should be allocated additional slots. If capacity 
is limited, then these slots must either be newly created capacity or 
must come from other carriers~ 
b. Carrier contraction. The corollary to the above is that in the absence 
of either excess capacity or newly created capacity the slots for 
expanding carriers should come from the carriers whose marginal 
operations are the least efficient. 
II-3 
c. Entry. An entering firm is similar to an expanding firm (only starting 
from a zero base). If the potential entrant can provide equal quality 
service at rates lower than existing carriers, then the slot and the 
business should go to the entrant. Again relative profitability at the 
margin is the key. 
d. Exit. If a firm can be replaced by another firm that can create 
greater net value from the use of the slots, then under conditions 
of limited capacity, the former should leave the the market. The slots 
should go to the most efficient firms. Likewise some firms should be 
prohibited from entering a market. If slots are taken from a carrier 
and given to a less efficient carrier, consumer prices will go up as 
a result. If the slot transfer to an entrant results in an efficiency 
loss, then the slot should not go to the entrant. Entry with corresponding 
efficiency losses is wasteful of resources and simply forces the prices 
of air transport services to be above the competitive level. A possible 
exception exists in the case of substantial monopoly but even here the 
output-restricting tendencies would necessitate capacity slot use patterns 
with marginal efficiency levels below those of potential entrants. Thus 
the goals of efficiency and competitive industry prices dictate that 
inefficient entering carriers should not be encouraged by the transfer of 
slots. 
e. Cordination. Carriers have some time frame latitudes within which 
operations can be shifted. Sometimes shifts of operations within these 
latitudes are inconsequential to the carrier while at other times they 
are costly. The fact that these latitudes exist indicates that "gains 
from exchange" can be achieved through proper coordination of carrier 
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services. Thus carrier A may see a big cost savings or a big profit 
opportunity in a shift of an operation from time x to time y. Another 
carrier, B, operates at y and is essentially indifferent between 
operating at y and operating at z. A third carrier, C, operates at 
z but would be willing to shift to x. By coordinating the operations of 
A from x to y, B from y to z, and C from z to x, the efficiency of the 
pattern of capacity use is increased. Any system of slot allocation 
should foster efficiently coordinated patterns of capacity use. 
f. Overall market efficiency. Each of the dimensions above contribute 
independently to the market efficiency fostered by the slot allocation 
method at a given airport. An allocation system might perform well on 
some dimensions and poorly on others. However, some care must be 
exercised in looking at the dimensions independently. The contributions 
to total efficiency are not necessarily additive. That is, the poor 
~performance on one dimension can be offset in terms of overall efficiency 
by poor performance on another dimension. Thus, overall efficiency must 
be evaluated independently. 
g. System level efficiency. Not only do interdependencies exist among 
carrier operations at a single airport, they also exist between airports. 
This ia because overall routes and city pairs figure heavily in forming 
a market. The value of a slot at airport A might vary considerably 
if a slot at the appropriate time is available at airport B as opposed, 
say" to some other airport. A system of slot allocations operative at 
many different airports must be capable of capturing the efficiency gains 
and reductions in the overall costs which can result from prop~r 
coordination among airports. 
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3. Responsiveness to changing circumstances. The fact that the 
economic circumstances of individual carriers can change needs little 
documentation. Alterations in the patterns of carriers relative to 
each other should accurately reflect any underlying changes as quickly 
as is possible. 
4. Susceptibility to monopoly and/or collusion. Since slots are a 
critical resource (there are no substitutes) their allocation dictates 
the pattern of competition. In any market the control of slots could 
provide a key for the development and enforcement of anticompetitive 
practices. Therefore the process of allocating slots should have 
adequate safeguards to prevent these possibilities. 
5. Long-run industry growth. Without additional capacity the industry 
cannot expand. Yet, capacity expansion necessarily absorbs valuable 
resources. One measure of the need for capacity expansion is the 
value created by additional slots. If such values, when integrated 
over time exceed the cost of expansion, then capacity expansions are 
in order. The calculation is complicated, however, because the operations 
of an airport involve the public values in ways other than as users 
of air-transport services. Activities of a "public goods" nature 
(convenience, availability, etc.) or "public bads" (noise, pollution) 
may be present. Nevertheless the slot allocation process if properly· 
designed can be used to facilitate the growth of the industry. 
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6. Process cost. Processes use resources. 
B. Performance Measures in Controlled Environments 
In controlled environments relevant for this study some 
aspects of performance can be easily measured. Benefits to participants 
accrue from only one source--the resale of any acquisitions to the 
experimenter. From any given and constant state of underlying resource 
availability, some processes naturally and systematically generate more 
income for participants than do other processes. Such processes do a 
relatively good job of coordinating activities and individual deci~ions, 
while others do not. As was discussed above many of the principles CHAPTER III 
which govern these events are well understood and can be used to ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES 
predict the outcomes with remarkable accuracy. 
Within any controlled economic environment there exists a 
maximum which participants can collectively earn. In technical terminology 
'it is the maximum of consumers' plus producers' surpluses and is the 
controlled environment analog of the income generated by an economic 
system. Whenever this maximum is attained, then the process is said 
to be operating at 100 percent effiCiency. And in general the efficiency 
of a process is defined as, 
efficiency actual earnings 
maximum possible earnings 
This measure obviously abstracts from interpersonal comparisons 
of utility and related concepts found in the technical literature. It is 
however, Simply a direct application of measures used in field studies 
-to evaluate the performance of naturally occurring processes. 
III. ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES 
There are a large number of alternative processes which would 
allocate the available slots at airports. Some can be summarily dis-
missed, while others have features which are attractive. This chapter 
consists of a listing of alternatives which should help organize the 
discussions of options. 
Every process has two important features as dictated by the 
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slot problem itself. First the process must provide a primary allocation 
of slots at each airport. Secondly, the process must allow for adjustments 
in the primary allocation to reflect changing economic circumstances, 
mistakes, unfulfilled expectations, etc. Thus each process must actually 
be composed of two processes--a primary process for allocating slots 
and a secondary process which operates afterwards. 
Table I lists many' of the options and indicates the chapter 
of this report in which some reference or evaluation is made. Frequently 
the reference Simply indicates why the body of the report was not devoted 
to the study of that particular alternative. 
For the most part the process names reveal the essence of 
the process. This is clearly the case with committees, auctions, and 
lotteries. A "grandfathered" primary allocation simply means that carriers 
are given the exclusive right to the slots they have used in the past. 
An entitlement system would involve a title to a "slot" which could be 
sold, traded, or simply not used as the preference of the owner dictates. 
Local authority discretion is essentially the system used now at all but 
the high density airports. 
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Among many of the processes summarily dismissed are those 
which would involve radically different committee procedures from 
those now used by the committee. Majority rule (or any less than 
unanimous voting rule) for example is known to have especially poor TABLE I 
features in such situations because of a failure to protect the rights 
of minorities. Given that unanimity is to be used, several different 
sets of parliamentary rules could be imposed. The fact is, however, Secondary Allocation 
...., 
that the procedures that have evolved under the ATA chairmanship are OJ OJ ""0 .., 
'" 
... 
as efficient, fair, and effective as could be expected from a committee 
... ~ ""0 Primary Allocation Eo< OJ 
... 
M III ""0 OJ 
process operating under unanimity. Some room does exist for using 
modern technology for expediting the details of the committee process 
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but that is another matter. 
Committees: Unanimity Chapters IV, V, VII 
A variety of secondary processes exist. There are, for 
example, many different ways to organize a secondary market. Brokers, I 
I I 
I Committees: Majority Rule Chapter III I I 
Auction: Sealed-Bid, One-Price Chapters VI, VII 
specialists, computers, etc. all provide market-oriented alternatives. I I 
Auction: Sealed-Bid, Discriminatory Chapter VIII 
Those listed on Table I are only suggestive of the possibilities. I I 
Auction: Oral, English or Dutch Chapter VIII 
I I 
Grandfathered Rights Chapter VIII 
I I 
Entitlements Chapter VIII 
I I 
Lottery Chapter VIII 
I I 
Adjustable Landing Fees Chapter VIII 
-
Local Authority Discretion N N N N N 
FAA Administered Methods N N N N N 
-
N not studied 
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IV. SLOT COMMITTEES: PROCEDURES AND PERFORMANCE 
A. Introduction 
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In 1968 the Federal Aviation Administration established quotas 
for scheduled airlines, commuters, and general aviation at five high-
density airports in the United States, and the CAB authorized airline 
scheduling committees for each of the five airports. The five airports 
were John F. Kennedy International Airport, La Guardia Airport, and 
Newark Airport in the metropolitan New York area; O'Hare International 
Airport in Chicago; and Washington National Airport. Currently Newark 
is not scheduled by a scheduling committee; thus we shall focus our 
attention on the scheduling of the four designated high-density airports. 
As will be described in more detail below the committee problems 
are basically to divide up among the members a fixed number of units of 
a valuable commodity, viz. slots. The number of units varies across the 
airports with the FAA quotas. The committee actions appear to be 
dominated by two factors: (a) the fact that any distribution of the 
slots must be unanimously agreed upon,· and (b) expectations concerning 
possible outcomes should a committee fail to reach agreement. As each 
~ommittee meets periodically this means that the carriers are involved 
in a multilateral sequential bargaining situation. Given the institu-
tional framework to be described later in this chapter, one would expect 
the following: (a) entrants will be able to obtain slots from the 
committee but only a small number for each one; (b) growth will be 
difficult, especially for large carriers unless, of course, slots are 
in excess supply; and (c) considerable strategic behavior on the part 
of the committee members will occur. 
IV-2 
B. Institutions 
The nature of slot committees has been determined ·substantially 
by various aspects of the problem they were originally formed to solve 
and by the CAB order. When first organized the major problem was not 
primarily one of allocating fixed airport capacity among competing and 
potential carriers. Instead the major problem was one of coordinating 
the operations of a fixed number of carriers. Individuals who represented 
carriers were fully informed about the technical details of carrier 
scheduling operations (as opposed to having a management or marketing 
orientation) and had considerable authority within the firm organization 
to formulate and implement schedules. 
Originally the typical firm's representative on a slot 
committee was an expert on the technical aspects of scheduling and 
had the authority within limits to schedule a firm's movements. 
It is our impression that the importance of the firm's representative 
nas increased with time, however, and has grown closer to top manage-
ment. It seems that individuals have tended to retain part of 
their function as a representative on a committee even while moving 
to a higher level of management within their own organization. As a 
result the committee representatives tend to be important within their 
own organizationso Though there is some turnover, most have years of 
experience with the committee and are generally friendly towards one 
another. 
The Civil Aeronautics Board approved the establishment of 
airline scheduling committees for each of the airports. These 
committees generally meet on a semi-annual basis. Each committee 
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has as members the certificated scheduled airlines serving that city. 
Each of these airlines may send a representative to the committee 
meetings. Notice that this means that the membership of the four 
committees is not identical, though of course there are substantial 
overlaps. Also the CAB and FAA may, and occasionally do, send observers. 
The procedures followed by the committees are to a considerable 
extent controlled by the rules laid down by the CAB. Each meeting is 
limited in scope to ensuring that the number of scheduled flights into 
and out of a given high-density airport is consistent with FAA quotas. 
Discussions of city-pair schedules, fares, profitability, and other 
general aspects of airline competition are specifically prohibited. 
These rules make it difficult if not impossible for the airlines to 
trade slots either across the high-density airports or over time. 
Of course, this may not preclude carriers from trying to make such 
arrangements, but the committee procedures and current conditions 
(to be discussed later) make enforcement of any bargains difficult. 
While the procedures used by the committee were not detailed 
in the order which created the committees, the basic rule is unanimity. 
Any agreement must be endorsed by all certificated carriers at a given 
airport. "Should a committee fail to reach an agreement, the responsibility 
for a decision would then rest with the FAA. The possible consequences 
of such a "default" are of overriding importance and will be discussed 
in detail. 
Prior to each meeting the carriers send their requests for 
slots (called SUbmissions) to the scheduling committee staff. These 
submissions are tabulated and distributed to all member representatives 
at the start of each meeting. Also, the requests and amendments to 
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the submissioris are shown to all in attendance using an overhead projector. 
In addition to the submissions the committee staff provides the represen-
tatives with the results of the previous meeting and the planned movements 
of the carriers as reported to the FAA. Notice that this emphasizes three 
different points of departure for bargaining: (a) the previous meeting 
outcome; (b) actual schedules; and (c) submissions. Only the first two 
are necessarily within the FAA quotas. On occasion other historical data 
may be provided. For example, there appear to be some seasonal factors 
in the traffic at O'Hare International Airport and, at the most recent 
meeting of the O'Hare scheduling committee, the staff passed out data 
relating to the meeting of a year prior to enable those present to make 
year-to-year comparisons. In essence, it allows them to perform a simple 
sort of seasonal adjustment to the data. 
The representatives generally address each other by airline 
name and the chairman of the committee also addresses the members by 
carrier name. Most remarks of the carrier representatives are directed 
to the chair, but this is not a part of the formal procedure. Represen-
tatives do address each other, "side conversations" take place, and no 
procedures govern the interaction of members during breaks or recess. 
As one might expect, the submissions generally exceed the slots 
available. The chair begins the meeting by calling on carriers in a 
roll-call fashion to reduce the requests. This, together with spontaneous 
discussions, serves to reduce the requests as carriers strategically 
lower their demands. "Sliding,11 a procedure whereby a carrier moves 
an operation from one hour to another, frequently occurs. At some 
point an "exercise" is proposed whereby carriers attempt to allocate 
their operations constrained to the individual totals of some previous 
(typically the last) meeting. 
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As stated earlier the CAB requires that all agreements that 
the carriers enter into at the SCheduling committee meetings be 
voluntary. Thus, no carrier can be "coerced" by the other carriers 
into an agreement that it finds unacceptable. In other words, all 
agreements require the unanimous consent of all participants. This rule 
directly affects the way the committee operates. 
Since it is not possible to bind any carrier to a particular 
schedule, the meetings often entail discussions of hypothetical 
schedules or proposals. These hypothetical schedules may, for example, 
be of the form that each carrier have the same number of slots as it 
received at the previous meeting with certain specified exceptions. 
If all carriers agree to discuss such a hypothetical schedule (the 
"exercise") then bargaining proceeds from there. Note that the committee 
representatives are not bound to go along with the results of an 
exercise and may explicitly reserve the right not to do so. At .its 
beginning an ,exercise may not represent a feasible schedule. This 
is because the assumptions of the exercise may exceed the FAA quotas, 
and even if the total number of slots required is in balance, there 
may be excesses in the peak hours of the day. 
The main portion of an exercise is taken up with the carriers' 
moving-slot requests from one hour to another ("sliding") and also 
Some reductions in the total number of slots requested. This process 
can be rather complicated and appears to require extensive study of 
planned operations of the individual carriers. Thus the representatives 
of an airline may after studying a computer printout announce that it 
would be possible for them to reduce, say, a slot at 1500 and increase 
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at 1600. During an exercise and during other times in a meeting, carrier 
representatives may offer to make certain moves if any of a variety of 
conditions are met. These include: that the group is "close" to a 
feasible schedule to vote on, that the offered move aids the search, 
that certain named carriers reduce their demands, or that some other 
move be made. Depending upon their complexity these offers are posted 
in the front of the room using the overhead projector. Except for tying 
one's moves to actions of other carriers, there appears to be little 
direct trading or bilateral negotiations. 
The purpose of an exercise seems to be to obtain a schedule of 
operations that works, that is that meets the FAA quotas. If such a 
schedule is reached, the carriers may then vote on it. If all agree, 
the schedule is set (subject to checking for errors in bookkeeping, etc.). 
If, however, one or more carriers object, the proposed schedule must be 
modified or a different basis for negotiations must be established. 
An example of a somewhat different type of exercise as well 
as the role of unanimity is given by the "3.5 rule" suggested by the 
representatives of Aeromech and Air Florida at the Washington National 
meeting in July 1979 (Appendix C, pp. 38-40). The suggestion was 
for all carriers to reduce their requests by 3.5 percent (of their 
requests as .amended during the preceding bargaining process) rounded 
to the nearest even number. The rationale was that the requests for 
slots, at the time, exceeded the FAA quotas by 3.5 percent. After 
some discussion the carriers' representatives agreed to see what this 
calculation would lead to. When it was apparent that it affected only 
the largest carriers, complete agreement was not obtained. There was 
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some discussion of voting in the procedure by majority rule,. but counsel 
explained that this could not be done without explicit CAB approval. 
C. Elements of Strategy 
In the absence of strict parliamentary rules governing proposals 
and discussions, committee decisions generally lie in the "core" of the 
appropriate game. l Since there are no side payments and no enforceable 
agreements involving city pairs, or past or future meetings, this means 
the allocation will be one which for every carrier is at least as good 
as the consequences of default and for which there does not exist ~n 
allocation of slots preferred by all carriers to the accepted one. This 
behavioral principle of decisions has the important property that the 
decisions are governed substantially by the perceived consequences of a 
committee default (a failure to obtain unanimous agreement). 
Traces of this tendency can be detected in the actual pattern 
of slot committee decisions. These decisions and patterns will be 
explored below. The full implications of this basic principle will 
not be discussed until the next chapter. There the behavior of a 
variety of different committees operating in a controlled environment 
will be explored and the implications of this type of slot allocation 
proces~ can be clearly spelled out and demonstrated. 
There are currently many speculations about what will happen 
1. For an introduction the interested reader should consult 
R. J. Aumann, "A Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side Payments," 
in Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, 
ed. M. Shubik, (Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1967); or 
R. Mark Isaac and Charles R. Plott, "Cooperative Game Models of the 
Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person Majority Rule Committees: 
Theory and Experiment," Game Theory and Political Science, ed. P. C. 
Ordeshook (New York: New York University Press,. 1978). 
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if a committee defaults. In general there is much uncertainty but 
the alternatives seem to have been narrowed as follows. 
1. First come, first serve. The view that this alternative will result 
from a default has been supported by alleged quotations from high-level 
administrators from the FAA.2 This policy means that the local towers 
will have a great deal of discretion. Evidently at airports near full 
capacity experience shows that these systems have not been satisfactory 
since they frequently involve delays, lack of coordination, etc. If 
capacity is limited under conditions of growing demand, the delay cost 
will increase similar to a price increase, to a level which discourages 
additional attempts by carriers to use the airport. But unlike price 
processes the delay costs involved with first come, first serve are 
wasteful of resources. Carriers in general do not seem to favor this 
policy except possibly as a device to expand capacity utilization beyond 
the FAA quotas which are sometimes regarded as being arbitrary and too 
low. No doubt the first come, first serve system at the high-density 
airports would involve considerable uncertainties. At the July 1979 
meeting in Denver the committee counsel told the representatives that 
this was likely as an interim solution only. 
2. FAAcadministered and determined allocation. It is known that the 
FAA is working on an administrative model. The form of the model is 
largely unknown but carriers seem to think that any such process will 
involve politics if not congressional involvement. Carriers who view 
2. In discussing the consequences of a default in his 
remarks the chairman of a slot committee attributed this 
policy statement to Langhorne Bond, Administrator of the 
opening 
possible 
FAA. 
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themselves as haVing a special advantage due to either influential 
congressional representation or detailed knowledge of administrative 
processes do not seem to view this option unfavorably. 
At the July 1979 meeting on Washington National the representative 
of New Haven pointed out the senators and congressmen with influence in 
transportation matters (Appendix C, p. 7). At the same meeting the 
representative of Eastern which is the largest carrier at Washington 
National and One of three largest on the Boston-Washington route stated 
they would take their chances on politics. He stated that Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy generally gets what he wants (Appendix C, p. 11). 
3. Grandfathered slots. This option would simply maintain the existing 
allocation of slots. It seems to be a viable option in case of a political 
stalemate over the other options. Administrative sources do not seem 
to be advancing it but industry sources are. 3 It also seems to be a 
likely option in case of a single default and the absence of a "standing" 
replacement for the committee. 
4. Lotteries. Many industry representatives believe this is the 
option most favored by the CAB. For large carriers it provides virtually 
no chance for them to retain the slots they now control unless the 
lottery were weighted in their favor. 
5. Markets. Carriers view markets as increasing their costs and 
reducing profits. Few if any seem to favor this option over committees. 
Some feel that the politics would be such that carriers would pay for slots 
and then be told how to use them. Many carriers are aware that this study 
3. Melvin A .. Brenner, "De-Regulation Creates Airport Crunch,1T 
Airline Executive (June 1979): 22-23. 
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has been undertaken. They also participated in a forum where market 
alternatives were actively discussed. S Thus carriers must consider the 
establishment of a market to be one of the possible consequences of a 
committee default. 
With the exception of the "grandfather" alternative all 
alternatives will impose some cost (in terms of payments for slots 
or loss of slots) to carriers with a large number of slots. Thus, 
other things equal, one would expect such carriers at this time to 
be relatively "soft" with respect to concessions. 
Currently there are new entrants certificated by the CAB'to 
provide service at O'Hare International Airport and Washington National 
Airport. At O'Hare the "crunch" caused by the entrants has not really 
been felt yet as they are operating using slots allocated to commuter 
operations. This temporary authority granted by the FAA is due to 
expire shortly and at that time there may arise difficult problems as 
demand for slots at O'Hare appears to be at or above the supply available. 
It should be noted that there seems to be nearly 
complete agreement that the entrants will receive some slots at O'Hare 
and Washington National. There is substantial disagreement as to the 
number of slots they should have but at least at the Denver meetings 
only oue carrier representative made any remark that could reasonably 
be interpreted as favoring exclusion. Thus the scheduling committees 
do not appear to preclude entry. In fact it is probably easier for an 
4. The study was referenced in statements by the counsel at 
the 1979 Denver meetings (Appendix C, p. 42). 
5. "New Engineering and Development Initiatives -- Policy and 
Technological Choices," vol. 1, U. S. Department of Transportation, 
March 1, 1979. 
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entrant to obtain a few slots than for a large carrier, e.g. Eastern 
at Washington National to increase operations by the same number of 
slots. 
The reason entrants can obtain slots is that there .appears 
to be a general belief that in the event of default each entrant will 
obtain some slots from the FAA. The unanimity rule means that entrants 
can veto any proposal which does not provide them with slots. Since 
they clearly expect that any administrative process will provide them 
with some slots, they can and do threaten to force the committee into 
default if their demands are not satisfied. For instance, at the 
July 23, 1979 meeting of the Washington National committee the 
representative of New Haven Airways stated that if the committee 
defaulted, those asking for a small number of slots had nothing to 
lose, but that it was the major lines that were vulnerable. He 
stated that Eastern would lose slots in such a process and (probably 
facetiously) offered to take bets on that proposition (Appendix C, p. 11). 
A carrier that is large at a given airport and thus possibly 
at risk in the event of default may wish to make deals or concessions 
concerning operations at other airports. The CAB order restricting 
discussion to scheduling a given airport at a single time period to 
conform to the FAA quotas clearly hinders this sort of activity, but 
does not completely eliminate it. 
For example, at the recent O'Hare meeting in Denver (July 24, 
1979) the representative of Eastern Airlines was quite explicit in 
stating that he hoped that the concessions he made at that meeting 
would be remembered later when the Washington National committee 
reconvened on August 7, 1979 (see pp. 68 of Appendix C). Similarly 
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TWA's represe~tative asked for help at Washington National when making 
concessions at O'Hare (Appendix C, p. 70, 74) and later when the DCA 
committee did not respond positively to TWA requests, TWA explicitly 
opened the possibility that TWA would reduce its activities at ORD if 
it resulted in more slots at DCA (Appendix D, p. 42, 43, 45, 48, 54-55). 
In addition to attempted bargains involving more than one 
airport there are attempts to bargain over time. At the start of the 
July 1979 meeting there were several references to a seasonal factor 
in Eastern's traffic at O'Hare. In fact the committee staff had handed 
out data concerning the previous meeting and the meeting one year prior 
to facilitate such comparisons. Near the end of the same O'Hare meeting 
the representative of Trans World Airlines, when reducing his requests, 
clearly stated that in the future most of the scheduled airlines would 
have to make reductions in their operations at O'Hare to accommodate 
entrants (see pp. 77, Appendix C). He stated that TWA would "take 
its lumps" then but for the other carriers to remember at subsequent 
meetings that TWA had already taken its reductions. Thus though the 
scope of each meeting is limited to scheduling a given airport for .a 
specific period of time, there are some apparent attempts to tie 
meetings together. 
Prior to a meeting each carrier submits a request detailing 
for each scheduled hour of each day the number of operations the 
carrier wishes to perform. There are considerable strategic considerations 
involved with submitting such a request. For example, a carrier can 
request more slots than it might reasonably expect to get and then 
"concede" slots to others during the course of the meeting. Note that 
the submissions generally exceed the number of available slots at least 
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for the peak periods of the day. As the capacity constraints become 
tight relative to demand, the strategic behavior apparently increases. 
Note that at O'Hare International Airport, not only do the total requests 
exceed the FAA quotas, but over the years the majority of the slot 
requests by individual airlines have been reduced in the scheduling 
committee. From Tables Z through 9 One can see that there are 
generally more requests than available slots but the effect is greater 
at O'Hare and Washington National. The requests for the recent meetings 
at Washington National when the entrants first appeared on the scene 
is especially interesting in this regard. From Tables 4 and 5 
it is apparent that the increase in the requests at that meeting to a 
considerable extent is due to the existing carriers who were apparently 
anticipating a difficult bargaining session. This increase in requests 
and by implication, the possibility of strategic behavior, was the subject 
of extensive discussion at the meeting. This strategy of asking for 
more than one expects from the meeting is typical of committees' 
operating under unanimity and it can clearly be seen operating in 
the controlled-environment committees which are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
A good example of explicit strategic behavior was given at 
the July 23, 1979 morning session of the Washington National Scheduling 
Committee. At that meeting, as noted, several entrants were asking for 
slots and several established carriers were asking for increased 
allocations as well. In particular, TWA was asking for an additional 
ten slots. When asked by the representative of National if he expected 
to get the ten extra slots, TWA's representative said no, but TWA would 
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not reduce its request until the other carriers whose requests were up 
also reduced (see Appendix C, p. 8). Note also that throughout 
the three sessions devoted to Washington National, small carriers tended 
to talk in terms of percentages, e.g. New Haven Airways'drop of "twenty-
five percent"--two slots--(Appendix c, p. 4) while the larger 
carriers' representatives generally spoke in terms of the number of 
slots that needed to be dropped. Recall that it was Air Florida and 
Aeromech, small carriers at Washington National that introduced the 
3.5 percent exercise discussed earlier. 
From Tables 2 through 9 one can see that on average carrier 
submissions exceed the FAA quotas at least at peak periods of the day. 
These quotas have been constant since 1968, but submissions still 
exceed them and are bargained away during committee meetings. The 
demand seems to be especially tight at O'Hare where nearly two-thirds 
of the requests for slots are reduced prior to resolution. 
During the bargaining certain airlines may b~ singled but 
and· become the subject of pressure to alter their requests. Particularly 
visible are carriers' attempting to increase their share of slots 
(e.g. the TWA example cited earlier or Appendix B, p. 22). Small or 
entering carriers can also be visible if their requests seem "largeH 
or are not equal to the requests of other small carriers (Appendix B, 
p. 17; Appendix D, pp. 15~18). 
Carriers that have not used the slots they were allocated 
are also the subject of pointed discussions. At the July 1979 meeting 
of the Washington National scheduling Committee, considerable emphasis 
was put upon the number of slots an airline obtained previously as 
compared with the number actually used. There was a substantial 
IV.,.23 
discussion of·carriers' "releasing" slots; that is, carriers that 
obtained slots at the previous meeting and did not use them. Braniff 
Airlines in particular was singled out for having increased its allocation 
by four slots (to 28) and then only having used 24 of them. Other carriers 
(Eastern, National, and United Airlines) also released several slots 
but did not appear to be the target of as much criticism as Braniff. 
Generally the excuse offered was equipment shortages due to the problem 
with DC-lO's. Note, however, that this phenomenon of releasing slots 
did not occur at O'Hare International Airport. In fact, of the 576 
slots allocated for July 1979 only one was released (by Mexicana) 
compared with 23 of 634 at Washington National. Also at Washington 
National the number of slots reserved (as reported to the FAA) for 
June 1978 was below the postmeeting resolution by a total of 30 slots 
and the figures for the winter of 1978-1979 were comparable (January 1979 
was 26 slots below the postmeeting resolution for February 1979). 
At the meeting in July 1979 the chairman of the meeting exhorted the 
committee member representatives to ask only for the slots that 
they needed and would use. Regarding the practice of obtaining slots 
through the committee for whatever purpose a carrier might have and then 
later releasing them, the chairman told the committee that those days 
were over -- or shOUld be over. (See also Appendix B, p. 10, Appendix D, 
p. 20, 24.) 
D. Actual Outcomes of the Committee Process 
Tables 2 through 10 and Figures 2 through 19 give a summary 
of the actions of the scheduling committees. Figures 2 through 5 
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Slots from post meeting resolutions minus submissions 
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Slots from post meeting resolutions minus submissions 
John F. Kennedy International airport 
January 71,73,75-79; July 70-73,75 -79 
en 
Ul 
U 
Z 
150 
135 
120 
105 
Ul 90 
0: 
0: 
::l 
U 
U 
o 75 
lL. 
o 
ffi 60 
OJ 
::E 
::l 
Z 
45 
30 
15 
of r ~ 
-4 -2 0 +2 .. 4 
RESOLUTIONS -SUBMISSIONS 
Figure 5 
140 
130 
120 
110 
100 
90 
en b 80 
-1 
en 
lL. 70 
o 
ffi 60 
OJ 
::E 
::l 50 
z 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Committee decisions at O'Hare airport 
January weekdays, 1500 -1959 hrs 
UA UA 
TW------ ....,.. TW 
NW, 
'------
----NW 
E'~~ OZ 
o EA 
CO CO 
01 f?~;; I !~? 
1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
YEAR 
Figure 6 
IV-29 
100 
90 
80 
C/) 70 
l-
e 
~ 60 
Lt... 
e 50 
0:: 
~ 40 
::;: 
;:) 
Z 30 
20 
10 
Committee decisions at O'Hare airport 
January weekdays, 1500 -1959 hrs 
AA-- - - AA 
DL-- DL 
NC- -NC 
_----BN 
BN_ ~ AL ~ __ ---- AL 
o I ~t::::""'1 e ..... 1 I I ~l 
1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
YEAR 
Figure 7 
IV-30 
140 
-130 
120 
110 
100 
C/) 90 
l-
e 
~ 80 
Lt... 
e 70 
0:: 
ILl 
Ol 60 
::;: 
;:) 
Z 50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Committee decisions at O'Hare airport 
July weekdays,I500 -1959 hrs 
UA UNITED 
TW~ -TWA 
IV-31 
DELTA (WITH 
~ NORTHEAST) 
NC NORTH 
DL CENTRAL 
M~ _ : OZARK 
AL EASTERN 
"OTHER 
c:::::::::::::: - ALLEGHENY 
o DOMESTIC 
01 I I I I f I I I I I 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
YEAR 
Figure 8 
120 
110 
100 
en 90 
.-
o 
..J 110 
en 
IL. 
o 70 
It: 
:il 60 
~ 
::> 
Z 50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Committee decisions at O'Hare airport 
July weekdays, 1500 -1959 hrs 
Ali. 
NW ____ 
IV-32 
AMERICAN 
----- NORTHWEST 
BN FOREIGN 
F ~ -:=--...........::: BRANIFF 
CO :;::: CONTINENTAL 
01 I I I I I I I I I I 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
YEAR 
Figure 9 
IV-33 
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show the results of comparing the submissions with the number of slots 
received by the domestic air carriers. Note that in all four cases 
the modal (i.e. most common outcome) is that the submission is equal 
to the resolution. In other words in most cases an airline receives 
the number of slots it asks for. At John F. Kennedy International 
approximately 11 percent of the requests are reduced and around one 
quarter are reduced at Washington National and at La Guardia (24 percent 
and 28 percent respectively). The pattern at O'Hare is quite different 
in that the majority of the requests are reduced. Also, the patterns 
of resolutions at O'Hare are atypical. Note from Figures 8 and 15 
that there appear to have been fewer changes in the number of slots 
carriers receive over time at O'Hare than at say Kennedy where some 
carriers, especially Eastern and Braniff, have increased operations. 
Also~ at La Guardia one can see more movement as some carriers give 
up slots temporarily and then regain them (e.g. TWA and Allegheny). 
As at JFK, Braniff expanded operations at La Guardia. At Washington 
National some carriers, Eastern, Northwest, Piedmont, Delta, and until 
recently, National, all held fairly constant numbers of slots. TWA 
and Braniff both expanded operations while American and United 
contracted. 
To verify the appearance of greater constancy in the 
resolutions at O'Hare we calculated for each major carrier the 
standard deviation of time series of resolutions for each airport. 
To allow for possible seasonal fluctuations the series were split 
into winter and summer series. For the summer we found that of the 
eight carriers that have substantial operations at both JFK and 
O'Hare, six of them (Allegheny, Braniff, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, 
IV-44 
and TWA) showed more variability at JFK than at O'Hare, while only 
two (American and United) showed less. The figures were more variable 
at La Guardia than at O'Hare for seven carriers and less for three, 
essentially the same as JFK. The comparison with Washington National 
was (as the graphs show) much closer to comparability with five carriers 
more variable at DCA and three at O'Hare. For the winter months the 
results were the same. The resolutions for seven carriers showed 
more variability at JFK than at O'Hare, while for La Guardia and 
Washington National the corresponding figures were eight and five 
respec tively. 
To sJmmarize, Tables 2 through 9 and the corresponding 
figures show that there has been little variation in slots received 
at O'Hare International Airport. United, American, and TWA are all 
large operators at O'Hare and have maintained th~ir positions. Braniff 
has made a small increase (up five to six slots over the decade) and 
Eastern has dropped a comparable amount. It appears that there is 
demand for extra slots there (note requests consistently exceed the 
FAA quotas). With the new entrants there the situation can only be 
expected to become worse. 
The other airport where the slot problem is especially tight 
is Washington National. The FAA currently authorized 640 slots between. 
the hours of 0700 and 2259. At the most recent meeting there, the 
requests exceeded the figure by approximately 50. These figures reflect 
the existence of a curfew on jet flights at the 0600-0659 and 2300-2359 
time periods. The largest operator at Washington National is Eastern 
Airlines. Its level o{ operations has been roughly constant. Allegheny, 
IV-4S 
United, and recently National Airlines have all reduced the number of 
operations, with TWA and Braniff both increasing. As was the case with 
United, American, and TWA, the largest carriers at O'Hare, Eastern has 
not been able to obtain more slots from the committee. 
Kennedy International Airport offers a significant contrast 
to O'Hare and Washington National. Here, Pan American and the foreign 
carriers reduced operations around the time of the Arab oil embargo. 
They have not succeeded in regaining these slots while some domestic 
carriers (Eastern, Braniff, and TWA) have increased operations. 
Similarly, at La Guardia one can find substantial movements in the 
number of operations per carrier. Note especially the time series 
for Eastern and Allegheny. Here also Braniff has expanded operations 
somewhat. From the historical evidence, we conclude that O'Hare and 
Washington National present harder problems to the scheduling committees 
and speculate that meetings involving these airports are frequently 
longer and more difficult than those concerning the other two. 
As expected the largest carriers have been unable to expand 
operations at the airports where they are large. If anything, the 
potential threat of default makes them vulnerable. Note that Eastern 
which is the largest at Washington National has been dropping slots at 
O'Hare and, conversely, United Airlines which is the largest operator 
out of O'Hare has been dropping slots at Washington National. 
E. Conclusion 
The record of the scheduling committees suggest that the 
carrier representatives are fully aware that they are participating 
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in a complicated bargaining situation. The meetings described in 
Appendix B, C, and D provide substantial documentation for this 
conclusion. From the patterns of submissions and requests it appears 
that strategic behavior is taking place, including possibly attempted 
bargains involving more than one airport and attempted bargains at 
the same airport for different points in time. Thus one would expect 
this process to follow the same principles of behavior which are known 
to characterize bargaining committees. 
Concerning actual outcomes of the process the threat of 
default seems to ensure that entrants get some slots, but probably' a 
relatively small number. Generally large or medium-sized carriers find 
expansion difficult when the demand for slots is tight. Braniff and 
TWA do, however, appear to be exceptions, though their growth could 
hardly be termed dramatic. 
CHAPTER V 
THE COMMITTEE PROCESS: EVALUATIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
THE COMMITTEE PROCESS: EVALUATIONS AND DEHONSTRATIONS 
The interpretation and evaluation of the decisions made by 
committees presents a particularly difficult problem. Not all 
data are available. In fact only traces of the relevant data 
available. Furthermore, even if the data were available, the 
limited by existing theory. Committee processes are 
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understood. Finally, even if all historical data were 
available and if the principles governing committee decisions were 
satisfactorily isolated; there would still be no knowledge about the 
parameters and circumstances which might characterize the committee.' s 
environments. 
In spite of these fundamental limitations, judgments about 
committee process need not be made in a vacuum. It is possible 
to gain experiences with the tendencies of such committees by studying 
committees which make decisions in a controlled environment. In this 
chapter we report on the results of several such studies demonstrating 
the existence, importance, and implications of several key principles 
which govern their behavior. 
As was discussed in the chapter above the key to understanding 
and predicting certain types of committee decisions is the core or the 
underlying cooperative "game" and this, in turn, is determined by the 
tlthreat points" or default values in the case of the slot committees. 
In order to demonstrate the operation of this principle, we report on 
the decisions of a large number of committees which met within a 
controlled environment. There were three design blocs of the controlled 
environment committees (see Appendix F) but in each bloc many of the 
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essential features of the slot problem were present. Committee members 
were required to divide a scarce and valuable resource among themselves. 
The value of the resource was systematically varied with individuals 
and groups so the nature of the response of the process to individual 
economic opportunities could be studied. 
All committees used the rule of 
parliamentary processes that have evolved in the slot committees. 
default rules and default consequences were systematically varied in a 
manner which demonstrates the importance of these variables. 
Three different default rules were studied. (a) If the 
committee defaulted, each committee member received his/her "initial 
allocatiorr' of slots which was unambiguously specified and known before 
the meeting began. (b) If the committee defaulted, slots were allocated 
randomly. (c) If the committee defaulted, slots were taken at random 
only from those with large initial allocations and given to those with 
small or no initial allocation. 
The analogies with the slot committees are clear. Policy (a) 
is similar to a grandfather policy. Policy (b) is similar to complete 
uncertainty as to what will happen, and policy (c) reflects a set of 
political circumstances in which the large carriers feel that entrants 
will re~eive ·slots and they will result in a reduction from the large 
carriers' historical shares. The key policies for study are (a) and (b) 
because they represent polar cases of current expectations, the first 
involving no uncertainties about the consequences of default and the 
latter reflecting complete uncertainty. For the large carriers the 
certainty of a grandfather policy is preferred to complete uncertainty. 
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For the small carriers or potential entrants complete uncertainty is 
preferred to getting no slots for sure as would be the case with a pure 
grandfather policy. All other options are combinations of these with 
large carriers seeing no likely default consequence which would 
costlessly improve their position over what it is now and small or 
entering carriers having some confidence that they will receive "something." 
The details of the committee environment are contained in 
Appendix F. The essence of the problem was that nine people for some 
committees or fourteen people for others had to divide "cards" or "flags" 
among themselves using the rule of unanimity. In bloc I (six experiments) 
nine participants divided up 28 cards (10 blue, 9 pink, and 9 green) and 
32 flags (10 blue, 11 pink, 11 green). The cards/flags dichotomy provided 
an opportunity to build in a type of system interdependence, as each person's 
payoffs for the second meeting (flags) depended upon the number of cards 
received in the first meeting (cards). A similar system was employed in 
bloc 3 (six experiments) except that in four of these there were fourteen 
rather than nine participants. In bloc 2 fourteen participants divided up 
32 cards (10 blue, 11 pink, 11 green), but there was no interdependent flag 
meeting. 
Values for cards were created by application of induced value 
theory. That is, each individual was paid for participation in accordance 
with the number of each colored card he/she had in the allocation 
unanimously approved by the committees. These values differed among 
committee members and card colors. The marginal payment also decreased 
with card volume. The complete schedules are contained in Appendix F 
but the range is from $6.87 for a single card to zero. Earnings, which 
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were paid in cash, ranged up to $50 for some individuals for a single 
meeting. Each committee member had an "initial allocation" of each 
type of card. 
The analogy with the slot committee is obvious. A card is 
analogous to a slot and the color of the card is analogous to the 
time of day. The delineation between cards and flags is analogous 
to different airports. In designing parameters, certain features 
of O'Hare were used as a guide for the card meeting and National was 
used for the flag meeting. The declining marginal values to committee 
members are analogous to"diminishing returns to operations for carriers 
at a given airport. The procedures followed by the controlled 
committees were almost exactly those that have evolved for the slot 
committees. The initial allocation of cards to committee members is 
analogous to the historical allocation of slots among carriers. 
A. Default Value Influence 
For the controlled committes in bloc 2 two different default 
consequences were studied. (1) The first was a "grandfathered" policy 
whereby each committee member received his/her initial allocation in 
case of a default. The analogy here is of course the "grandfather" 
option in the case of a slot committee default. (2) The second 
consequence was an equal-chance lottery. If the committee failed to 
reach an agreement, available slots would be" allocated at random with 
each committee member having an equal chance for each slot regardless 
of the initial allocations. 
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The results of the experiments in bloc 2 are displayed in 
Figure 20. On the vertical axis is represented the number of units 
received. On the horizontal axis is the "schedule number" which 
represents a specified profit opportunity. They are similar to 
economic positions in a market. 
It is clear that the outcomes are substantially different 
when the "random" default rule is used rather than the "grandfather" 
rule. It is no coincidence that, since the expected number of slots 
received by a participant in a random allocation is two and two-sevenths, 
all outcomes in the "random" process were either two or three. Th~s 
is exactly the "core" prediction. On the other hand, the outcomes in 
the "grandfather" series tended to be close to the initial allocation 
(again, the amount to be obtained in the event of a default) which for 
this committee is also the case. To the extent that outcomes diverge 
from the initial allocation (core) in the "grandfather" series, the 
tendency was for those with large initial allocations to give up some slots 
to allow limited expansion by persons with smaller initial allocations. 
Such tendencies are not unusual but the opposite tendencies, for the large 
to get larger, are never present. 
It is clear that the "real" default process in the airline 
scheduling committees as perceived by carriers is not identical to either 
of these archetypes; however, all the descriptions articulated so far 
suggested that the real consequences of default involves elements of either 
"uncertainty" or "grandfathering" or both. The controlled-environment 
results give a demonstration of the tendencies which the actual rule will 
have as it resembles either randomness or uncertainty. 
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The results from bloc 1, portrayed in Figure 21, demonstrate 
in a different light the power of the default positions. In these 
meetings the default rule was identical (initial allocation grandfathering) 
but two different initial allocation schedules were used. Again, the 
difference in outcomes relative to the underlying economic value of units 
is readily apparent. Outcomes tend to shift directly with the default 
values alone. 
In summary, the committee decisions are substaatially influenced 
if not completely determined by the consequences of default. Under the 
grandfather arrangement "hardnosed" committee members will simply d"fault 
rather than take less than the default value. Social pressures do exist 
for those with "large" initial endowments to give to those with "small" 
endowments, but even if there is no default because of concessions to 
social pressure the final outcome is not "far" from the "grandfather" 
alternative. On the other hand, when the consequence of default is an 
equal chance lottery, the slots will be divided equally, independent of 
the initial allocation. The the extent that committee members are risk 
averse this equal split optian is preferred to the lotteryl and wili be 
unanimously adopted. Default values literally determine the outcomes in 
processes such as these. 
B. Efficiency Properties of Committee Decisions 
Allocations which result from committees' using procedures 
such as those used by the ·slot committees need bear no relationship 
1. The equal split provides each committee member with the expected 
value of the lottery. Under risk aversion the certainty is preferred to 
a lotter with the same expected value. 
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to allocations which are efficient from an economic point of view. 
The primary variable which guides the committee decision is threat 
point (the consequences of default) and this latter will be related 
to economic efficiency only by accident. This general conclusion 
applies both at the independent committee level and at the "systems" 
level. For the slot committees this means that the conclusion applies 
to both the airport level and the air transportation system level . 
1. Efficiency at the Single Committee Level 
Each of the efficiency criteria will be applied to the cQmmittee 
process at the single committee level. System considerations will follow 
in the next subsection. 
a. Expansion of efficient producers. As is explained in Chapter IV 
the pattern of allocations has been for the new cariers to receive a 
small number of slots at the expense of those carriers with a large 
allocation of slots. Aside from this small allocation at the time of 
entry, individual carriers have experienced little growth . 
This pattern of allocations is understandable. Large 
carriers have large potential losses from committee default (depending 
upon tne carriers' assessment of the relative likelihood of the various 
default consequences) and are thus willing to give up a few slots to 
entrants who have little or nothing to lose from a default and thus may 
be prepared to induce a default should the committee give them nothing. 
Once a carrier has something to lose from a default, it can expect no 
further concessions from the other carriers. 
This same pattern is readily detectable in the data from 
the controlled environment committees. On Figure 22 it is shown 
that in the second experimental bloc those participants with large 
(5 or more) initial allocations never were able to expand even though 
such expansion would, at times, increase efficiency (eight expansions 
should have occurred according to the efficiency criterion). 
Because the initial allocations need not be related to 
underlying profitability, those who should expand cannot. In the 
controlled environment committees there were individuals in each 
size class that should have grown considerably. Such growth was never 
achieved for large participants and seldom achieved for smaller, 
nonentrant participants (see Figure 23) for which entry was small and 
random across participants. 
b. Forced Contraction. Inefficient carriers should contract in 
size. Operations should be transferred from less to more profitable 
applications. Certainly operations should not be transferred from 
more profitable applications to less. Yet the latter is exactly 
what can happen within committee allocation processes. Displayed 
on Figur~ 24 are tn~ £a~6e5 of outcomes for the second bloc of 
controlled-environment committees. 2 Notice that some participants 
always received more than their efficient outcomes. Because of their 
initial allocation they could successfully bargain for more. 
2. In the second bloc volunteers at the beginning of the session 
participated in one "card l1 meeting. After this was over, they were 
instructed that they would participate in a second card meeting with 
identical rules but different parameters (payoffs, initial allocations). 
It is the results of this "second decision" which are reported here. 
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c. Entry and Exit. High cost carriers should not be granted 
scarce slot resources and enter the market when carriers with lower 
costs can enter or expand to do the job. Committee decisions 
regarding entry and exit bear no relationship to this principle. 
Under the committee process there will be no exit since carriers 
whose operations should be replaced by other carriers have no 
incentive to relinquish their slots. There will also be no 
discrimination among potential entrants based upon their relative 
efficiency. All entrants have equal power to "default" the committee 
and jeopardize the slots of those who have historically had many. 
Thus under the committee arrangement all potential entrants can 
lfget in." 
For the controlled-environment committees this phenomenon 
is clearly evident. On Table 11 committee members with schedules 
number 10 should not receive any slots. They are inefficient and they 
had no initial allocation. Yet they always receive some unless the 
committee defaults. Furthermore, the allocations received by these 
members are substantially identical to the allocations received by 
members 2, 14, and 1 who also had no initial allocation. Member 
number 3 should receive exactly one card. Members 14 and 1 are very 
efficient in the sense that not only should they enter, they should 
receive sufficient cards to become "medium sized" or even Ttlarge." 
The point is that anyone who can "threaten" gets "somethingH but 
the resulting allocation has nothing to do with efficiency. 
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To date the "deal" has not gone through. 
The implication is that carriers have learned to mask their 
desire for trades. The meeting is probably not so open as it would 
otherwise be. Efficiency suffers to the extent that "big trades" are 
precluded because they cannot be hidden from the other carriers. This 
incentive to deal "under the table" also has implications about the 
possible existence of anticompetitive activity which will be discussed 
below. 
2. System Level Efficiency 
In th~ course of this study we saw nothing about the committee 
process which would suggest the existence of offsetting inefficiencies 
thereby rendering a higher overall system efficiency level than might 
otherwise have been postulated. We did, however, see aspects of a 
possible inability of the committee system to cope with certain types 
of systems interdependencies. These problems may be relatively minor 
now with only four slot committees oper.ative, but if many were operative 
their problem could become major. 
The value to a carrier of a slot at one airport will generally 
depend upon the other airports for which the carrier has access. For 
example r carriers entering a market need slots at all the involved airports. 
At a minimum this means two airports but because of joint costs and scale 
economies, entry into a "market" will frequently involve several airports. 
Thus if the market involves cities A, B, and C, slots at B may be more 
valuable to a carrier with access to A and C than to a carrier which 
does not. The allocation of slots within the system should be responsive 
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to these interdependencies. Perhaps the carrier with slots at A and C 
should be given greater priority in the allocation of slots at B. In 
fact, the optimum response might be for the carrier in question to give 
up slots at airport D in "exchange" for slots at B. 
The interdependencies among airports are clearly recognized by 
committee members. The opportunity for some coordination across high-
density airports does exist. Even though discussions of city pairs is 
explicitly precluded by the initial order, references are made to other 
meetings. Furthermore the meetings for different airports are 
convened "back to back." But coordination in an open committee meeting 
is difficult at best. The TWA proposal is an example of the difficulties. 
It may be possible that bargains and coordinations can be achieved by 
private, bilateral negotiations but this involves an alteration of the 
process that needs to be reviewed itself (see section D in this 
The nature of the problem is easily identit'ied in the behavior 
of controlled-environment committees. The profits of 
members were interdependent across two meetings. The profitability of 
"flags" in a second "flag" meeting was dependent upon the number of 
obtained in the first "card" meeting. If the individual received a 
critical number of cards, then the value of flags was increased. Thus 
bargaining for cards necessarily involved some considerations at the 
individual level about the value of cards for the flag meeting. 
In general we found no evidence that the controlled-environment 
committees were capable of dealing systematically with the interdependence 
problem. Each decision was as if in isolation and was governed primarily 
by the default consequences for that meeting. If only committee processes 
TABLE 11 
TREATMENT OF PARTICIPANTS WITH ZERO INITIAL ALLOCATION 
BUT DIFFERENT EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS 
Participant 
Schedule No. lOa 
(Efficient allocation is .Q cards) 
Schedule No. 2b 
(Efficient allocation is 1. card) 
Schedule No. 14c 
(Efficient allocation is 1 cards) 
Schedule No. Id 
(Efficient allocation is 1 cards) 
a. Mean number of cards 
b. Mean number of cards 
c. Mean number of cards 
d. Mean number of cards 
.7S. 
.87S. 
.625. 
1.00. 
No. Cards Frequency Received 
.Q 
I 
2 
3 
0 
1. 
2 
3 
0 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
2 
1 
Standard deviation 
Standard deviation 
Standard deviation 
Standard deviation 
1 
4 
I 
0 
3 
1 
2 
0 
4 
3 
1. 
0 
4 
3 
1 
1. 
.707. 
.834. 
.74. 
1.06. 
V-IS 
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d. Coordination. Generally speaking the committee procedures that 
have evolved through ATA chairmanship are capable of dealing with 
certain limited aspects of the broad coordination problem. Tbe 
sliding operations systematically exploit the "gains from trade" which 
carriers can achieve by trading operations at various times of day. 
Tbe procedures are so natural that many controlled-environment 
would initiate the sliding operations even in the absence of their 
introduction. For the case of a "grandfather" default rule 
of the committees that did not default invariably increased over the 
initial allocations in spite of the inefficient entrant problems. 
"capacity shares" are not a variable (no entry and no growth), the 
committee process can solve the coordination problem. But, there is a 
cost even with this feature. 
Tbe gains from trade between two parties can be prohibited by 
a third member not a party to the transaction (by virtue of the unanimity 
rule). Tbus, a member who recognizes that two other members wish to 
a "transaction" can use his power to prevent it (the unanimity rule) as 
leverage to gain concessions for himself. Committee members clearly 
recognize this possibility in controlled-environment committees. In the 
slot committees this phenomenon may have happened when TWA expressed a 
willing~ess to reduce its slots at O'Hare if it could gain slots at 
Washington National. It has been alleged that United Airlines was 
interested in such a "trade" (see also Appendix D, p. 45, 48) as was 
perhaps Piedmont (Appendix D, p. 54), but when other O'Hare carriers 
heard about the potent~al maneuver, they increased their own O'Hare 
requests presumably to get a "share" of the TWA O'Hare reductions. 
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alone are operative (no discussions of "markets" and open negotiations), 
efficient systemwide organization will not be attained. Committee 
processes such as these are simply not the appropriate instrument. 
C. Responsiveness 
Since the committee decisions reflect primarily the conse-
quences of default, they cannot respond directly or readily to changed 
economic conditions of individual carriers. In fact, the committee 
decisions can be perverse. If the profit position of a carrier 
increases, the optimum response in the committee can be to make 
concessions on marginal slots in order to "protect" its operations 
from a committee default. Tbus the firm would contract as it becomes 
relatively profitable rather than expand as it should. Tbe problem can 
also exist when a carrier experiences a temporary disruption due to a 
strike and so forth. In such circumstances the carrier should have an 
incentive to release slots for the use of other carriers. However, 
haVing released slots there is no guarantee that the carrier can 
successfully obtain them at the next meeting. Other carriers having 
undertaken the expenses to schedule operations themselves in those slots 
may be hesitant to "return" them6 and carriers who reduce slots are 
frequently the subject of heated discussions and accusations (see 
Appendices B, p. 10, 23; D, p. 20). Since such a possibility exists, 
carriers may be hesitant to release the slots at all if they can avoid 
it. In general, because "grandfathering" may playa role in the case of 
a committee default, carriers always have an incentive to control slots 
even when the operations so scheduled are not particularly profitable. 
3. Some carriers attribute this strategy to Braniff. 
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D. Susceptibility to Collusion 
Discussion of markets are strictly forbidden during committee 
meetings. City pairs, prices, profits, etc. cannot be discussed. Yet, 
because of the committee structure each committee member has a type of 
control over competitors which is uncharacteristic of markets and 
inconsistent with the operation of a freely competitive system. Firms 
can influence the market shares among its rivals while leaving its own 
market share unchanged. The firm can exercise this power selectively' 
over rivals by simply threatening to veto any pattern of resource 
allocation which it does not like. Thus a firm can prevent the growth 
of an aggressive firm even though the aggressor may have grown at the 
expense of a third firm. 
Exhibitions of the existence of this power over competitors 
frequently occur in the meetings. Consider the following concern of 
Delta, a carrier whose position at Washington National has been very 
stable and thus has "given up" nothing to those who are expanding. 
DL: I've got som~ numbers I'd like to read off. Postmeeting 
January, 1978, BN had 20. Postmeeting June 1978, BN had 20. 
Then 22, and after the meeting last summer, BN had 24. Now 
with four new carriers, BN asks for 4 more, all in overage hours. 
I don't know whether to say congratulations or shame. I don't 
intend to let BN get away with this. I've got people who ask me 
about slots not being used. I explain that it's a voluntary 
thing, in good will. But it's harder to explain why we don't 
get any. I can't explain how a carrier can go from 20 to 28. 
Iemphasis added] [Appendix B, p. 12 of this report] 
This quotation from Delta is not atypical of concerns carriers 
articulate about the general slot distribution. Frequently during meetings 
carriers will say they will reduce requests only after "others" (often 
named) have done so. Sometimes they are very explicit about who they 
feel should get what. See the discussion Appendix D, p. 55) in which 
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Allegheny, after phoning management (presumably), lists exactly the 
pattern of slot allocation which would induce Allegheny to reduce its 
requests. 
The fact that unanimity gives each carrier a veto over the 
entire pattern of slot allocations has another implication. As was 
noted in Section B of this chapter, carriers have an incentive to 
mask their desire for trades and negotiate bilaterally in circumstances 
which protect them from the surveillance of other members of the committee. 
The rule of unanimity can serve as a vehicle for enforcing such "private 
trades." The problem is that when such "side conversations" take p,lace, 
there is no mechanism which protects the consuming public from deals 
which involve markets and limited competition. 
E. Long Run Growth 
With the committee process the value of a slot does not serve 
as the means and the reward for creating additional airport capacity. 
Instead the slot values are capitalized in the value of the recipient 
carrier companies. If financing for airport capacity increases can 
continue to be supplied through the fiscal syste~ this feature of 
the committee allocation system may not be relevant. If the fiscal 
system fails to provide adequate funds, the committee allocation 
process will provide no stimulus at all for increaSing airport 
capacity. Or, if airport capacity is to be supplied in response 
to the economic demand for that capacity similar to the supply of 
other resources to the industry, then the committee allocation system 
cannot be an adequate mechanism. It will foster no capacity increases 
beyond those which currently exist. 
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F. Process Cost 
In addition to any budget for the Airline Scheduling Committees 
the major cost of the process is in terms of time, transportation, and 
lodging of the airline representatives. The meetings last about a 
and are held twice a year although the time required has been increasing. 
All airlines wanting slots must be present and the carrier representative 
must have a certain level of authority. A full four weeks have been 
required in 1979 and most of this time was used in dealing with O'Hare 
and Washington National. When a large number of airports become 
the process wiil be costly. 
G. Summary 
Existing theory and experience suggest that the decisions of 
the scheduling committees are determined substantially by 
of a committee default. This means that the decisions will be economical~ 
efficient only by accident. It also means that the nature of the 
decisions can change dramatically with a change in the political climate 
of the industry's regulatory environment. 
If this assessment is correct, then the current political 
climate is leading to a committee process which has the following 
tendencfes. (a) The process places a downward pressure on large 
(b) The process prevents the growth of large and medium-sized firms even 
when the economics strongly suggest growth. (c) Entry is allowed 
independent of the efficiency of the entering firm and possibly at the 
expense of more efficient firms. (d) If there are no firms seeking to 
expand operations at the airport or if there are no serious capacity 
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shortages, then the committees can achieve an efficient coordination 
of the time of day allocation of slots. (e) The ability of committees 
to coordinate operations at the system level (the multiairport level) 
is not good. Separate airport committees cannot coordinate operations 
in an interdependent system in a manner which captures any existing 
efficiencies. (f) In addition, the committee decisions are generally 
unresponsive to changing economic circumstances. (g) They also provide 
a forum in which seemingly anticompetitive agreements can be forged and 
enforced. (h) Finally, the committees provide no vehicle at all for 
expanding scarce airport capacity. 
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VI. THE RECOMMENDED PROCESS 
The study of the allocative features of the slot committees 
led naturally to an isolation of various problems which any allocative 
process should solve. The process outlined in this chapter is a first 
approximation of a process which should provide a generally satisfactory 
solution to all the problems. Each feature of the process is designed 
to fill a particular need. As a whole the process seems to have the 
best features of the several component processes. The predominant 
features of the process are as follows: 
a primary market for slots organized as a sealed-bid, 
one-price auction, 
• a computerized aftermarket with "block transaction" 
capabilities, 
special provisions for small communities, 
special prOVlSlons for changes in the definition 
of a "slot," 
provisions requiring that the funds be used for 
expanding airport capacity, 
the possibility of "negative bids" for off-peak 
periods at airports for which a "zero-sum" feature 
is appropriate, 
• sanctions to prevent the "non use" and/or monopolization 
of slots, 
a gradual introduction. 
A. Sealed-Bid, One-Price Auction 
This auction works as follows. Each potential buyer submits 
for each unit desired a bid indicating the maximum price the buyer is 
committed to pay. The bids are then arrayed from highest to lowest. 
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If x units are to be auctioned, then the highest x bids are accepted. 
The price paid by each of the winning bidders is the value of the 
lowest accepted bid. For a slot auction this means that the value 
of a slot will be determined by the least profitable flight. 
A hypothetical example using Washington National should 
the mechanics clear. All slots for, say, a six-month period at Washington 
National would be auctioned several months prior to the use of any 
Such auctions would be held at regular, announced intervals. Each 
carrier wanting a slot at a given time on a given day (say July 17, 
at 1400 hours) would submit a bid. For convenience in the example each 
day is considered separately. 1 The bid could be submitted at a bank, 
a local airport or some computerized facility depending upon convenience, 
cost, etc. 
A bid is a commitment by the carrier to pay a maximum of the 
bid price should it be necessary in order to obtain the slot. Carriers 
desiring more than one slot would submit a separate bid for each slot 
as desired. For example, carrier A might submit a single bid for $450; 
carrier B submits three bids of $3,000, $700, $400; carrier C submits 
two bids of $550 and $425; carrier D submits three bids of $1,500, $500, 
and $350. 
Suppose that the quota for this day and this time were only 
six slots. The bids would be arrayed from highest to lowest (i.e. $3,000, 
$1,500, $700, $550, $500, $450, $425, $400, $350) and the highest six 
1. Alternatively the commodity sold could be a slot at 1400 every 
Thursday for a six-month period. Which method is better (an auction for 
each day separately or an auction for blocks of days) is left open in 
this report. 
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bids would be granted slots at a price of the lowest accepted bid ($450). 
That is, carrier A would get one slot; carrier B would get two; carrier C 
would get one; and carrier D would get two. The price of a slot to each 
of these buyers would be $450. That is, even though carrier B bid $3,000 
it would only pay $450. 
This particular market organization has the feature that the 
optimum bidding strategy is for each buyer to bid the maximum that he/she 
is willing to pay (except possibly for the marginal bids where the 
strategy is sensitive to the information state of the bidder). Naturally 
this maximum is closely related to the profits the flight will generate. 
As a result the economic circumstances are reflected immediately and 
accurately in the market. For carriers it means that the profits from 
their most profitable flights are protected--they will not be dissipated 
for slot acquisitions. The highest bids do not determine price. Price 
is determined by the lowest accepted bid and therefore by the least 
profitable flight in the market. 
A controlled-environment market is used to demonstrate how 
this type of market works. The demand functions for each individual are 
induced by application of induced preference theory. Each individual is 
given a schedule which dictates the terms on which he can redeem for 
dollars~any units purchased. The individual is free to keep as earnings 
the monetary difference between the redemption value and the purchase 
price. Naturally the maximum the individual is willing to pay is the 
redemption value. So the redemption schedule becomes the individual 
demand curve. By controlling the redemption values and conducting the 
auction we can observe the market under a variety of market circumstances. 
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The market was conducted for several periods. The demand 
curve, DD, is drawn in Figure 25 for periods 4, 5, and 6. The bids 
for these periods are the curves bb. As can be seen on the figure, 
the bids are very close to the theoretical prediction. The market 
itself is almost always 100 percent efficient even after parameter 
changes. The price is always exactly the competitive equilibrium 
price. These data are on Table 12. 
The volume going to each participant is almost always the 
socially optimum volume. During this market, the circumstances of 
each individual changed each period even though the market aggregates 
remained constant for some periods. The social optimum volume and 
the actual volume for a typical individual is shown on Table 13. 
As can be seen the actual volume for this individual remains almost 
identical with the social optimum. Individual expansion and 
simply mirrors the underlying economics. 
Unless technical problems are encountered, slot auctions 
should be held on regular (six month) intervals. Each hour of each day 
over the six month period should be treated as a different commodity. 
A separate bid should be submitted for each slot desired. Other 
aspects of the auction organization should be similar to the Treasury 
bill au~tions. Appendix A contains many details. 
B. The After Market 
The sealed-bid auctions can be applied to only one airport 
at a time. In order to facilitate coordination between airports, an 
aftermarket is proposed. In this market, carriers will be able to 
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acquire or sell slots in order to optimize their operations among 
airports. 
Each carrier would register in a central computer the 
maximum (minimum) price it would pay for (sell) a particular slot. 
Contingencies such as block provisions2 should also be listed. Such 
contingencies allow carriers to take advantage of interdependencies 
of operations which occur because of time and size (nonconvexities). 
By simply asking for a "print out" each carrier can see the full 
pattern of offerings at any given time and can activate a transaction 
through the computer (an "open book" feature).3 Many techniques ex~st 
for summarizin& information and allowing participants to be fully 
aware of the state of the market.4 
Markets organized with an open-book feature behave both 
smoothly and efficiently. In order to demonstrate how such a market 
works, participants in an environmentally controlled market were 
given initial endowments of units which they could resell to us . 
according to a given schedule or resell to other participants (who 
could then resell to us according to their own schedules). The 
organization and information was almost exactly the same as the 
proposed computerized market except that bids, offers, and acceptances 
were submitted orally. 
The resulting market demand parameters are shown on Figure 
For the nontechnical reader, viewing this as a demand and supply 
model will cause no problems. Technical readers will note, 
2. A carrier may want to buy (sell) only if it can acquire 
a certain set of slots. 
3. The identity of the carrier making an offer (bid) to sell (buY) 
would not be available to the potential buyers (sellers). 
4-.--Those desiring further details about such a computerized market 
should contact the authors. 
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however, that market demand functions were drawn rather than ~ 
demand functions5 (positive and negative) as a space-saving measure. 
The shape of the latter changes dramatically with changing initial 
endowments and so do the volume predictions but not 
The results of several periods' trading are also in Figure 26. 
As can be seen (in Figure 26) the markets converge to the 
competitive equilibrium price shown by the dotted lines and the efficienci 
is always near 100 percent. When demand shifts upward as in period 
market recovers immediately. When the initial endowments were shifted 
among individuals from period to period beginning in period 15 
in the time series is obvious even though the underlying demand and 
supply was constant. This perturbation creates a situation with 
dramatically changing economic conditions from an individual's (but 
not the system's) point of view. A situation analogous to this would 
prevail if, due to unforeseen events, many carriers found themselves 
with an inappropriate number qf slots in the primary markets. As can 
be seen (in Figure 2~) the price variance goes up but efficiency 
remains constantly near 100 percent. The overall efficiency can be 
seen again on Table 14. Notice that for each individual demand schedule 
the optimum quantity is constant across all periods. The fact that 
quantity purchased for each schedule was almost always the optimum 
(and in particular for the first eight periods) is an expecially clear 
demonstration of the system's efficiency. In each period for the first 
5. An excess demand function is the total quantity an individual 
desires at a price minus the quantity he/she has on hand. It is the 
addition or subtraction that one wishes to make on his/her stock of 
holdings. 
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eight periods a given schedule was held by a different individual. 
That is, the quantity purchased remained optimum for each schedule 
even though in each period a different individual was using it (see 
Table 14). 
C. System Efficiency 
The primary sealed-bid market alone cannot be used to eXDloit 
all the potential efficiencies that can be achieved from coordinating 
operations over time and among airports. The proposed primary markets 
will operate independently from one another so when a carrier bids at 
one airport, it may not know about the number of slots at other 
In this respect the situation is similar to the current policy 
of separate slot committees for each airport. Mistakes by carriers 
inevitable but by participating in an aftermarket they can be corrected. 
If a carrier finds that it has more slots than expected it can recover 
its expenditures by selling the slots in the aftermarket. If it needs 
more slots, it can bid for them. 
All such calculations would be governed by the profitability 
of the least profitable operations. With each trade the system efficiency 
will improve. The demonstration of how this works is reserved for the 
next chapter where the performance of this process is compared with 
committees. 
D. Small Communities 
Many feel that service to small communities will be terminated 
if slots are allocated by a market process. Markets can be organized in 
ways which will prevent this from happening. 
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For each airport we recommend the establishment of·a restricted 
for small communities. A restricted market is one in which only 
with special status can participate. In this case the special 
would be based upon the origin or destination of the flight 
(geographic region and/or city size). The passenger classification of 
the aircraft (commuter, general aviation, etc.) or the size of the 
aircraft are also possibilities. Regardless of the ultimate definitions 
(which are beyond the scope of this study) the technology exists (through 
the reservation system for runway access) for keeping all markets 
separate and maintaining price differences. 
The market organization should be exactly like that for 
scheduled airlines. The primary market shOUld be a sealed-bid, one-price 
auction. The secondary market should be computerized with the "open book" 
provision. This policy has substantial advantages in that the market 
institutions, facilities, etc. can be shared with the larger market. 
The advantage to small communities can be controlled in the 
same way it is now--by adjustments in the share of slots which are 
allocated to the "small community" market. The price differences between 
the markets and the pattern of bids can be used to assess accurately 
future policies regarding small communities (e.g. the consequences of 
increaSing or decreasing the small community share of slots, changing 
the definitions of special status, etc.). 
A final comment is in order about markets, small communities, 
and the types of comparisons which must be made. A general belief 
exists that in a market the price of slots will be bid up by the higher 
density routes and service to small communities will be squeezed out. 
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This can clearly happen but in assessing its likelihood two a9pects 
must be kept in mind. First, for a small city to lose its service into, 
say, ORO the most profitable service that could be scheduled from the 
small city to ORO must be less profitable than the least profitable 
services along the higher density routes which may have acquired the 
additional services. The relevant statistics are the profits from the 
marginal flights and not the average profits over city pairs. Secondly, 
in the deregulated environments, rates can be adjusted to reflect higher 
costs per passenger. Since demand elasticity from small cities is 
likely to be low, it is riot at all clear that they will lose in a 
market competition for slots. 
E. Slot Definitions 
Certain types of aircraft use more "capacity" than do other 
aircraft. An increase in the percentage of "heavies
u for example can 
result in a loss of airport capacity.6 In some instances modification 
Vortex of the aircraft itself might reduce its pressure on capacity. 
alleviation at the source and noise abatement at the source are both 
within the range of engineering reality. 
A proper system of capacity allocation should provide 
for those aircraft modifications which would in turn result in a more 
intensive and economical use of existing capacity. The definition 
of a "slot" and/or the number of slots necessary to perform certain 
"operations" are instruments through which such incentives can be 
6. "New Engineering and Development Initiatives -- Policy and 
Technological Choices," vol. 1, U. S. Department of Transportation, 
March 1, 1979, p. 133. 
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created. Operations having characteristics which place disproportional 
demands on capacity should require more "slots" than other operations. 
Aircrafts, for example, which contribute significantly to binding noise 
constraints (that is, noise is the reason for limitations on movements) 
should require more slots than those that do not. Carriers facing the 
higher (slot) cost for operating aircraft with properties that are 
"capacity using" have an incentive to modify the aircraft and conserve 
"capacity." In doing so the capacity constraints will be partially 
relieved. 
Any attempt to actually provide the appropriate definitions 
or statement of policy regarding slot definitions would go far beyond 
the scope of this study. The appropriate definitions could vary 
among airports, thereby reflecting their individual capacity problems. 
The definitions may also change over time as measuring and monitoring 
devices are developed. The key idea is simple enough however. If 
carriers can modify their aircraft and/or operations so that less 
capacity is used, they should be rewarded for doing so. 
F. Disposition of Funds 
Funds generated by the sale of slots should be used to defray 
the cost of removing the binding airport capacity constraints. Many 
possibilities exist7 including the establishment of satellite airports 
but almost all of them require funding. The sale of slots provides 
a natural and economically efficient way of recovering the costs. 
The importance of this "use of funds" provision needs to be 
7. Ibid. 
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emphasized. The agents who receive the funds might be able to act 
as monopolists, restricting capacity in order to drive up the price 
of slots. The agent could then enjoy the benefits of the revenues 
by diverting them to other uses. Such behavior would substantially Price 
hamper the efficiency gains from the policy proposed here. D NEGATIVE AUCTION (YELLOW): Period 7 Demand Function and Bids 1.50 
In the event that that the funds cannot be used to expand 
capacity, they should be used to encourage offpeak traffic. This can 
be done through a "negative" lottery of the sealed-bid, one-price type. 
1.00 
Carriers can be allowed to bid negatively, thereby indicating the 
subsidy it would take to entice them to provide offpeak services. 
Even though the wording is a little awkward this process is no different 
from a sealed ~ process whereby the carriers are simply indicating 
the price at which they would be willing to provide the offpeak service. 
All carriers operating at a subsidized hour would receive a subsidy 
equal to the lowest accepted (negative) bid. The number of bids -0.20 
accepted would be governed by the available funds. -0.40 
-0.50 
A controlled environment market was conducted to demonstrate 
-0.60 
-0.70 
how such markets work. The demand function for units is shown on 
-0.80 
Figures 27-30 as DD. Wherever the function is negative the unit can 
-1.00 
be acquired at a loss. The analog for an airport is that the slot 
could only be used at a loss to the carrier. As shown on the figure 
the bids represented as the curve bb (for the tenth period) approach 
-1.50 
the demand function (the optimum strategy is still to bid the maximum). 
A time series for this auction is on Table 15. Prices are as predicted 
D 
and the efficiency is near 100 percent every period. Such markets work 
very smoothly indeed. 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Fioure 27 
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Price 
D Price 
NEGATIVE AUCTION (YELLOW): 
Period 8 Demand Function and Bids 1.50 
1.50 
D WEGATIVE AUCTION (YELLOW): Period 9 Demand Function And Bids 
b 
1.00 
1.00 
, 
-< I 
i 
I 
I 
0.00 + .....,......, I J 0.00 r 
~ L.! , -0.20 ~ 
-C.20 4 
~ I -C.40 I 1 -C.50 -0.40 --C.60 -C.50 -C.70 -0.60 -0.80 
-0.70 
-0.8-
-1.00 t 
-1.00 
-1.50 
b 
-1.50 b 
D 
10 15 20 25 JO 35 
Figure 28 10 15 20 25 JO 35 40 Js .-.----~. 
Figure 29 
Price 
D 
BEGATIVE AUCTION (YELLOW): 
Period 10 Demand Function and Bids 
b 
D 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
Figure 30 
TABLE 15 
NEGATIVE BID AUCTION 
Period 7a 8 9 10 
Theoretical Price 0 
-$.40 -$.40 
-$.40 
Actual Price 0 
-$.50 -$.41 
-$.40 
Efficiency n.a .. 87.6%b 94.s%b 98.6% 
a. In period 7, no negative bids were permitted. 
Since excess supply existed, the theoretical 
price· was zero. 
b~ These efficiencies are corrected for one 
individual who treated his negative redemption 
values as though they were positive. 
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Subsidized offpeak operations will operate through 
to lower the price to airline customers. As prices for peak periods 
are edged upward because of the slot price, and offpeak prices are 
lowered because of the subsidy, customers are encouraged to switch to 
the offpeak flights. This process will help "smooth" the demand 
throughout the day. 
The advantages of the negative auction are the same as with 
any efficient market process. The only major difference is that with 
the negative auction a very precise 'definition must be provided for 
exactly what types of service qualify for subsidy. For example, the 
funds might be used to subsidize only flights considered desirable 
during the offpeak periods. With this qualification, competition 
assures that the operations so purchased are the least costly possible 
and that, given the expenditures, the maximum possible shifts to offpeak 
hours are thereby achieved; 
G. Antimonopoly Policies 
It is difficult to see how a carrier might successfully 
an auction process to monopolize an airport. Even collusion 
in an auction since neither winners nor bids are announced. In the 
aftermarket neither the buyer nor the seller of a slot needs to know 
the identity of the other. Monopoly is especially difficult since the 
act of driving up slot prices to prevent competition necessarily uses 
up all the presumed monopoly profits. Furthermore, the funds would be 
destined for capacity expansion which would further undermine any 
monopolistic tendencies. 
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Nevertheless monopolistic tendencies should be rather easy 
to spot. Monopolies are effective because they withhold supply. In 
the case of airports this could only mean that large proportions of 
slots go unused or that they are used for operations which do not 
involve many passengers. Under monopoly, revenues from several of the 
operations would not cover the price paid for slots. We suggest the 
addition of a nonuse provision whereby slots acquired in any substantial 
number must be either "used" or offered on the aftermarket. Surveillance 
in the future could then be the responsibility of the appropriate 
authority. 
H. Implementation 
The transition to a market system should not be too abrupt. 
A market for slots will probably induce some changes in accounting and 
management practices. The market system is likely to have some "bugs" 
at first. However, after the "bugs" are worked out of the system and 
after firms have had an opportunity to assess any schedule changes, 
there is no need for delay. Firms for the first market should be 
allocated some reasonably large fraction (say, two-thirds or three-fourths) 
of their historical shares of slots. This means that the remainder of 
the total slots will be auctioned. For the next auction (six months 
later) firms should be allocated a smaller portion of their historical 
shares with the remainder of the slots being auctioned. This process 
should continue in a timely manner until all slots are auctioned. 
Summary 
The major features of the recommended process are summarized 
in the introductory remarks of this chapter. The process is well 
to meet all the social and economic criteria 
allocation process. Entry, exit, capacity growth, the 
of small communities, etc. will be handled in a smooth 
This judgment is backed by a great deal of experience and with 
environment markets, and with very complicated markets such as the 
Treasury bill market. Aswillbe discussed in the next chapter the 
recommended process is preferable to committees on every criteria. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE RECOMMENDED PROCESS AND COMMITTEES: 
COMPARISON IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT 
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VII. THE RECOMMENDED PROCESS AND COMMITTEES: COMPARISON IN A CONTROLLED 
ENVIRONMENT 
In order to explore the behavioral differences and similarities 
between the recommended process and processes based on the slot committee 
procedures~ a special series of controlled environment committees and 
markets were designed. Participants were, primarily, employed adults 
with advanced degrees in physics, engineering, and aeronautics. Many 
were completing work for the PhD degree from Caltech. All were experi-
enced with the institutional structures of controlled environment 
processes. They viewed participation as a job and as an opportunity 
to earn additional money. 
The format was essentially as was introduced previously in the 
section on committees. Demand for a resource was induced by application 
of induced preference theory. The resources were called cards (blue, 
pink, and green) and flags (blue, pink, and green). This terminology 
was chosen because of its neutrality and brevity. The terms used are 
of minor consequence as long as the accepted conventions for this type of 
demonstration are satisfied. 1 
The analogies to the slot problem are clear enough. Cards of 
different color are analogous to slots at different times of day at 
a given ~irport. Flags are analogous to a different airport. In many 
respects O'Hare and National peak hours were used as a model. Size 
distributions of participants, demand elasticities are all similar up 
to scale factors. An attempt to stay completely consistent, however, 
1. Smith, Vernon L. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value 
Theory. American Economic Review 66 (May 1976):274-79. 
was aborted because of both lack of information about profit <details 
and the necessary expense of any attempt to stay completely consistent. 
The market demand functions for cards are represented on 
Figure 31. The market demand functions for flags cannot be drawn 
without some assumption about the distribution of cards because of 
an interdependency incorporated in the design. For each participant 
the value of flags depends upon the number of cards. (This is similar 
to the dependence of slot values at one airport upon the availability 
of slots at other airports.) On the assumption that ea~h participant 
has the system efficient number of cards the demand functions for ftags 
are on Figure 32. 
The supplies of cards were 10, 9, 9 for blue, pink, and green 
respectively. The corresponding supplies of flags were 10, 11, 11 
respectively. As shown on the figure these should be allocated to 
participants with the highest values. 
Allocation of cards and flags was done twice through markets 
and twice through committees using the same pool of subjects. In the 
text we fully report the results of only one of the markets because a 
clerical error resulted in the sale of three extra flags in the other 
market. As a result the data are not readily comparable. The overall 
efficiencies are comparable however and are almost identical (as are 
other aspects after the proper adjustments are made). The data from 
second market are in Appendix E. 
Generally the results are consistent with all the discussions 
above. Market prices are dictated by the least profitable units. The 
model predicted prices of $4.79, $4.37, $4.36 for different colored 
cards and the actual average prices were $4.61, $4.43, $4.50 respectively. 
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For flags the predictions were $4.79, $4.32, $4.34 and the actual averages 
were respectively $4.73, $4.05, $4.30. The number of slots obtained 
by each individual was that dictated by economic efficiency. The 
historical allocation was irrelevant as those who should expand did 
so and those who should contract got smaller. In committees on the 
other hand the default values essentially determine the results with 
large and medium-sized participants' experiencing no expansion and 
entrants receiving only a minimal number of slots. The pattern was 
consistent with all other experience and theories about how such 
committees operate. 
The committee p~ocess managed to extract many of the gains 
from exchanging away from the unprofitable distributions which existed 
with the initial allocations. Again these results are consistent with 
tho,se reported above for groups that do not default. The work of "third 
parties" on bilateral negotiations was evident. In order to see this 
improvement here, we need only compare the efficiency of default for 
the two committees which is 71.4 percent and 25.8 percent, respectively 
with the efficiency of the final resolutions .which is 82.4 percent'on 
the first committee and 84.9 percent on the second reported committee. 
The comparative results are on Table 16. From a system 
efficiency point of view the markets were 99.5 percent of maximum 
efficiency. The differences lie primarily in the inability of the 
committee process to deal with system interdependencies and the relative 
efficiency of adjustment of slots among different participants. 
The system problem can also be seen with the data on Table 16. 
The value of flags depends critically upon the number of cards obtained. 
TAllLE 16 
COMPARISON OF TWO ALLOCATION PROCEDURES 
WITH IDENTICAL ECONOMIC PARAMETERS 
Unanimity Committeeg* Market Process"'* 
Efficiency 
Number of Persons 
on Wrong Flag Chart 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Total 28 
Exp. 23 
82.4% 
1 
32 28 
Exp. 24 No.2 
84.9% 99.5% 
32 28 32 28 32 
*These two committees operated with a rule in 'W'hich default meant that 
payments were based on the initial allocation. In experiment 23, the initial 
allocation was Pareto optimal with respect to "sliding"; that is. no two 
persons could exchange slots in their initial allocation and both be better 
o 
" 
'" 
off. In experiment 24, Pareto optimality did not hold for the initial allocation. 
**Thls process consisted of six competitive auctions (one for cards and 
flags of each color) followed by six secondary markets. In process no. 1, an 
administrative error resulted in 35 rather than 32 flags being sold. The efficiencY 
results are corrected for this error. ' 
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In both of the committees eight out of fourteen committee members 
received a number of cards which placed them on the "wrong" flag 
chart. (In practice, the participants used one of two "flag" 
payoff charts depending on the number of "cards" received. Table 16 
exhibits the number of persons whose "card" outcome put them on the 
"wrong" or system inefficient flag chart.) For the markets the total 
number of "errors" was only two. 
As can be seen, markets allocate slots almost perfectly. 
The committee choices are not governed by the economics; they are 
controlled almost entirely by the consequences of default. Those 
with large and medium-sized initial e"ndowments who should expand do 
not and those who should contract substantially do so only marginally. 
Entrants who should get many slots get only a few and those who should 
get none also get a few. 
Summary 
On all economic criteria the committee process is inferior 
to the recommended process. From the carrier point of view, however, 
the committee process might be preferable. A resource which they have 
been receiving free would become costly under the recommended process. 
Even t?ough this cost would ultimately be passed along to the users of 
carrier services, no doubt the adjustment "period could involve some 
lowering of profits. Carriers which perceive themselves as having a 
strong political base may also prefer the committee process as might 
carriers who perceive themselves as being marginal (from a cost point 
of view) within the industry. 
On the other hand large and medium-sized companies will 
very little opportunity for expansion under committees. Entrants 
little chance of growing beyond the low or medium-sized range. 
more the committee process affords no natural pressures 
of airport capacity as does the recommended alternative. So, the 
recommended process may not be totally without carrier support. 
CHAPTER VIII 
COMMENTS ON ALTERNATIVE CLASSES OF PROCESSES 
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COMMENTS ON ALTERNATIVE CLASSES OF PROCESSES 
Aside from the problem of small communities which requires 
treatment regardless of the process, there are only two key 
considerations involved with the evaluation. The other aspects of 
efficiency follow from these. Slots must go to their most economical 
use and the funds should be used to relax capacity constraints. 
Landing fees if properly administered would satisfy both 
broad criteria. In fact if landing fees were properly administered, 
the resulting price pattern and allocation would be almost exactl 
. the same as that of the recommended process above. From an economic's 
point of view the problem is formally identical to the peak-load and 
capacity-charges problem found in electricity generation. 
In practice, however, landing fees have not been administered 
to reflect demands and Uses of capacity. There seems to be two reasons. 
First, the politics of the fee-setting process results in fees that are 
too low. If fees were properly set, they would be sufficiently high to 
discourage some users and bring the demand for capacity in line with 
existing supplies.
l 
The funds generated by the fees would be used 
to expand capacity to the point of demand and supply balance. We are 
unaware of a single airport for which such a fee policy has been implemented. 
The second problem is related to airport knowledge about 
demand. Traditionally airports have not been aggressively engaged in 
selling slots (a slot fee) and are unaware of the structure of demand. 
The auction process precludes the necessity for developing such a 
marketing orientation. The proper fee will be automatically set. 
1. In the final period of the market represented on Table 12 
an optimum fee was imposed. The resulting volume was exactly that predicted 
to the competitive model and id~ntical to that of the sealed-bid auction. 
The first basic tenet of efficiency will be met in part by 
almost any primary process for allocating slots as long as there is 
an effective secondary process. If landing fees are set too low, for 
example, there is a problem similar to the existing allocation problem 
of allocation among those who wish to purchase at the low price. If 
those who successfully acquire slots can then resell them in a 
properly organized secondary market, the slots will ultimately find 
their way into the proper hands. 
The basic problems with a policy of low fees with an after-
market are similar to the problems with other alternatives. There are 
three different problems. The first is the obvious problem involving 
transactions costs and middlemen. If the slots were initially sold 
to the ultimate recipients, some costs of resale could be saved. If 
they are not, then every intervening party takes a profit cut which can 
discourage marginal final users. The second problem is also related 
to the fact that the initial recipients of slots can obtain a profit 
upon resale. This profit amounts to a rent which is capitalized in the 
value of the original company. Such rents can serve to attract firms 
to the industry and retain firms within the industry that should not 
be there. The final problem is perhaps the most serious. The value 
of a slot_derives from capacity resource scarcity but the funds generated 
by slots are not applied to increase the capacity. 
The same mode of reasoning applies to several other allocation 
methods. A "grandfather" policy with resale possibilities is economically 
similar to a policy of very low fees coupled with an airport allocation 
method based upon historical shares. Without an aftermarket neither 
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policy would capture efficiencies due to differing carrier capabilities. 
With an aftermarket efficiency would be increased but the funds would 
not be used to promote capacity expansion. There is an additional 
problem here in that the grandfathering of slots would institutionalize 
the potential control that certain carriers might have over a market. 
The basic set of carriers might remain unchanged for long periods. 
Many widely accepted theories maintain that this type of arrangement 
can induce a "parallelism of auction" inconsistent with the operations 
of a competitive market. By refusing to sell their slots the firms 
could ensure themselves against any entrants whose presence might not 
be conducive tQ cooperative behavior. 
Some criticisms of the low landing-fees option apply equally 
to lotteries. The funds will not be available for capacity expansion. 
Rents from slots may encourage the entry of inefficient firms. Those 
eligible for a lottery must be well defined and the definition itself 
should not prevent entry. The aftermarket from a lottery will probably 
be "uneven." A check of periods 14 through 18 on Figure 26 demonstrate the 
effect (under constant demand conditions) of rotating the endowment of 
slots among participants. The markets remain efficient but price variance 
increases substantially.2 Lotteries do have one advantage over low 
landing fees and grandfathering. Entrants have substantial opportunity 
with the lottery. There is little possibility that a few firms could 
use slots to insulate and protect a collusive arrangement. 
The final institutions examined were various types of auctions. 
2. The problem is probably because of the variance of seller 
strategies and the inability of buyers and sellers to separate underlying 
parametric changes (which would affect their own decision rules) from 
"noise." As a result price equilibrium is much slower if it exists at all. 
Oral auctions (such as the commodities market) were viewed as too 
If slot "packages" (consisting of a right to conduct an operation 
specified days for a six-month period) were auctioned, an oral auction 
for all periods could be conducted simultaneously for a day or so. 
would reduce the cost considerably. In general, however, oral auctions 
can "expose" the buyers to high prices in a way the airlines fear. 3 
Since no advantages of these auctions over sealed-bid auctions were 
visible and some disadvantages seemed to emerge, this 
was not pursued. 
The recommended auction is a sealed-bid, one-price auction. 
An alternative institution (used by the United States Treasury) is the 
discriminative auction. The mechanics are the same except that in the 
discriminative case each accepted bid is accepted at a price equal to 
the bid itself as opposed to the lowest accepted bid. Thus, if 
bids high in order to assure a slot for a profitable flight, it pays a 
higher price. 
Bidding strategy with this institution is considerably more 
complicated than with the one-price auction. Carriers would have an 
incentive to bid at a rate lower than the value of the slot. Whether 
or not this strategy results in higher payments on average than would 
have been the case with the one-price. auction depends upon the 
of demand for slots and the degree of stability of demand. 
As inelasticity of demand and uncertainty about the state of 
market demand increase, the revenues (average price) generated from 
the discriminative auction increase relative to the one-price auction. 
3. See the discussion that follows and the discussion in the 
summary chapter. 
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Under very stable conditions the revenue generated from the discriminative 
auction approaches that generated by the one-price auction. Figures 33 
and 34 illustrate the behavior of the discriminative auction relative to 
a one-price auction. The actual market demands are on Figure 33 and the 
results of some controlled environment markets in which these demands 
existed are on Figure 34. As was demonstrated above the price in the 
one-price auction is almost always equal to the competitive equilibrium 
price. This price is deSignated as the "equilibrium" price. It changes 
from period to period in response to demand shifts (Figure 34). The 
average price which resulted from the discriminative auction is designated 
by the curve Pd' As is shown there the average price (and thus total 
receipts) in the discriminative auction are almost always greater in the 
discriminative auction. For demand curves with these shapes (compare 
with the figures in Chapter IX) this will almost always be the case. 
In addition the discriminative auction tends to be a little less efficient. 
Since the discriminative auction results in different prices for different 
routes, it might also have more·subtle inefficiencies which stem from 
this source in addition to those which result from the market operations 
alone. Because of these efficiency questions and because of the continuity 
of the one-price auction into the negative auction case, the research was 
not centered on the discriminative institutions. 
Summary 
The other options listed in this section all seem to have several 
disadvantages. Optimally set landing fees with resale rights would have the 
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requisite properties but the best way to set the fees would be 
Among the other nonauction options, the lottery with, say, a 
aftermarket would have the fewest problems. But such a policy 
shortcomings as outlined above. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
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SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
In the course of the study several questions have surfaced 
that are not addressed elsewhere. These are listed here and are 
to the extent that answers are currently available. 
A. What Will Be the Price of a Slot? 
Considerable speculation exists about the potential price 
of a slot. Frequently the speculation is based upon assumptions about 
the market organization which differ substantially from that proposed 
here. Consider the following quote taken from the trade press: 
With all due respect to the virtues of the marketplace, it 
was never designed to deal with something like an airport 
slot; i.e. a scarce resource, of a critically essential 
narure and available only from a single source of supply. 
Considering that $20-million vehicles can be useless without 
access to the right airport at the right time, the bidding 
for airport slots could be driven to ridiculous extremes.1 
The concerns expressed in this quote might be justifi~i if 
the auction were a discriminative sealed-bid auction (see the discussion 
in Chapter VIII), or perhaps a unit by unit oral Dutch auction. Or, the 
concerns might be justified if no controls existed on the use of funds, 
so those receiving the funds might be free to behave as monopolists and 
further restrict capacity. However, the process recommended above behaves 
entirely differently as is easily de~onstrable. In fact, the institutions 
were designed specifically to avoid these problems and several others 
which could result from an inappropriately organized market. 
If the one-price, sealed-bid auction is used the price will 
be closely approximated by the average profitability of the least 
1. Melvin A. Brenner, "De-Regulation Creates Airport Crunch~" 
Airline Executive, (June, 1979): 22-23. 
IX-2 
profitable flights that are currently being maintained voluntarily by 
carriers. While estimating the value of a slot goes well beyond the 
scope of this study, calculations were made based upon data supplied 
by the Financial and Cost Analysis Division, Office of Economic AnalYSis 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board. These estimates should be treated with 
extreme caution as they are based upon assumptions about 
of joint costs, (2) the alternative opportunities for an airplane day, 
(3) the shift in demand as a result of airline deregulation, and (4) the 
nature of the inefficiencies generated by the slot committee allocation 
process. A more detailed description of the data is in Appendix (i. 
Since most fears seem to be that the price of slots will be 
"too high" we chose to make liberal assumptions about profits with a 
clear upward bias so we could obtain an "upper bound" on the likely price 
resulting from a one-price auction. A peak hour (1700-1759) was chosen 
for August (a peak month) and for February (an offpeak month). !tthe 
data were taken without adjustment, the price of slots would be zero. 
Marginal flights are not profitable even with the very charitable 
calculations. We suspect that this reflects in large part the ineffic 
of the committee process. If we assume that a demand shift (as a 
deregulation and open entry) involves a 100 percent (50 percent) 
increase, then the August slot price would be less than $1126 ($650) and 
the February slot price would be less than $639 ($322) according to this 
model. Calculations were made using conservative profit estimates. 
These are shown on Figures 35 and 36 along with the more liberal 
profitability derivations. The lower bound estimates are $361 and $238 
SLOT VALUE ESTIMATE 
August: 1700-.l759 
Washington National AirpqTt 
25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 35 
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respectively.2 Translated into passenger fares these figures imply 
peak period increases of $10.50 per passenger for the highest estimates 
and $5 to $7 increases for the lower estimates. 
If there are no subsidies and if all slot funds are diverted 
to capacity increase, then the price of a slot should ultimately grow 
to the marginal capacity cost for capacity expansion. While we know 
of no estimates, we suspect the number will vary widely among airports 
depending upon the nature of constraints which limit capacity. 
B. Uncertainty 
If slots are to be sold a new dimension of uncertainty is 
injected into the system which replaces some old uncertainties. Will 
there be uncertainty about the price of a slot and what will be its 
effects? 
No doubt there will be some variability in the value of slots. 
In fact the value of slots should mirror the demand and supply conditions 
for air transportation. When profits "are high (demand for air transport 
is high and/or costs are low), the price of slots will be higher than 
otherwise. This might have implications for both airlines and airports. 
The implications for airlines are minimal. These firms are 
accustomed to dealing with uncertainties of resource prices. The slot 
value is no different. Besides, from all indications the cost will be 
small relative to other costs of operation. In any case they can 
clearly estimate slot prices if they can estimate competitors' profits. 
2. The difference between the upper bound estimates and the lower 
bound estimates provide some margin for errors about profitability 
calculations. 
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The profits of the least profitable flight will determine slot prices. 
For airports the uncertainty is a slightly different matter. 
The sale of slots might well mean that airports will ultimately alter 
their methods of finance somewhat. To the extent however that current 
airport financing is tied to carrier profits, the uncertainty aspect 
should be no greater than that which exists now. If carrier economic 
positions are stable, the slot price and the revenues generated by 
each carrier source will be stable for the airport. If carrier profits 
go up so will revenues thereby signaling the airport that capacity 
expansion may be necessary. Falling slot revenues may well mean that 
some of the existing capacity should be retired. The point is that 
while uncertainty may be a nuisance the swings can be an important 
indicator for what airport policy should be. In this respect airports 
seem to be no different from any other industry. 
C. Mixed System: Markets and Other Methods 
What might be the consequences of markets at some airportS 
and committees or first come, first serve at others? The mix of systems 
causes no problems. If slot prices are high at one airport, 
will be diverted from airports controlled by committees when the airport 
is at capacity. Or, some flights will be diverted from "first come, 
first serve" because of the cost of delay when the system is at capacity. 
The cost of delay is analogous to the cost of a slot. Delay costs, 
like slot values, are zero when there is excess capacity. The major 
a~tference is thaL Lne slot values can be used to increase capacity 
while costs due to delay are lost. 
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The point is that a system which mixes markets at some 
airports and alternative allocation methods at other airports can 
function without some type of fundamental fault. The mix of systems 
causes no independent problems. 
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x. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Having studied the slot committees and a variety of other 
processes for allocatirig slots we recommend a process with the following 
features: 
a primary market for slots organized as a sealed-bid, 
one-price auction, 
• a computerized aftermarket with "block transaction" 
capabilities and an "open book." 
special provisions for small communities, 
special provisions for changes in the definition 
of a "slot," 
provisions requiring that the funds be used for 
expanding airport capacity, 
the possibility of "negative bids" for off-peak 
periods at airports for which a "zero-sum" feature 
is appropriate, 
sanctions to prevent the "non use" and/or monopolization 
of slots, 
a gradual introduction. 
The process is fair, efficient in every dimension, and 
generally meets the goals of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 
The existing slot committee process is well suited for 
airports whi~h have no major capacity constraint. However, experience 
at existing slotted airports (notably O'Hare and National), and 
experience with committees operating in a controlled environment 
suggest that the reliance on slot committees in the future will foster 
many undesirable tendencies. 
The committee decisions will always be heavily influenced 
by the consequences of a committee default. Within the current regulatory 
X-2 
climate this means that large and medium-sized carriers cannot 
Entrants will get in but entry and growth will be unrelated to 
efficiency. What will be the state of future political environments 
is more difficult to say. If, however, carriers were ever assured 
that a committee default would result in an allocation strongly based 
on historical shares, then the committees would become an effective 
barrier to entry and new competition. In addition to the problem of 
entry and growth the committees provide a possible forum for the 
forging and enforcement of anticompetitive agreements. 
As the system grows the committees .. 1'111 have two further 
defects. First, the committees allocating process provides no funds 
for capacity ·expansion as do certain market processes. Secondly, the 
committee processes are incapable of efficiently anticipating the 
interdependencies which are inherent in a complicated system of inter-
related airports. From a "systems" point of view the committees' are 
inefficient and will result in higher prices to the airline customers. 
In comparison the proposed market process is an improvement 
over the committee process in every economic dimension. If the 
recommended process is not implemented, then we suggest a lottery 
with an aftermarket. This option seems inferior to the recommended 
process but it is preferred to the committee process in almost all 
economic dimensions. 
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING AIRPORT SLOTS: 
PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 
APPENDICES 
David M. Grether 
R. Mark Isaac 
Charles R. Plott 
(J) 
z 0 
H
 
8 U 
.0: 
~ i>i 
X
 
"" 
H
 
D
 
0 
(J) 
Z 
.0: 
[ii 
fll 
p., 
~ 
8 Z 0 (J) 
[ii 
8 0 Z 
APPENDIX A: NOTES ON TREASURY AUCTIONS 
There already exists a functioning, nationwide auction 
process: the securities auctions of the U.S. Treasury. There .are 
certain aspects of the mechanics of this process which are discussed 
in this appendix because they can provide some insight as to how slot 
auctions could be operated. 
First, it is possible to develop a regular schedule of 
periodic auctions which participants find comfortable. The Treasury 
Department formally announces each auction; however, the weekly cycle 
of the Treasury bill offerings is an historical pattern to which the 
financial markets have easily adapted. 
Secondly, it is not necessary for the entity offering 
commodities for sale actually to conduct the auction. The mechanics 
of U.S. securities auctions are handled by the Federal Reserve System 
as the agent for the U.S. Treasury (which has final rights in making 
the awards). 
Thirdly, bids may be placed at points widely dispersed from 
the central point of sale of the commodities. In the Treasury auctions, 
bids m~ be placed not only in Washington but also at more than thirty 
locations (Federal Reserve banks and branches) throughout the country. 
In any allocation process, one might expect to have to 
address the problem of potential noncompetitive behavior by participants. 
The U.S. Treasury has no special delegated antitrust authority. It 
would rely on the existing antitrust statutes and enforcement 
agencies if necessary to confront potentially collusive behavior. 
(However, the Treasury has recently modified its regulations so as 
to limit to 25 percent the amount of any public offering awarded to 
a single buyer.) 
2 
Finally, however, there is one potential problem, breach 
of purchase by a winning bidder, which is addressed by the Treasury 
in a manner which mayor may not be applicable to slot auctions. The 
institution used by the Treasury is naturally suited to the role of 
the Federal Reserve as auction agent: ordinary bidders are required 
to place a deposit on bids. However, the deposits are waived for 
banks, recognized securities dealers, or persons whose bids are 
guaranteed by a bank. This is a rather natural approach, as the 
guarantors, incorporated banks, are members of and/or have extensive 
dealings with the auction agent (the Federal Reserve). 
APPENDIX B 
TRANSCRIPT OF SLOT COMMITTEE, APRIL 1979 
To: Ruth Bell and Charlie Plott 
From: Ira Leibowitz 
Subject: AIR CARRIER DCA SLOT MEE'!.lNG, APRIL 17-19, 1979 
The scheduling committee meeting to distribute slots at 
Washington's National Airport began at 1:30 PM April 17 at. the head-
quarters of the Air Transport Association, 1709 New York Avenue, 
Washington, DC. It lasted until 6:00 PM that day. The next day if 
reconvened at the Sheraton Hotel in Reston, Va. at 8:30 AM, lasting 
until 5:40 PM. The following day, April 19, it again convened at the 
Sheraton, and finally broke up at 3:ltO PM. Present were Nestor Pylypec, 
Chairman of the Airline Scheduling Committees; Walter S. Coleman, Director 
of the Airline Reservation Center; George Lapham, General Counsel of the 
ATA; Haggie Crittenden, an employee of the Reservation Center; representa-
tives of every carrier serving or allowed to serve DCA except United and 
Federal Express; and representatives of the Department of Justice, the 
FAA, and myself representing the Board. 
I attempted to transcribe verbatim the di8£ussion that took 
place over these three days. I believe I was largely successful: 
However 1 I did miss portions of the session when the pace of the give-
and-take WilS beyond my capacity to take notes. This tended to happen 
when debate heated up and charges and countercharges were exchanged. In 
addilioH, this tHlilscrlption cannot account for the tone antI tenor of 
the discussions, the pauses and silences (often lengthy), and the 
whispered side discussions and working lunches "here options were 
explored and where many of the deals were apparently hammered out. What 
I give you is the best recording I could make of what 1 directly observed. 
At tachrnent 
Ira Leibowitz 
Attorney 
Competition and Maintenance Division 
Pylypec: 
Lapham: 
This i.s a special meeting of tbe 'daabington 
ing Committee. I see some new faces. The Executive 
Vice President and the President and Chief Exe .... tive 
Officer of ATA are in back of the rootl. ' 
I would like to disucss some irrelevant things. 
This is a. special meeting, held because of the new 
authorizations to Washington which came about at the 
close of the last joint meeting. Several neW' carriers 
have come in. Their submissions are formidable. We 
took it upon ourselves to explore with the FAA the 
possibility of interim relief. Those who attended 
Uie joint lIeeting recall the discuasion regarding 
the changing of rules. It's those disCUssions which 
are irrelevant. We've met with the FAA and told 
them of the substantial burden we bear. We explored 
suggestions, especially in light of tbe O'Hare 
situation. We asked them, "WOUld you be susceptible 
to granting interim relief?" We stressed 'interim', 
pending final resolution of the issues. Carriers 
opet'atins 8mall equipment - would they consent to 
an Air Wisconsin-type of exemption, we !!Isked. An 
exemption was granted them for three meetings last-
ing 18 months -- giving them an air taxi exemption -
they would take their chances in air taxi, and- air 
carrier quotas. Air Wisconsin came into the O'Hare 
meeting on the third or fourth day, and after creat-
ing quite a stir at the outset. We asked the FAA 
for an exemption for the others ... We Bot a re8ou~d­
ing "no." This is becsuse air taxis now stand on 
line for quotas - there has been pressure frotl 
powerful Senators to do something about it. FAA 
wouldn't hear of an Air Wisconsin-type of exemption 
at DCA. We suggested transfer on u short-term baais 
of slots from the general aviation category - we 
also got "8 resounding no. Reference vas then made 
to the FAA policy statement on DCA. 
We then asked for II raise In the air taxi slot 
allocation from 8 to 12, coupled with an Air 
W~scon51n-type of exemption, but we got no better 
answer. FAA said they would have extreme difficul-
ties raising the capacity of DCA, when they're on 
record as favoring reducing it. Adding into it the 
environmental impact statement required, the interim 
relief sought could not be granted. 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
WA: 
UR!Empire] 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
Coleman: 
N8: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
NB: 
Pylypec: 
EA': 
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We discussed the FAA memo to DOT which was the subject 
of the Daily story. ATA participated in those meetings. 
We asked if there was anything behind the star"" We 
were told yes, and that the policy stated is true and 
a "deeply held" view of the Adm:tnistration, and on a 
very tight timetable. They 'Would call for a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking in a month, contemplating a 
final tule by September 1. Every effort will be made 
to adhere to this tirretable. 
I fear the FAA would assign slots on an arbitrary 
basis·, which no one would agree with, if the meeting 
here doesn't solve the question. But it will be 
difficult. FAA will retain the quota for now, 
and accept planes on a first-come, first-serve basis. 
But if the plane doesn't come in within the slot time, 
we have been warned that it would have to ~o somewhere 
else. I couldn't believe my ears. We must use our 
best efforts volunt.arily to adjust operations so that 
the totals won't exceed FAA rules. It's worked 
because of good will, it must work in the face of 
adversities facing us. The CAB forbids us to discuss 
markets, origins and destinations, anything of that 
kind. 
No one owns any slots at DCA -- anyone may request 
as many as they wish. No one may be made to cancel 
or gUde a slot. 
United Airlines couldn 1 t come, Federal Expre~s is 
not here either, probably because they don I t want 
slots until Septemher, and then at 7. We're meeting 
in the Sheraton Reston tomorrow, 8: 30. 
The May sheet doesn't look too bad. These are our 
final pre-meeting numbers. 
New members, are there any questions -- lolA 7 
We have authority and fuel, and we've made arrangements 
for handlin~. We've asked for 4 -- 3 present various 
problems. We look forward to a successful meeting. 
We've operated at DCA since Milrch 15, with assigned 
slots. We want 4, uhich seems to be the minimum. 
We aTe w::llling to take one at 7; the others seem to 
be popular. " , 
Thece is room. here for all Glots to move into 6pen 
hours. July is rough"- if we solve it, April and 
Hay will fall into line. July is identical to' 
August, September, and October. 
Let's start with July - that's a major problem. 
Let's solicit some deletions. That I s the only way 
it'll work itself out. 
We need 22 deletions between 7-22. 
That's" a lot, but it's what'it's going to take. 
For the period 29 April - 31 May, we I re using ~ 
slots at 21, not 5 as shown. From June 15 00, we're 
requesting an additional slot at 16 and 17 - former 
~ to 5, 17 6 to 7. 
Allegheny, this is not good news. 
It's only fair to say -- Allegheny went from 8~ 
at the end of the last pre-meeting - then 78 upon 
our request, then 80, now 82. So actually they're 
minus 2. 
We now need 2~ deletions. 
We'd be amenable to dropping 9 to 8 for 29 April -
31 May. There's a correction made. 
We'll drop one at 17 for the season. At 19 (this 
will screw up the works), we can drop one 29 April 
through June 7. 18 I can't help '.0 Hake that 19 
Lor all ueason, Mr. Chaitlllun. 
Thank you very much, Bill. That's what it's going 
to take. I hope we can keep up the momentum. 
We'd also be wUling to move an 18 slot to a 16 
slot, starting with 29 April - daUy aU season, 
For the first one we should have said daily all 
season too. 
EAt 
Nothing right nov, but we will. 
NB[few"Havenf 
. 
AK[ALTAIR] 
PI: 
He: 
NA: 
EA: 
PYlypec: 
AK: 
TIl: 
PI: 
DL,BN,NW: 
Pylypec: 
!flypec: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
WA: 
Pylypec: 
Coleman! 
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We have nothing to say. 
We hold 6 slots as a commuter. We I re expanding __ 
we require slots at prime hours. We appreciate 
being here - we will cooperate in the difficulties 
we recognize exist. 
Chuck Vesper of NC is a new face in the Waahington 
Scheduling COlDDlittee group. 
We have four, and don't expect to need IIOre. We're 
starting June 25, not June 7. 
As a member of the Executive Conaittee (and not as 
National Airlines) I dont see the meeting being 
resolved today. For the first timers - you adght 
hear name-calling, argument - but it's not personal. 
Call each other by your airline names. You'll be 
exasperated, bored, you'll threaten to walk out, but 
we'll meet the quota, because a lot of people hope 
we don't .. 
1 hope the new carriers know what probbms we face -
that what we leave with isn"t what we come in with. 
The way to make it work is by action, not words •• 
The Committee has worked - sitml'tions look hqpe1ess 
at times. but dedication, the necessity of it work 
it out. It must be a joint undertaking, not one or 
a group. 
I'm new, and 1111 Bee how it goes. 
We've be~n at DCA for quite 8 few yean; we've 
picked up 4. usually at 7 or 22. So carriers who 
are new may not be able to get what they want at 
this meeting. There will' have to be a comprollise .. 
I'm concerned about the SUlllller traffic. 
No cotunent. 
The federal agencies Which are represented here --
speak up •. You'll be recognized, Aak questions. 
Thank you very TlUch, NA. 
As a result of NA' s move, this is what Hay looks 
like [Projects month on screen -- only 1800 hour 
has over ~O, and it has ~l] 
\lA, are your figures correct for Hay for 181 
We have no eubmiBsione for Kay. We don't· 
start until June 15. 
So Hay is cleared. 
If tie could do a month an hour we'd'be all 
right. 
QH [Air Florida1 [to WAJ - you're starting June 15. 
WA: Yes. 
UR: I'm willing to trade 8 19 for a 21 in Hay. 
Coleman: Hay is resolved. Everyone hae what they wsnt. 
NA will take it for 21 and 2 draft choicee. 
HA: We can do it. I want to release it through 
June 7. Talk to you [URJ later. 
Coleman: We'll move 19 to 21 in Hay, UR. 
OR: O.K. 
AK: \Ie'11 r¥JVe. 16 to 1.5, June 1 - • 
Coleman: AK'll move 16 to 15, June 1 through the eeason. 
EA: We'll drop one for season - 7 - plus one at II--
both for season. 
Pylypec: EA drops 7 and 11, one slot, for season. 
AK: We'll take 7, surrender at 8 --starting June 1. 
<;oleman: That's the etart of your season, June 11 
AK: 
Coleman: 
AK: 
M: 
NA: 
Crittenden; 
HA: 
Coleman: 
M: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
AA: 
Pylypec: 
!W: 
M: 
Pylypec: 
Ne: 
NB: 
NB: 
COleman: 
Pylypec: 
IIA: 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
PylYpec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
M: 
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We t 11 take 7, surrender at 8 -- starting June 1. 
Thet's the IIIUrt of your sesson, June 11 
That' 9 correct. 
We'd like to take one at 7, minus one at 10, June 1 
through the Beason. 
llhen you finish that I'll give you [committee] one 
more. 
Then you t 1~ 8it back. 
Then I'll wait. 
[Projecting on screen] This 1s what July looks like. 
We dontt need 7 from July I-August 31. Walt. 
NA, did you say you had one more? 
Yes, minus one at II, all sesson. 
Thank you again, NA, AA, we have that slot from you. 
Do you have any deletions? 
No deletions. 
!W? 
Nothing. 
For the record, we traditionally had 74, noW' we have. 
62, "'hleh represents a very substantial reduction for u ••. 
Just for the record. 
Net 
The carriers at the bottom stick out like a sore thumb. 
I'v noticed that one carrier goes up four slots from July 1 -. 
BN. is trYing to RO \lb. This fellow nas been .. 
here tor years. AL hils gone down. 
At has gone up by 2. 
now I explained th~t. 
Carriers want certain I!Ilots at certain hours 
and knowing they won't get it. You have to have 
flexibility. That· I!I what EA is saying. Nothing 
is cast in concrete. WA? 
We're all disadvantaged by the fact that a carrier 
with many slots can't be here to see if they can 
make changes. lole should contae t them by phone or 
get a substitute. 
This is normal procedure, thanks for reminding me. 
Often an absentee has come to the rescue. If we 
need to we'll get in touch. We all understand their 
situation. 
[BreakJ 
It's been stated many times. but I'll say it again. 
lie need deletions, plenty of them. lie Ive .had Borne 
good examples of flexibUi ty _. granted, Y0 4 can't 
get everything, but if you want something, you've 
got to move. This 1s not directed at anyone- 1n 
particular, but to the COlllllittee as a whole. 
BN. are you prepared to offer ua a reduction? 
A reduc't1on? Sorry, don't have any. 
We have 2 deletions from NA at 11 _ daily, 
all seasons, for a total of J, down to 3 
[From 40 to 38J. 
That f S a total of 8 deletions for the day from all 
carriers. NA has made 6, EA two. 
AA has made one from part of the season. 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
1J!t: 
Coleman: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
PI: 
Pylypec; 
QH: 
Pylypect 
W: 
Pylypec: 
DL: 
EA: 
ColeMn: 
EA: 
NB: 
Py~ypec: 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
AK: 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
NB: 
Pylypec: 
EA: 
PYlypec: 
EA: 
Pylypec: 
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Yes, Braniff. 8N, any cODrnents? 
Theae are the elota we feel we need. 
"'eIre flexible in 18, 19, 20, 21 if anyone vJlbte to trad 
We'll remember that. 
18 mcmths have to Come off the board. Somebody's 
got to give them up. 
PI, can you offer some help? 
We can make a deletion in Augult, but 1 thought 
that would wait until we Ire down the pike. 
QH? 
No tDOvee.. 
W? 
No movea. 
DL? 
I don't have anything. 
Can I ask Walt if he haa the number of deletion. 
by carrier, over, say. the last couple of years? 
I haven't got it, but I can get it.· 
We've released 7,22,'. couple of. other •• ,be. 
The salle carriers yur afur year reb •• e .lot., 
.nd·don't Ule them. You need a deletion. Dot .lid •• 
or InOvea. We did it at Chiugo for" lleetin&a. 
It just becomea rldiculout - no matter wnat the 
situation is with new routes. I don't believe aNI 
or an AK can come in and ask for 6 or 8 slots. 
You have the BIOst to loee. You have 26.9% of all the 
'Slota. 
EA has a deletion, lIinua one at 12, daily all .easo~ 
[42 to 41]. That's 9 deletione now. 
Only 15 more to go. 
We're goi~g :to need Iota tnore help. 
Ale, can you offer u. anything? 
Not r1ght now. We'd like to be flexible. If it would 
open the floodgates, we'd have to let go of two alate, 
but that would he 25% of our request. If it would nelp 
I'd recommend it to my client but I doubt even as a fir~t-t1_ 
observer that it would. 
BN? 
We have nothing. 
NB? 
No. "'eire looking at numbers like 144 and 72, which 
represent 23% and 11% respectively. AU ve want 1 •• ix. 
Yes, I sympathize, but every little bit helpa. If anyone ~::d d~t~t without totally messing up their operations, we 
Does anyone know the coat of slot.?' We pay great co.te to 
operate at DCA. We believe that every carrier Who want. 
a slot should have one. But to ask a carrier to aove . 
existing lervice - thia isn't like 0'1Iare. You're • 
asking a carrier here to IIOve out of Washinlton. We'll do 
anything within the real .. of senaibl Ii ty to resolve this 
meeting. Fairyland 'nil'; the second aection we haggled over. 
It was resolVed ten years ago. .' 
That's not an issue here. 
It seems a shame that we sit hr.re like in Chicago and 
then 'we resolve things. Someway we'll reBolve it. 
Thatls right. 
NB: 
FJ.: 
Lapham: 
IIA: 
Pylypec: 
NC: 
Lapham: 
Pylypec: 
UR: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
AA: 
ColelLBn: 
AA: 
Crittenden: 
AA' 
Pylypec: 
HA' 
AA: 
Cole .. n: 
Py1ypec: 
PI: 
DL: 
BN: 
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I could have had 6 or 10 last July without legal or 
administrative hassles. We have the least to lose -- we're 
not asking for a whole lot. EA has the moat to lose. 
But 'We can take the slota they give us. 
If you're asking EA to give up 15 slots. you're stl1ting 
them to go down the tubes. 
No one has Bny nore riIj;hte: to slots than another. We 
'Wear each other down, that's how we do it. The new -
old distinction is meaningle88 here. Let's not think 
in negative term;, that'a not why we're here. 
llhat are released slots? 
A carrter gets them and doesn't use them, for 
various reasons. 
Carriers release them for a moth or a whole season. 
Some release as many as 12 per month. That's a lot 
of slots -- hate to see them go to waste. Before O'Hare 
became as tight 89 nO\l, carriers had pocket slots, but 
'When it became tighter, they disappeared, and 08 far 8S 
1 know they don't have them now. We should smoke them 
out here. 
Pocket alots can be an outrageously premptory indulgence, 
or something a carrier drops after using its best 'efforts --
depending on your point of view. It is definitely an 
evil, but has helped us get over Borne rough spots. It's 
been a mixed bag. We're operating a little closer to 
the 'Wall nO\l than before, though. 
We need deletiona -- 'We've g~tten 9, need 15 WJ~~.' 
\Ie really need only 11 .,re~ J>ecause there il'rooll. 
for 4 by IUding. . 
Actually, URi we have 19 overages, \Ie can ,lessen 4 
by sliding. 
AA. are you about to offer lomething? You have that. 
optimistic look. 
No, just trying to close out my June schedule. 1 see 
long nights ahead. 
So AA dropped 10 and 11 eHectlve June 
7 - September 5. Add 20 for the same period. 
13 also, June 1 - Septelllber 5. 
Plul one 20 is June 1 through the season. 
, 
Right. We've dropped two. 
Beautiful. Very good.. 
AA, if you've got another hour where you need a 
a lot, And w111 give up, I'll give it to you. 
No thinks. 60 fro. 72, gentleMen. If we get 
soe .aveaent like that we'll be home free. 
20 over, there's roo. for 10. 
We're Jl'l8king progress - slowly, but we're Wlking 
progre... PI, can you be of lome help? 
There's a possibility of going frora 8 21 to a 6. 
I'll let you know in a .,~nt. 
I've got 101M! numbers I'd like to read off. POBt-
tIIeeting January, 1978, DN had 20. Post-meetfng 
June 1978, DN had 20. ~n 22, and after the meeting 
last BUlmer, DN had 24. Nov, with four new carrierv 
8N asks for 4 IIIOre. all in overage hours. I don't 
know whether to say congratulationo or oh • .e. 1 I 
don't intend to let liN get awa-y with this •• I've 
got people who ask JM! about slots not being uoed. 
1 explain that it's a voluntary thing, In good will. 
But it'. harder to explain vhy we don't get any. 
I can't explain how a carrier can go frobl 20 to 28. 
t'd Uk-e to expla in to DL regarding picking up • 
pocket dotl. 8M dOeln' t apologize for picking up 
slots other. can't use. 8N has introduced service 
to two new cities, and planl for two IIOre. Now 
if ve folleved the ratio of other carriers, we!d 
have 16 new elots, not 8. Maybe the problem arises 
'with carriers introducing new set'vice with higher 
frequency. Let's look at the usage of slots reserved 
in February 1979, 620 stots were reserved and 594 
operated -- II.Bking 26 unuaed. Of that, DN vas 
successful in u!iing two. 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
NC: 
AA: 
NA: 
AA: 
NA: 
AA: 
EA: 
AA: 
NC: 
NA: 
AA: 
EA: 
AA, 
EA: 
Pylypec: 
AA: 
Ne: 
ON' 
IIA: 
ColeMO: 
\lA: 
NA: 
Coleman: 
Lapha.: 
Coleman: 
PI: 
AA[to me): 
Pylypec: 
lB there anything you'd like to have flashed 
on the screen to get this lOOving, or is there 
enough information? 
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Maybe it'. time to start aome kind of exercise. 
Over the yeBrB this committee has 
used several moves \lith success. Anyone have 
potential tnOves, depending on someone elee'e JIOve? 
I don't know if it's possible to slide - to 22, 
can't get .departures, but we'll go from l~ to 20. 
If we can let. 20. ve'll drop. 
Oh, a pocket .lot. 
No. tt will give us flexibility in our schedule. 
Anyone have a 20 to give to AA? I want to see what they drop. 
There'a no way to II8ke changes without a'20. 
What will you release? 
13 
AA will pick up a 20 and delete 8 13. He'. not dropping 
anything. 
Either you have a slot to release or not. 
We have .everalmoves [dependent on that]. tt'a cOl\lPlicated. 
But if you're deleting a 13 and I gtve you a 20; it'. 
an even swap. What are you deleting? 
11 
Oh, 1J and 11 for 20. I'll IOOve frora 20 to 
21, from June 7 on. 
Any time you're ready. AA. 
Add 20, minus 13 -- that leaves us at 62 -- minus It, 
and m,inus 10. Deletions good through Sept. 5. Total ia 
down to 60. 
Our aBking for an increase fa just as valid as 
any to cover an operation to a new route or city. 
This is to cover an operation to a new route or 
city. Thil i. to cover an operstion or lervice 
than other carriers have requested. One -.ore point: 
the DN increalea cover hours that are over _ we've 
requested one in 18, one In 19 -- currently. 8N 
has only one in each, because by hour, it'. fairly 
constant at the level of two. No peaking .a .ight 
have been luggeeted. 
When do thue .lot. actually becOlae noticed for 
re1eaae? 
The procedure, forll8lhed, starta approximately 
in the middle of the previous tnonth '-- usually not 
enough tiJne to use it as a regularly scheduled Dpentton. 
When giving the. up, all carriers and the rellervation 
center .hould be notified. 
Is it correct that in the last bOnth 20 slota have 
been released too late to be used by others? 
It depends on seasonality. 
It hOB been extraordinary lately because of the 
10SB of carrier'. equipment. 
For \lA's infol'll8tion, it'a not·a 'forul' procedure. 
but custoury. You couldn't bring ao.eone to count 
for violBting that practice. 
I agree with counsel. 
Take one out of 21. June 14 daUy .U aenon - on.~.\ 
up at 6. 
You've leen .. ch more IItOvetnent than you've a right 
to expect. The cOJIIIIIUters are asking for too IlUch. 
At a'nitre, Air W1aconstn asked for 30 slots and 
settled for five. Thh is purgatory for lie. 
[Break) 
Le' B get salle deletionB here. AA, any moveB you 
can II&ake1. 
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M: One IDOre move and I can stay here fOrE"ver. 
Pylypec: AK? 
AK: We're looking at BOllle possible changes. 
Pyiypee. AL? 
AL: I was talking to my office. We may have sOlnething 
Cor you tomorrov. I 
Pylypec: BN? 
BU: liN has no .:>vea. 
Pylypec: But y~u'll be explaining? 
BN: Yes, air. 
Pylypec: DL? 
DL: 
EA: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
I don't have anything. 
EA? 
Nothing. 
NA? 
I'll going to look harder than EA or BN. I think EA 
and ~A need some help froll sonle other people. In my 
case I pulled l!Iix out and there's a possibility tha~ I 
CB:l go 11 Uttle heavier. I echo DL.--- it's difficult 
to explain reduction. to your home office with dther 
carriers (not necessarily newcomers) having increases. 
We'll try to do JlQre, but we can't carry everything. 
Pylypec: NB? 
UB: We're looking at p0l9ib1l1tiea. 
Pylypec: PI? 
PI: 
Pylypec: 
TIl: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
DL: 
Pylypec: 
EA: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
NC: 
Pylypec: 
PI: 
Pylypec: 
'Il': 
NA: 
Co1etnan: 
Pylypec: 
M. 
Pylypec: 
NC: 
BN: 
StUI looking. 
TIl? 
fossibly santE' chan~efl for July and Augu'it. Trying 
to tie down for June. t10 flexibility there. Possibly 
aome sliding ,poaaibilitho ,for July nod Aultust. 
Yes. sir. 
Cood. BN? 
\.1e cannot offer a delett~n. We'll do everything' 
'lie possibly could in the way of sUdes. 
D11 
Maybe sliding. 
EA? 
Hay be able to help out with sUding. 
NA? 
You \lant blood? 
Ne? 
Nothing. 
PI? 
No, I don't have anything. 
'Il'? 
No deletions. may possibly be able to help in slides .. 
Walt, what vas UA's position yesterday? 
They are reworking several schedules. won't be in the 
office for another half-hour. I said I'd be in contact 
vith around 10:30 our local. 
Four to go •. Can you be of any help to us? 
Who me? No. 
Twenty-five minutes and counting. 
Yes, ~C? 
This may be considererl thoughts vhUe shaving. But I 
wonder if BN called this meeting to gain more slots. 
I can respond to that, but 1 can't answer it. Who knows. 
NA: 
NAi 
Colellan: 
HA: 
\lA: 
NB: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
EA: 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
M: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
IIA: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
Coleman: 
NA: 
Coleman: 
Pylypee: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
Delete one at 14, daUy .11 aenon. When lI!Io",eone 
else don lI!Iosethina. we'll aive thea in brother. 
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It 11 reduce 3 data in the aorning if the other •• ven 
slote CBn Calle out of the group. If they don't by 9:30, 
I'll withdraw the offer. 
I'll advile UA of tht. offer .. 
1 have an i.portent engage.lent Thunday afternoon in 
Miami and 1 vant to -.eke it. 
I ".n~ you to ... tte it. 
We'd 1ik. to help NA, by giving up two .lot., on condition 
of no further changea. We will cancel 12 and 13 one •• ch, 
but lDOve 16 to 18. 
That'. I very good offer. 
I'd like to eee five rlore offers before we ,.ttle in 
for the niaht. Then tomorrow we could .tart with altdin,. 
We need, fev .are. Get five .are deletion. here, we 
certainly could expedite thinge. We could be Uniehed 
by noon tOllOrrow. 
Anybody want to offer on NA', package? 
[Adjourned I 
(Resto tel HA f. offer] Walter (Colellan) va. in touch 
\lith UA tast nisht and they're studying the .. tter. 
You can put EA down for one. 
Good. Four 1IOre. 
AA, can you offer ua anything'? 
No. 
AL? 
Not at this time. We're in a situation "here we can't 
lUke any contribution. Our achedule t. befng preaented 
to our officers. There 11 • po .. ;ibiUt1 thia afternoon. 
Would that include a deletion? 
Speaking 8S a nevcomer, and seeing hOY it works it 
"'QuId have been easy to ask for eight slots and' then 
graciously step down to four. To start operations at. 
an airport aod ask for eight slots is rather presumptive. 
Without pi~king on anyhody -- even to a newcomer. You 
can see it s a damn tight situation. You can Bee WA can't 
do anything because of restrictions on our movement and 
:~;~o!:r:~ could we t d wait and see some movement by the 
We're trying to get In touch vith AX. At the moment 
811 the newcomers but AK are doVll to four. 
Did QH come down? 
I dido t t count thelll as a newcomer. 
That's right. You get two out of AK or 80~bOdy 
and I'll give you the other two. 
Yes, Bir. 
Change that number of NA '8 from .3 to 5. That'. predicated 
on someone giving up two. 
We're trying to do just that. 
AX. said he'd drop three. 
l' 11 take one back. 
I thought you'd say that. He vants to move one to 8ix 
1 explained the sitUation to him. He said if there ar~ 
any problems he'd send 8 representative. 
With five minutes to go. 
AK takes one out at 8, one at 15 and one at 16. I'll 
make hi ... changes too. He's going from 12 to 11, he's 
going from 19 to 21. 7, 11, 12, 21 and I think he has 
one at 6 too. Let me: go call his and check. • 
QH , you came just in time. We need II move. 
Let IS take a five minute break while Walt confirms 
AK's hours. 
Cohman: 
Pylypec: 
Co1etaan: 
EA, 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
EA: 
AL: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
IIA: 
Pylypec: 
Coleman: 
M: 
PI: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
Pylypec: 
M: 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
DL. 
Py1ypec: 
EA: 
HA: 
EA: 
Py1ypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
Ne: 
Py1ypec: 
PI: 
WA: 
Coleman: 
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6, 7, 11, 12 and 21 
lie have hours for Nft. Minus 12 and tflinus 13. 
And as part of the package - they \lant a 16 end an 18 .. 
I think it \las ainus one at 16. 
I'll put 'it up that l vay. 
NA, ~rl!'! .you ready to give UII your deletions? 
I Kuens .0. Hinus one at 10, .. Inus one at II, 
.. inU5 one at 13, 1II1nuIJ one at 15. Those art! all 
daily all season. Minus one at 14 effective June 15. 
According to tny count, my numbers at 0700 read -
total 34, 14 15 3, 15 is 4 .. 
EA, are you ready? 
0700. 
Hr. Chairman, At will slide from 8 to 7 
[42 - 41 at 8; 38 - 39 st 7] from June 15 on. 
I wont to know onl!! thing_ Does AX. or HA get 
thl!! magnum of champagne? Mr. Chairman, I'vl!! got 
to call the office -- not about slots. But 1'11 be 
back in II few minutes .. 
Now, it's tiflll! to think about sliding. 
Actually nW we should be one "nder. 
Yes, we lire. 
Be back in a few minutes. 
I trust that t!vrryone' a exploring the sUding • 
capability. It's got to go to the left - obviousl~. 
There's • popular song about sliflpin' and alidin'. 
That aong originated in this cOll'l!littee. 
1 spoke to mI and UA and I gave them our totals 
and thE'y're studying thrm. ThE'y're delighted. 
On B scale of 1 to 10, I'd _9ay 6 or 7. 
Is that June 14, Bob? 
Yes. 
Only 12, dwn from 15. 
We were making 5uth good progress in my absence here. 
Let me not inhibit that. Keep it up. 
M, do you have any slides at this time? 
No. 
BN, do you have anything additional? 
Nothing more than I've indicated. 
DL? 
Nothing 
EA? 
We got some possibilities that I'm looking at. 
What are you waiting for, EA? 
I'm looking at making Borne other changes. 
Mr. Uoon? 
No, sir. 
Ne, I assume you don't have tnuch. 
Not right now - I can go from 19 to 20 but I assume 
that doesn't help much. 
No, PI? 
We got some possibilities in the early afternoon hours. 
Yhen are our friends from NY and UA going to come? 
\.Ie've contacted them. 
Pylypec: 
BH: 
Coleman: 
BN: 
COleaan: 
BN: 
Coleman: 
HA: 
TIl: 
EA: 
Colelll4n: 
UR: 
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t trust everyone fa studyin& their .chl!!du1ea to 
!lee if they can BUde. 
21 to 20, 16 to IS. ponfbIe 9 to ft. That'. 
It the botto. of our deeirabl11ty U.t. 
There'. no doubt that'. the kind of thins ye're 
100ktns for. 
\Ie Ihou1d set a li.t frO'll everybody of the kind of 
changl!!8. they could -.ske. 
And what leu on? 
n.t. would be efhcttve June I 
nat's the kind of drift we need. We h.ve to flaw 
to the left - that 20 will have to go to the left. 
I'll So 21 to 16 - at least July 1: Walt - ,OU 
can _t. that daily all lenon. 
20 to 19. July 1 onward. 
''.It, effective July 1, 21 to 16. 
Htnu. on •• t 21. plu. one at 16. 
'What vas that again? 
ColeMn tRepeat_] And fro. URI 
UR: 
colellan: 
UR: 
EA: 
ColeMn: 
Pvlypec: 
UR: 
Pylypec: 
UR: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Coleman: 
TIl: 
Coleman: 
Coleman: 
EA: 
Coleman: 
EA: 
Nothing. (21 10 nov dovn to 40. 20 to 42; 19 t~ 
41; 16 up to 40; 15 up to :381 Could UIl - -this 
isn't reolly helpful, it juat helpa us - could we 
shift Hay and June froa 20 to 211 
I think t'd prefer to vait to see how the 11idu 
work the1llfte!ves out. They're both oVer. I thtnk. 
it'. OK for Kay, but not for June. Let' •• ee how 
this thtng vorks itself out. 
O.K. 
)lalt, effective June 1, turn 18 to 17. 
Great, June 1 through the season. 
change w1,11 be in the kay aT June. 
But TW is~'t going to reqUire all carriers in this 
room to move Over tvo or three slides. It's going 
to hurt, its going to require s little hurt, for all. 
Carriers hsve more slots than 1 do and they're going 
to have to cooperate. I'1Il looking at Salle .oves. 
UR. Are you exploring any possibilities1 
No. lle"f re just asking for four slots. 
Are you exploring Possibilities? 
t don't want to. We've already .ade a co .. lt11ent 
ori schedules. 
Hr. Chairman, although it won't help the nu.bers, 
we'll move froll 20 to 16. June 15 thx:ough the season. 
That's very good. that'll help a lot. WA, I take 
it you have some problems on these slides. 
Hr. Chainaan, at thia time I'd also like to know If 
UA and NW ·could be contacted, and given the late8t 
readings. Maybe they could be of some help. 
Here'a a 111 possibility. 
Hr. Chairman, atnus 19. plus 18. As I Bay it's a 
change in our existing schedules. We'llm&ke it, Una 
when we get some other carriers.to Bake chan~l!!s, .lides. 
UA haa two .aves. Kinua: 19, plu. 17. and 15 to 14, 
June 8 through .Uson. 
I st .. t)wing ChartJ Theae numbera represent the difference 
tram pORt-meeting. But there were a ton of trades .after 
that (We #can produce that too). This inclUdes new 
carders, \lho didn't have anything at post"meeting. 
TW, your offer is -- still a handsome one but not nece88sry, 
in view of VA's move. 
equId you tell me how I came out at 2000 hour? 
Post-meeting? 10 
And now? 
Crittenden: 
EA. 
PI. 
Coleman: 
PI. 
TW. 
AL. 
TW: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
TW: 
AL: 
TW: 
AA: 
Plypec: 
EA: 
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8. 
If anyone wants me to move 11 or 18 to 20. 
I'd be wil11ng to do it. 
We uny have to olide. 
As EA is suggesting~ this isn't a complete 
picture. We're asking for a drift from 20 to 
the left. 
1 wasn't aware of all the changes. I wasn't. at 
the last meeting. 
I notice' on that previous chart that AL 1s up 5 
at the problem hours. They're one of the fat cats, 
maybe they can help out. 
We've lost a total of four sinc~ post-meeting. 
I'll talking about ·the problem hours. 
I think the whole chart' 8 a problem. 
I trust you're thinking of aaking moves. 
I'll be frank, we won't have any moves un~il this 
afternoon. This is a new game, new time. 
I vonder if AI. has any idea when this information 
would be available to it. 
I'd l!Iay no earlier than three this afternoon. 
I noticed one of BN' B new acquisitions 18 in the 
1800 hour. Maybe they would like to move to : 
12 o~ clock. . 
Let's compare the chart, excluding new entries .... 
from FAA figures of 1978. BN 20-28, DL even . 
(34-34). EA 138-140 (plus 2). NA 39-34 (down 5) 
1M even at 42, PI 68-12 (net 4), TW 38-44 (plus 
6), UA 64-70 plus (6), AA 66-60. Just somethin~ 
else to consider when we talk about slides. We re 
down to minimum capability -- we've gone down six. 
We can't make any slides. We should look at those 
that have gone up, PI, nI, BN up 8. Ponder that over 
an hour and a half. 
I could possibly go from a 17 to a 16. 
Py1ypec: NA? 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
AA: 
Pylypec: 
URI 
IIA: 
Colellan: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
EA: 
NA: 
Coleman: 
I might be able to go 17 to 13. 
BN? 
I can't even COile close to anything like that, Mr. Chairman. 
We need a little help in the 900 hour too. let's not over-
look that. 
I've offered aome help in the 900 hour. 
1I0w about an 8 to a 7, snyone -- a 9 to a 107 We'll get 
to you, AL. around 3 0' clock. 
Sounds like a deal. 
Hr. Berger? 
Sorry, don't see anything. 
UR? Any slide capability? 
No. 
Are UA snd NW still being polled as to possible changes? 
Yes (Shows chart if poedb1e adjuetrlentl juet .eD~1oned 
were implemented) 
NA, you see any potential moves? 
Yes. I see a lot of potent!al moves. I see AA moving, I 
see BN moving. We'll be sitting here all week~ maybe next 
week, if we don't make some moves. 
You can aake 17 to 15. (43 to 42; 37 to 38) 
You can show NA then 16 to 13 (42 to 41j 38 to 39) 
Another move? 
AA: (continued) 
EA: 
IIA: 
PI: 
Pylypec: 
Coleman: 
Py1ypec: 
AA: 
Pylypec: 
TW: 
Py1ypec. (to NA) 
Coleman; 
TW: 
Plypec: 
PI: 
Col,eman: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
AA: 
NA. 
EA. 
NA: 
BN: 
Coleman: 
EA: 
NA. 
Coleman: 
AL: 
Crittenden: 
NA. 
M: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
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Just snother ingredient -- if sl1 of the pluBses 
cBJle out, there'd be a lot acre slide capability 
and a lot more movement. 
1I0w many totsl slots did AA come out of the aeeting with, 
and how many did they fly? 
I think t;hat's irrelevant now. The days of pocket slots 
sre over.' .. This 1s the nitty-gritty now. 
One observation - in the 12 slate ve're over - new 
entrants only account for four. ' 
You could juggle those figures any way you want. 
LUNel! BREAK 
Let's hope AI. Calles back at three vUoh sOlIe good news. 
But we'll need more than that. Much more. We'll lose 
some of our members at the end of today's session ao we've 
got to go the whole waYa 
I can't do this in lIy office you know. 
I see AA'a working very bard on his charts. 
No, it's just aaking it obvious. Nestor, that I can't 
do anything. Deletions are what we're after. 
I thought this would have been t:Jte easier psrt. \ You 
guya just like Reston, I know. Gouraet restaurants -.1 len 
Another one down, on the bottoll there. 18 to 17. 
We voted 1n your absence that it would b. D.1c~· to· 
cancel instead of diding. 
If 'lie went fro. 19 to 17. someone could go froa 18 to 
19. 
I I d like to see some movement. 
Wh'at other possible moves are there -- not definite 
but possible. PI7 
We could move 18 to 19. 
That helps. Let ... e put it down as a potential. 
Is this June 15 through the season? 
I'm not too lure, I'. trying to figure it out. 
EA'. for July 1. 
It looks to ae like both of thea would be June 8 
through the se8son. 
Hr. Chairman, are those recorded .uvea7 
No, they're just part of the package.' 
You could take aine. 
You could take aine too o 
O.K. 
Walt, could you read the total on 17001 Shouldn't 
it be 42? 
That' B what I have. 
It isn't a question of what we can do, it'll .. que.tion 
of "hat we viII do. Soae can 1IOve out of Walhington, -1 
necessary. It' •• question of getting loaeone to bite 
the bullet, if necessary. Get ' the people who -.k. the 
decisions in here, close the door, and leave them in 
until th~y make the decision. 
I'm going to have my secretary attend a8 of ta.orrov 
tIOrning, with complete authority. 
Is this the one "ho saYII yu and no, Bill? 
No, 1 think that's what I'll really do. My aecretary 
or soltleone froll l1y office -- with complete authority. 
We go this every damn .eeting. It's amazing, in 
Chicago you can't get down to the numbers. Here, you 
get down to the numbers and nobody moves. 
Jack, are you working ~ard on possibilities? 
!W: 
Pylypec: 
HA: . 
M: 
'!lA: 
M: 
NA: 
M: 
NA: 
M: 
HA: 
WA: 
py1ypee: 
HA: 
M: 
HA: 
M: 
HA: 
Lapham: 
M:. 
NA: 
.AA: 
NA: 
Coleman: 
HA: 
Coleman: 
NA: 
EA: 
NA: 
IIA: 
Lapham: 
WA: 
Py1ypec: 
HA: 
Lapham: 
NA: • 
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Yes, I'm looking. 
What's everybody vaiting for? 
AA to move. 
I made B speech while you were out, Bill. 
I've heard it. 
We can't delete any IIOre. 
You don't have to delete, but slide. 
We have no flexibility to slide because our deletions 
removed the possibility of any movement. 
This happens at every .eeting. 
It's the schedule that'. tied. It tiea the hand. It 
doesn't utter vho's 8itting here. We're pretty close 
to the runway. 
Well we gotta do something. I'm not going to sit here 
all week. And I'll serious, I'm going to have somebody 
from my office alt here and if you need me you can call 
me in Miami. ' 
20 minutes to AL'., decision. 
I'm sure ve'll get 8O.e JIOves. 
Well, I can't touch 16, .17, and 18. And if You vant· 
to compare year by year,\Bob. Lwil1.. 
Well there are other carriers at the table. \lily not 
compare with them? 
I'm not talking about deleting, I'm talking about sliding. 
Our deletions prevent ull frODl sliding. 
You know, back in '61, whatever, we moved carriers frolll 
LAG to EWK, we eliminated flights at DCA. We had the 
top dogs there -- maybe that's what it takes here to get 
them out of 16, 17 and 18. And while they're meeting. 
1 t 11 be on vacation. 
You might have a long vacation too, BUI. I might add that 
the last time we had an impasse and had the top people here 
\Ie lost at least 50 slota. 
Bill, you say AA 1s one up over vhat? 
The sheet you got yesterday. 
There's been two deletions, which represented the 
momentuUl you got today. 
, 
The only two carriera which have done anything in these' 
critical hours have been NA and PI. 
UA'moved a 15 to a 14. And a 19 to a 17. 
\/hat did Nil do? 
Nothing. 
As usual. There isn't anything else'that I'm even 
going to look at, until some carriers begin moving. 
You vant mine? 
No, I don't want any of yours. 
Hr. Chatman? A connent has been uade that the 1500 
hour is a critical period, and mention has been uade 
that eleven slots have been asked for by new carw;'iers. 
Now I can't speak for anyone but .. WA, .but I vant to make. 
Bure everyone und@rstands our situation. We 'have re-
strictions on our authority, they're linked up in-
separably to a. 7:00 origination and a 2200 determination. 
Let's not talk about arrivals and departures. 
No, it gets impoaaible to sit here and not say 8nyt~tng. 
I don't knov if it's possible that people with shorter 
hauls have more flexibility. It's hard to psrticipate 
in deletions when you have hardly an thing to delete. 
Two are out of the problem area. Tvo are in the ·thick 
of it. 
I'm sure the cmrmittee understands and is sympathetic. 
We could callan our government bodies to help us 
out as they have for us in the last few months. 
They've given us a great chance to do it ourselves. 
We've got to do it ourselves. 
Rig~t. 
Pylypec: 
HA: 
Pylypec: 
Lapham: 
Coleman: 
AL: 
Coleman: 
AL: 
Coleman: 
NA: 
pylYpec: 
AL: 
fy1ypee. 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
IIA: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
!W: 
WA: 
!W: 
11M 
!W: 
Coleman: 
PI: 
Coleman: 
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It was a disas tel'. 
Those that are wheels shall run in circles. 
Some of them were ready to storm out of there in the 
first 20 minutes. 
Without pointing at anyone, Bill has IIllde aome pointa. 
especially regarding roon-attendance. Obviously, there 
w1ll he i;ome,occasions where one can't be here but that 
~hnuld be rare. lib second !'of.nt:. fA thftt it'll pointlea 
to be here if you have no power to aske moves. It is 
quite critical to our work that we b@ here and have the 
needed flexibility to get on with the work. Of course. 
even the president of a company doesn't have cottp1ete 
power. 
It 'Would be a shame to flounder on fIlOvell.ents. And I'll 
remind you of a third point that BiB. referred to - we 
have a DCA problem but not a Washington problem -- we 
have plenty of room to accommodate everyone in Washing-
ton. 
[ Break J 
AI, I think we're ready to Usten. 
I have one move that'll help. 9 - 10. We've cOllIe 
dow from our post-meeting total and have made three 
slides. We've done. our part to help new carriers cOIle 
into DCA and we wish others to -do the aalne •• [This 
put. 0900 at 42 - 41] 
Didn't you" •• 7"~hl!re-V.s~ oo.ethins und.r r.vJ. • ..,f .. 
A possible deletion. 
Ue exer~ise the option, we 1 d have 8 overag@ - 7 in' 
the late afternoon, one in the morning - that could 
go 8 - 7 or 8 - 10 or 9 - 10. Any way we. exercise 
8N 9 - 8. 16, 17, 18 those 7 wUl have to roll .. to 
the left, one hour at a time. 
Walt, let 1le throw B few figures at you. July, 
at hours 15 - 21 (we all know these are critical 
hours) -- AA is up one. AL is up two (that was a 
connection, technically that's not an increase, right?), 
BN, even - DL. even, EA - even, NA, dovn 5 in those 
hours, NW hasn't touched it. PI down one, 11I even, 
r didn't get the .figures. l(ow thoBe are 
Thsnk you. PI. ]loth very good aavea. Helpful. Seven ~ 
moves to go. We're asking progress. 
AL, I wasn't here when you gave your report • 
It was a g~d .how. 
l8 there IK)re to ca.e1 
We're working on it. lie have IIODe complications, but we 
want to. do it ourselves, rather than have it done for us. 
That's the right attitude. 
Has anyon@ spoken to NB? 
I've spoken to their attorneys. They're working on 'it. 
Unfortunately, they're not acheduling people. They're 
not as smsrt a8 our attorneys. 
!W? 
You can fim up .y 17 and 19. Taling up NA and WAt there'. 
approxillately 12 alots add~tiona1. It'a not one carrier, 
but 4 or 5 or 6. It'a obVious that carriers here can do .0 
much. 12 dots can not be filled in those alote. People 
are going to have to move out. Everybody's got to partici-
pate. Everyone's got the restrictione. Itt a sillple, it'e 
black and white. ' 
I would ,like a further explanation of 'everyone'. lot 
restrictions' • 
Every carrier has to fit times into their schedUle, w1th 
IIcheduling problems. .\ 
1 1 • not considering that. We've got .pecific routes we 
have to fly. 
lIe11. 19 to 17. 
And PI. 18 to 19. 
June 14 on. (Net effect is to change 17. 42 to 43, 18 
and 44 to 43). 
We've got a little drift to .. the left. 
EA: 
Coleman: 
NA: . 
.Pylypec: 
M: 
Pylypec: 
M: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Pylypec: 
BN: 
Pylypec: 
DL: 
Pylypec: 
EA: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec! 
NC: 
Py~ypec: 
AA: 
Lapham: 
AA: 
Lapham: 
M; 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
NA: 
Pylypec: 
O-JO 
If you want you could moVe EA from 12 to 11 for the 
whole season. 
Fine. 
I onder what vouId happen if I said that if we didn't so~ve this thing by 5 this afternoon, I'd rescind all my 
moves. 
That wouldn't go ove,r too well. We'll start at the 
beginning of the list again AA? 
Nothing. 
If not a slide, how about a deletion? 
No. 
ALl 
Not at this time. 
If you do hear anything, do you expect it before 51 
No, sir. 
BN? 
Nothing. Hr. Chairman. 
DL? 
Nothing. 
EAl 
As of July I, move 18 to 17. 
NA, anything froll you? 
I've got some moves left of 16, but I'm waiting to 9~~' 
other moves of carriers from 16. 17, 18. I'm not ma .. ng 
a move un til 1 have to. 
NC? 
We can move 19 to 20, but it wouldn't help. If it helps 
we'll do it. 
PI? 
Well Hr. Chairman, I think you ahould make that call. 
[Reports figures regarding 'critical' hours since 
post-meeting). I feel we've made our contribution. 
There are the nwnben. I don't think it can be argued--
if every carrier made thh contribution we wouldn't 
have thb problem. We've Mde contributions without 
movement from other c,rrien. 
It'a not the function of the chair to deSignate white 
and black trials. 
I agree. 
But it h a function to make .ure everyone showa up.' 
And every carrier hu to look for opportunities to 
do more. We certainly need to hold thh meeting 
together. There isn't a person here who can't articulate 
that he's right in hie Position. 
We're not going to another planet, I'm going to New 
York. I can be reached by telephone, if there are 
any problems. But I will Ilake that all. 
Then I'm going home. 
I hope all carriera can make conatruct!ve contributions. 
Right now it may be there's nothing we can 'do. 
We've reached. po.tUon where everyone's aaid, I'll 
move if someone else does. There are movementa of 
just a few minute a before and after an hour, but people 
are waiting for othen to IIOve. We've got to move out 
of 16, 17, 18. 
We plan on taking .uch atepa aa are necelf!llary. I've 
discussed it with George (Lapham] to make sure everyon"e 
is here. What incentive is there if half walk out? 
We're in this together; there is no special dispenaation 
for anyone. It's a joint effort, and once people leave 
the fold, it's no longer a joint effort. I'd do the ssme 
thinc--why the hell should I stay? We've aU got to 
stick together and solve thh thing. And it doea disturb 
me that Borne of the new tnembera callle in, gave their 
requests, ond didn't ahow up today and some of the older 
members too. 
PI: 
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Pylypec: 
TIl: 
BN: 
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B-Jl 
We can move 11 to 16. 
As of June 4 PI IlOves 17 to 16. 
Thank you. nn 
nave a c01lbination move -- 18 to 17, 21 to 19. I'll go 
on record as saying six slide a that have been ode May, I 
June -- it's going to take a little bit of hurt but you re 
going to have to do it. r can't 1Iake any IIOre IIOves in 
theae hours; Together with NCo 
If it'a a 20 to 21 I can undo what I did earlier. It 
will in effect .ak; an 18 to a 17, won't it? 
It'll wash the whole thing. 
NC 19 to 20, TW 18 to 17, BN 20 to 21. We benefit becauae 
it allows '1'W 18 to 17 (17 goes to 44; 18 t~ 41; 19 and 20 
unchanged) • 
We can go back to where we were. 
And then they could accuse us of not doing anything M 
could lIove back to where it was and then it can slide asai 
Mine is effective June 1. 
I have to tell the conference people by five if we need 
the room. Tomorrow it'll cost. I don't want to be here. 
I won't be here. 
Well I won't be here if AA isn't. 
Mill ahow up. 
Well then I'll be here, but I won't be here if a .. jar 
carrier isn't{ 
We can't let these Meeting. deteriorate, and 10U know they 
do when carriers leave. Now UA -- this is the first ,!eetil 
they've missed, and they have a Bood rell!!!Jon. But ot~erwisl 
everyone should be here. If anyone needs a ph~ne we 11 
Tlake it available. It would be a dn if we have to com~ 
back. We've made great -- astounding prQgress. lie can t 
let this meeting break up. At O'llare we lost ground every 
time after we broke up. Now we'll make a phone available 
to anyone who needs it. 
We're Aoing to try. It'. not fair to the rest of the 
cOllDlllttee. I don't believe ve. can force them, but 
we'll appeal to their conacience. . 
Why don't you pullout Mr. Lapinaky'. letter--he •• id 
any meeting in Chicago and Washington they Would attend. 
Let', take. five-.inute break. 
[Br •• k) 
At, do you have an,. good news? 
No, but perhapa room G lIill help G for good. How ab,out 
G for 'Get everyone here'? 
Let's get lIuggeat!onl on how to reeolve thi. thing. 
Shall ve make this a popularity contest? Any propOlala? 
We need help. 7 movea-7 dots open. 
Do we have anything to ahow what dots were uaed lut 
aummer? , 
We have the June 1978 FAA handout. 
Five or dx carriers are actually aak.tng for aDre IIlo~. 
in 16, 17, 18 than previoualy, and two leas. Just an 
observation. 
Yes, lomething like that w .. laid, it involved trade-
ofts. It hasn't eacaped the scrutiny of the other 
members. 
Ate lie going to hear Iny _ore new. this evening? Good 
news? Bad news I don't Want to hear about. Is there 
anything you feel you can atill do this evening, to .. 
help U9 along? 
There's one. lIore IlOVe that I'll do, I don't want to do 
it, but I'll move out of 1600 into .omething earlier. 
I don't want to do it yet, I Wilnt to Bee another iIIOve. 
In connection with that, Itll IIOve an 18 to a 16. 
don't know if fbn'. being recorded. 
I'm recording ~t. 
In stone: 
EA: 
Coleman: 
lylypec: 
EA: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
AK: 
Pylypec: 
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Py1ypec: 
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Pylypec: 
TW: 
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IIA: 
NB: 
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NB: 
TW: 
Pylypec: 
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If you vant you can lIOve me from 16 to 15. 
In effect an 18 haa gone to • 15. Everybody agree? 
Six moves. We've come a long way. We really have. 
Before we recess I urge you to study your papers, talk 
to whoever you have to. Let '" get this thing wrapped 
up first thing tomorrow morning. We were hoping we'd 
be at that position today, We're close. We're making 
progress, though dowly. We'll lIolve it, like we always 
have. 
Can we ~ontact UA and NW' before we clear up ahop. 
Sure. 
llaller haa been in touch with them all day. 
1 spoke to AX'II attorneys in New Haven and -told them 
it would be good, instructive, if they could get down 
here tomorrow. 
[Receaa until toaorrov] 
[1600 haa 42: 1700 h .. 44; everything ehe clean] 
I think ve have everyone here. A representative of AA 
vill be joining in ehortly froll New YlIrk. We eppreciate 
AX. being here. It 'e been our experience that we get 
things done when everyone t. here, new carriero or carriers 
here for many yean. We hope all of you vl11 parti-
cipate until the very end. We've come a long vay. We 
have some overages in tva hour8--we have roolD in many 
houn of the day I we just have some overage in the peak 
hours. We could wrap thb up in a fev minutea or hours. 
We hope we could wrap thb up today. 
We do not impact on the affected hours. Wt!. have given 
up 40:C of our asked-for slota. We art!. a small carrier, 
we appreciate the irony that we give up $500/day by 
giving up a fHght and "ome of the larger carriers may 
give up $50,OOO/day. We appreciate that we've been 
allowed to come on board at DCA as 8 new carrier. 
[Shows Chart] 
We have tva dots in 1600 ho.urs 4S II commuter carrier. 
We could move one to 1500 if that kind of trade could 
be made. 
You could jUllt say 18 to 16, it's a Dlovement, VI! don't 
care how tt'!!! classified. I'm sure we could find a 
nominee to go 16 to 18 without much sweat. 
EA1 NA1 
Like I said yesterday I have some slides to 16 vhen 
counts come down on 117 And 16. But I don't vant to move 
when I don't have to. I can't move any more out of 
these, . I've already given up two out of 17. I could 
move 15 to 14. 
NC1 
Nothing. 
TW1 
I made six movea yeaterday. If someone would move 
21 to 22, I could move 11 to 12. 
Can anyone move 21 to 22? WAf any good news from you 
this morning? 
No, nothing_ 
I just talked to NB and they can't m;ve out of 1600. 
In order to do that they would have to leave New lIaven 
at 3:10, and they can't. . 
We can't talk about that. 
Oh. They could go from a 17 to an 18. They could take 
one at 18 and one .t 19. They could do two l8s. I 
have to get back to them, they are looking at the poni-
bll1tiea. 
I could probably go back 19 to 20, if it went that way 
(There ·are now the folloving possibilities, written 
underneath the main chart: BN, -11 +10; NB, -17 +19; 
TW, -19 +20] 
Ub, do you have anything? 
I can't move that 20, 1n order to have the airplane 
overnight for crew nnd maintenance. Our other flight 
1s at 7. 
Lapham: 
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Pylypec: 
AK; 
Coleman: 
AK: 
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NB: 
Coleman: 
NB: 
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Pylypee, 
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BN: 
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AK: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
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TW: 
Pylypec: 
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Crittenden: 
TW: 
Crittenden: 
Coleman: 
NC: 
B-35 
Say that again. 
We could trade a commuter dot for a carrier alot. 
No that definitely wouldn't help. 
Sorry about "that. 
Nothing happened l .. t night. 
We're aho here on behalf of ND, if anything develop. 
as to that. If they have any thoughts ve'll try to 
convey them, 
Would you know what NB' s .lide capability i., a .lide 
out of 1700. • 
We could go from 18 to 17. 
The only room we have left, ve have to lIOve to the left. 
The 168 and l7a have to move to the 11a and 128 and 13 •• 
I will contact them and see what they can do. 
Any !lOve to the left if there', room. 
Any IIOve to the left even if there 1In' t rooll. 
AL. are you Btill hopeful that you'U'"coae. througtr with 
aomething today? 
At thill time we don t t h,ve .ny alidu. deletion •• 
At this time. 
BN. how do thinga look in your cllllp. 
Pretty ble.k. In fact. that lallt .ave I made I'll trying 
to figure out a way to fit it in. I created. problem" 
for mys~lf. 
DL1 
Is it the coneenlul of the Broup that -.ovement to the 
left. eay 18 to 17 or 17 to 16, that wuld be helpful? 
We could underatand the need to have adjacent houn. 
What is it going to take, other than obvious moves? 
What are. ve all waiting for? It'" not going to happen 
by itself. You've got to do it. 
We have to go to another engagement. We'll move one 
from 20 to 21, one from 21 to 22. 
Beautiful. 
I can t t· think of a better parting Beature. 
We should find out then if ve could get that NB "ve. 
tf you can leave a lIesaage--we could 'num" 17 to 19 
18 OK. Before they go is there anyone who could go 
from 17 to 18 or 18 to 19. 
We'd prefer to Itay where ve are. 
I could undentand that. And if ve can't get the ... 
other moves we're back to .quare one. TW you had a 19 
to 20, fA had an 18 to 17. 
lIe'l1 hold that. 
We'll call you about NB. 
Walt, let' •• ee vhat ve get fro. liB first. 
Let'l take a break. 
[Break] 
What vae the Ka total for April 1 allocated to them? 
What they uaed. 
Thh ia an updated copy. 74. 
Winter .fIlot allocation fa 74? And April 297 
62. 
I believe Bob cited theee preche figures yeaterday 
during one of his atatementa. 
I get .II message here from AL cancelling 13 1Il0ta at 
DCA in Hay. Can we hope they vould cancel them for June? 
AL: 
TW: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
TW: 
AL: 
TW: 
DL: 
WA: 
TW: 
Coleman: 
TW: 
WA: 
NA: 
coleman: 
TW: 
Coleman: 
Pylypec: 
TW: 
Pylypec: 
eN: 
Pylypec: 
AL: 
Coleman: 
TW: ' 
B-38 
We anticipate using .11 our .lots requested for the 
lIumraer sesllon. 
Perhaps At can help UIJ. 
AL, you do have an impre!ll!live number of dote, five, 
at 1700. M,y poallibl11ties1 
lIe've gone down 4 from what ve requested for the IIUlJIller; 
!lome have raised. W;e aade 3 or 4 slides, I don't know 
what else we can do. 
You did' indicate lut night that there 10ay be pOlldbillt1eso 
We checked into that. We can't do anything, we're 
governed by crew tillle. 
Carriers not udns dota, April 29 through Kay-VA haa 
4-2 In 2200 and 2 In prime houra. These deletions 
are up through June 6. They hold 70 allocations. We 
should ask VA their intentione on these. AL. AA, VA--
we got to get movement out of these carriers AA 'a 
come down in their allocations--but on 2 or 3 elate 
they could move. We've got to get slides out of them. 
We should ca11--an analyst coming down here won I t help 
Iluch. Got to call Mr. Hermsn directly. This is my 
personal opinion. You're groping for .1111 areas. We've 
got to try. 
Reference waa made yesterday to what WftS held in t'he 
FAA in June 1978--reference was made to the number of 
open slots at the time the number were reported to the 
FAA. Between noon and 2159, 15 alots were not used. 
By coincidence, the July 1979 new entries require 15 
alots. MOTe to the point, BN in June 1978 needed 16, 
In July 1979 BN holds 22--an increase of e1x over the 
number reported to the FAA in June 1978. On theae July 
charts f BN was up 4 between 12 and 2159. Those 4 flight. 
atUl ate not Icheduh:d. We have in prime hours at 
DCA six open fIlots--it seems to me. that the carrier 
who has, the overage, audacity, to come in, with new 
carriers requi ring dots, they should move into open 
elots. Six slots are open ftt opll!n hours. Nobody haa 
firm schedules--not 80 presumptivlI! as to make firm 
achedulee without a guarantee of alota. 
down to 23. With AK moving CroJD 20 to 22, that would 
leave a alot open aomewhere. To make it \lark for me. ] 
need another slot 12, 13. 14, except 11 AM. It would -
give me an o,ld number--15L I have to put stuff back 
that I took out. Maybe WA could move from 17 to 16. 
WA "ill do it, 
It would be July Ion. 
Minus 2 at 16, plu. 2 at IS, plus 1 at 12--0K? 
Wherever you vant to put it. 
It vou1d have to be June 15. 
I'll move a 15 to a 12. June 8 onward. 
Let's take the NB/AK/TW 1I'IOve and can it NB. OK, 'Ill? 
Why don't we take it from UA, and aybe persuade NB . 
to do something elle? 
VA b June 8. ),X is whenever they start. A problem of 
greatly diminished proportions. 
We could use cancellations. TW'? 
I could move 17 to 21. 
We need 21 to 22. BN, could you move one? 
A 21 to • 221 . No, lir. 
AL1 
I talked w1th our office, and told them it would 
looaen up something. They're looking at it. It'a. 
very big restriction on us. I'll go check with them. 
[The chart looks Uke thb: 1-39; 12-40; 13-39; 14-39; 
15-40: 16-41; 17-42; 18-40; 19-4020-40 21-40; 22-31. 
Possibilities: BN, -11+10. WB, -17 +19; 'Ill, -17 +21] 
Nl!!ed a 19 to a '21, and then two 2la to a 22. 
That would take both l7s out". 
BN: 
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BN: 
DL: 
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TW: 
Coleman: 
NA: 
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EA: 
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B-J9 
Number. can be made to make any point you want to~ 
It's true than BN Is looking for four more than it I, 
now operating. The reason h the same as for the othera-
new routes, new urkets to lerve. The hours in which . 
increases over current operationl occur are not in any 
hours. Where overages appear. Three oper.tion. are 
in the middle time frame where thera are .tUl openingl--
the latter times present no problem. DL 18 using figure. 
to make a p!'int which is not completely accurate. 
Could ". have BN lubmiuionl for thia pertod? I think 
my f1gurea era right. 
I'd b •. aled to .upply changee. 
I'd rather have lublliesion. 
[Read. liN ,ubmiesions] . 
AK had two 19a, lIOved one to 20 and one to 21. 
I agrell!d to calle back to the .eating on the bali. that 
AA would be represented. It'a 11 and they're not here. 
t lion' t be here this afternoon. 
I wish the chair would call Hr. IJenlan and .. k .bout 
poaslble deletions and slides. We need help from ¥. 
I just Ipoke with AA and UA. I Ipoke to Herun. "ho'. 
Bergerts (AA rep] boss, and Henl.nta bOlJs. They •• id 
they I ve reduced to what they came into the ll.eeting vith. 
as • utter of accommodation. They clidn' t nnd anyona 
here. I told them it was critical, and they .aid'they'd 
send aomeone. He should be here early afternoon. They 
didn't volunteer any additional WOVe!. 
They laid they'd take a 17 to 19 if NB doe.n't. He 
alao said he'd go from 14 to 12 .III • way of aking 'pael. 
We'll take that move. UA had lome other thinga to aay 
but 1'm not going to repeat them. Thi. 1e from June 8 
onward. 
Perhaps we can get two goinao 
We need NB. 
We are almolJt due a 17 to • 22 beeauee we know we've 
got it one way or another. It would be nice to get a 
19 to a 22. 
AI'.: 'feleaaed an 11 • 13; UP\" 20 .. 
two s10ts to 20--it'lII easy to get into 21. Go 1:0 14 t 
and vacated 20 go there, and we need a 16 to 14. 
We'll sUde .from 15 to D. June 15 through the season. 
[IS is now 19; 13 is now 40] 
If you can get AA to retract I'll release. 13. 
If ve c.n get. 16 to IS, 17.11 to 21. HOlt painful 
io 21 to 22, 
16 to 15: 
Two movea'll put UII one over. 
I val just noticing that .U new carriere ade ~re than 
their effort to aecoDlDodate, except QU. Why don I t we 
give them • call? 
I was on the phone vith them rather extensively. 
Apparently they've given it a hard look. Apparently, 
they're tied. 
Walt, hae NW cOlle out of that aeeting yet? 
I know, we t re 311 aware they haven't Irad •• chedua 
change since 1973. Any particular direction I could 
aend QU in? 
Sure, 16 to 15. 
21 to 22, 
That presuub1y would be IIOre difficult. But 16 to 
15 lIight b. f.uible. 
From what I understand of their ache.d, it'. rather 
difficult--but I'll pass it on. 
t cftn respond to the QH Query. 16 to 15 ia a turnaround 
and they get in at the end of the 1500 hour. They laid 
they've tried. I believe thea. There'a more to it, 
but it's not worth getting into. With a most rudimentary 
knowledge of scheduling, you can aee their difficulty. 
, ,[Lunch Bruk] 
TW, 
Cole .. n: 
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B-42 
Call NA vhen AA. ~rrives. 
That ahould be loon. EA 11 uking a call right now. 
Any good newl froa anyone over the long luncheon break 
that we had? 
There's an indication of two moves out of 1700 hour, 
correct? 
One at 19, one at 21. 
SOlleone' could slide a 16 to 15. I'll offer another 
possibility. To pair up with the NB possibility. BN 
,",QuId consider moving 1900 to 14. That cleaTS one of 
17. 111 moves vould .hitt 17 ·to 21. So we,would need 
two moves: 21 to 22 and 16 to 15. 
At, .how about you? 
No moveB at thb mOllent. 
16 to 15 and 21 to 22. 
We'd need both, Hr. Chairman. It bol1s down to two' 
moves. 
I have a dot at 18, and at 40--these are the two I 
have at the 1600 hour. 11m 18 minute~ from the hour 
on ,one, 40 minute. on the other. When you have two in 
the middle there'a nothing you can do. 
Jack, would you like to move a 16 to a 15? 
No, I wouldn't. 
Would it hurt that .ueh? 
nave we had a 21 to 22? 
No we haven't. We need 2 moVell. PI, what about you? 
No, I can't do anything there. 
Walter is calling ml. TW? 
Go ahead and mark it up, but 1t' s a bitter pill to 
swallow. It'. going to be done anyway, effective July 1. 
TW1 
July 1. 
[17 w.nt frail 42 to 40; 21. from 40 to 411 
Let's take care of the easy one first: 16 to 15. Who 
can do that? AL. you have a possible move. 
Yes, we are prepared to end thh meeting. We are 
prepared to move 21 to 22 if .omeone else yi11 mOve 
16 to 15. We'd like to go on record 8S saying if a 
20 of 21 opens .t DCA, we'd like to have it. ' 
Bill, would you like to be a hero and 1II0ve 16 to 157 
I can't do it. I ju.t c.n't do it. 
16 to 15, going once. 
A long way from this morning, from six to one or none. 
t think it 1 ll work out. 
If no one else iIJ going to do it--I hate to move off 
a flight I've had for 10 yean. It's not 8 hard move. 
but in all fairness I've had it for 80'10ng. I'm going 
to get shot for thh. OK. 
Yay. 
Ye •• 
If the committee doesn't .ind, I'd like to pick up 
an 11. Otherwbe. I'll go to the Res Bureau July 1. 
I don't. think there'. a problem. 
We only have an opening through September 5--but AA 
said they may change. Right now we can give it to you 
through September 5. 
We still have sOUle isolated problems to work out.' We 
know \Ie have everything solved froUl July 1 to Sep!:ember 5. 
The only thing to work out io the AA extension. 
TW: 
.BN: 
Coleman: 
BN, 
Cole1Dan: 
EA, 
BN. 
Coleman: 
BN: 
TW. 
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16 to 15, p1ua HA/a earlier conven.tian ••• Haybe NA 
could give up 13 for M, and anUlling 16 to IS and 21 
to 22, we need a 19 to 20. It'a a wild chance ... ybe 
we could do it. 
If AA could undo their move into 2000, we wouldn't need 
21 to 22. 
BN, could 10u-l have had a convenation with attorney. 
for NB--they'd rather go froa 17 to 18, if you could 
80 18 to 14. 
I've .1~eady I&Oved .0 18 to 14. 1 could SO 17 to 18 
if it would help. 
No, it wouldn't. 
Jack [TWI got 17 to 20. 
I could 80 21 to 20. 
I just called NW, he just vent to lunch. Loob awfully 
suspicious. 
If AA could undo that move into the 2000 hour. 
If he c.n l t do it, • 21 to 22 or another 16 to 14. 
I'll go cd1 Mr.- Herun. 
It'. really down to one move. 
Most people know what it'll take. At thia *>ment AL 
b workins hard for a .olution. Firat we'd like to 
hear in per.on frail repre.ent.tives of M and NA before 
we uke our .aves. 
AA said they couldn't do anything. So did NW. Nw 
add they couldn't do any more moves. NB aaid they 
didn't like moving 17 to 19, would rather 17 to 18. 
but they did it. I told M they could have an 11 and 
13 for a 20, but they uid oh no, they couldn't do :it. 
DN: BN isn I t particularly in favor of activating these .ove.--
if they can't even get a repreaentative here. Represen-
tatives of one-third of the total number of slots aren't 
here and they e'xpect us to grind out the work for them. 
I've got to get back to my oJlice, I've'Bot to vork 
night a and veehnd.'. 
one Over at 18. 
, tva over at 16, two at 18. 
The rest of it is minor, almost inconaequentl.1--one 
over for a week, a day here and there. We'll do it 
when everyone gets back. 
Coleman: Let'lf get back [Repeat a the nuabers]. We can tell you 
who' a up from July 1, if that t. helpful. One-week 
problems--you aight hear from us on the phone. 
DN. you're one up 1n that period--two in that period. 
TW, you did it July 1--th.t'. part of the problem. 
EA: I know two I'D. up. I moved them out of 16, effective 
July 1. 
TW: I canlt be in 16 if I'm down 16. 
Crittenden: Your problem i. the last part of June. 
Coleman: You DIade your date effective July 1. I'm looking at 
why July, August, and September .re aolved but June 
isn't. The aame is true in lBOO--EA up one. TW up one. 
That and overage are the only problemll that remain. 
DL: t'll 1I0ve one 18 to 19, but it will have to be through 
June 14. 
Coleman: That .olve. the fint part. 
BN: lIow'lI 1500 during the first hdf of June? 
Cr1ttenden~ Open. 
Coleman: We t 11 send a vire out soon nking for your weekend 
IiIchedules. 1 find this poaeibly • little too difficult 
to handle by phone. Can I t we handle these two weeks 
now1 I don't believe it'. worth aitting here for two-
weeks in June. I vote we adjourn. Not. diamiual. 
but an 'adjourmnent. 
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NOTES FROH AIRLINE SCHEDULING CONMITTEE * 
DENVER, COLORADO 
DCA MORNING SESSION, JULY 23, 1979 
Chair: Reported that ZW was at previous ORD meeting. ATA members 
have met to consider alternatives to the scheduling committee. 
Suggestions ranged from staying in, quitting, to getting 
more slots from general aviation. 
Discussed future of committee -- two possible threats. 
(1) CAB unhappy with current system, 
(2) Entrants led to fear that the system could fall apart~ 
"with tha t goes bag of horrors." FAA hopes tha t the 
system will not fail as does not wish to schedule and 
has no idea of the basis to be used. As an interim 
measure, FAA might use first come, first serve, 
FAA will not increase. 
Counsel: FAA suggests lowering slots at DCA from 40 to 36 for noise. 
Also, an increase in air taxis for small communities. 
Administrator said the task force group hopes for a recom-
mendation for a new system from the CAB in August. Previous 
deadline \JaB March. Regarding the "infamous" Frontier memo, 
CAB thinks the commIttee mechanism is not competitive enough. 
*These notes cover tll(' !-'f'llse of tIll' mC'etlng hut are nut necessarily 
verbatim quotes. Notel'! were taken by David M. Grether. 
bid type, have been suggested at the high-density airports. 
Also lotteries -- the CAB seems to be taking lotteries very 
seriously. This is distressing; hopes it never comes to 
pass. 
Unrealistic not to face up to the possible end of the 
mechanism. ATA feels that it works, and nothing so far 
suggested appeals to ATA. Members should be careful to 
see that the committee doesn I t fail. 
Coleman: Regarding ATA meeting and DCA problem -- KC operating at 
DCA without slots. Same could be true for CJ. Pilgrim 
wants In at DCA also and expects to be certified in 
September as does one other carrier. Currently in excess 
at DCA, FAA willing to let slide Until this meeting. 
(Showed total submissions for DCA on screen; pointed out size ( 
problem. Told members to study slide for a few minutes) 
Chair: First tried to solve August problem. 
NA: Felt not good time to solve August problem. New carriers 
should take slack hours. Old carriers have set schedules 
now. Slides not of much use when over on slots. 
(Meeting turned to winter schedule.) 
NA: Delete I at 0800. 1100, 1200, 1300, and slide 1900 to 2100. 
C-J 
NB: Can delete 2 -- could drop at 1800 and 1900, or 1 at 1600 
and 1700 for net drop of 2. 
Coleman: Took 2 and slide later if necessary. Now 60 over. 
Chair: 
NB: 
Chair: 
All right. Let's gettsome more deletions -- long day. 
Let's take allover 20 percent and talk them down. EA is 
only target; next largest carrier is 12.7 percent. 
Will go around the room. UA? 
UA: Looking hard; will have· something later. 
Ref Nothing to offer; holding with 4. 
DL: No reduction. 
BN: None now. 
NIl: None at this time. 
AK.: 1 at 1500 -- all days. 
Coleman: This gives you an odd number. 
AK: Add 1 at 0600. 
UR: Only have 4; Just want same. Hardly anything. 
NA: 
QH: 
C-4 
Already down. Those trunks going up should drop or will 
blow meeting; until trunks back to previous base level, 'Will 
hang. Can't expect entrants to drop. Bad guys are BN, and 
we all know who others are. If I were small, I would' t chan( 
NA won't change. 
No. 
AA: No. 
PI: Agrees vith NA. 
AL: No. 
EA: 
TW: 
Thought we had 140; somehow got 142; will drop 2 at 0700, 220 
and slide later. Have been around 140 for years; will not 
drop for entrants. 
11lanks to CAB, want to grow; this is part of deregulation. 
No help. 
KC Delete 1 at 0800 and 1300. 
UA: Been in trouble due to strike. But in spirit of helping now 
will go down 1 at 0700, 2100; will slide later. 
NB: We have already cut 25 percent; have flexibility to slide. 
WA: Have only 4; can't help. Notes that EA cut 1.4 percent of their request. Disturbed 
Chair: Don't talk about markets. Not supposed to discuss 
destinations. 
NB: We only go from New HavJn. Only an idiot 'Wouldn't know 
NA: 
Chair: 
TW: 
Chair: 
BN: 
NA: 
what market we serve. 
Lots of those in Washington, D.C. 
(long pause) 
You know what it is going to take. Let's get some 
deletions. 
(pause) 
lIbat about it TW? 
Have been releases by 6 carriers over summer', Those carriers 
should go down to starting base. Might as well get mad. 
Names them. AL, BN (gained 4 and dido' t use), NA, UA, 
EA, NlI, M. Some not using slots allocated. 
BN -- any comment? 
No. 
We released in summer because of DC-lOs. Have reduced 
already. This difference won't do. Until 8N, AL, M, and 
DL come dO.WIl, there won't be progress. Won't move until 
BH drops. If they sit, might as well quit. No one will 
move until liN drops down. 
more. Maybe wants to blow meeting. 
Chair: BN? 
BN: 
NA: 
Chair: 
NA: 
Chair: 
We seem to be SOB's but not changing now. 
Move to recess DCA. If BN drops, ve can start over. Let's 
go to LGA. Won't waste his time. Will walk out if DCA meeting 
continues unless BN drops down. 
Ten minute break. 
(later) 
I understand your frustration but it is always a difficult 
uphill.fight. Let's use best persuasive powers. Dontt feel 
we should close DCA meeting. I hope to get help from al1. 
Will keep pressure on. 
I hear you and if up 10 to 12 slots, all right; we could 
sit here and argue. But we are 60 slots over and I don't 
think anyone will move unless BN drops down. 
(BN out calling his office) 
Let's hope he gets good guidance. 
NA: If this is the best effort by BN, I hate to see worst. 
UA: Even if took away increases from last time and assume~ 
0700 and 2200 .It 40, would still need 30 reductions 
Chair: 
NB: 
Chair: 
BN: 
Chair: 
C-7 
with 0700 and 2200 full (which has never happened). Another 
reference to BN gaining 4 and no t using them. If no real 
progress by noon, we should go to LGA. Value of time 
brought up. 
Deregulation has done good things for many of us. At JFK 
and ORD wide bodies helped. If can't fix, give over to 
government. UA would like to see connnittee continue. 
UA goes along with NA. 
Let's not quit too quickly. Took around eleven days for 
ORD. Worst problem ever at DCA. 
We understand what might happen if FAA took over. We all 
know how political it is. Maybe we should review who would 
win. Names areas and congressmen and senators: R. Giaimo, 
Bayh, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Byrd. 
There is uncertainty, but it will be worse. Here we have 
control over our own destiny. Can't speculate on what 
would happen. This might not be best -- inefficient possibly, 
but has worked. 
Drop 2 at 1000 daily all season. 
Thank you BN. 
AAl 
M: Can't help~ lleleases in summer due to mechanical 'Problem9~ 
Chair: 
DL: 
Could we use July use as a "working base"? 
Poll: AA, yes; AL, no; BN, no; DL, yes; EA, no, but if close 
would consider (2 over); NA, nOj NW, yes; PI, yes; TW, no; 
UA, no, but" if close would consider (2 over); AK, no; NB, no, 
an unqualified no -- had 4, need 6, and have given 2; QH, nOj 
RC, yes; WA, yes; KC, nOj AL. yes, if 80 is number. 
Let's poll on post meeting numbers as a starting point. 
Post meeting poll: AA, yes; AL, yes; BN, yesJ Dt, yes; EA, yes; 
NA, pass; NW, yes; PI, yes; N, nOj UA, yes. already belowj 
UR, yes; WA, yes; KC, not there; NA, yes; 'fW, can go ahead 
but 'WOn't take number; NB, stop with 6 -- emphasizes already 
down 2; QH, no. 
(Coleman now going to change post meeting by lowering those 
already down and adding KC and AKj also those that were "no" 
NB. QH -- put in at higher figure -- on slide shown on screen __ 
called column G on slide.) 
Total: 652 -- down from 692. 
Coleman: If fill 0600 and 0700, etc. we will be only 8 over. 
AI.: Not sure of procedure!. 
C-8 
TIl: When did DC-IO problem start? Answer: around June 5 to 6. 
Slot releases not all mechanical problems. 
NA: '!'W, do you think you are going to end up with gain of 101 
TIl: No. 
NA: Why not drop now? 
TIl: If all carriers who are up come down, TW will come down. 
Currently, 
AA + 2, AK + 1, AI. + 4. BN + a, CJ + 2, DL + 2. EA + 2, 
NA + 12, NB + 2, PI - 1, QH + 4. TW + 10, UA + 6, KC + 6~ 
compared with what was reported to FAA as in operation in 
July. Is the 2 BN cut 2 of 4 it is not using? Says was 
token gesture. 
BN: No, they were part of increase. 
TIl: 
Chair: 
AL: 
(long pause) 
Drop I at 1600, 1700 daily all season. If have to chip 
away like this, it will be a long, long meeting. 
AL, can you help? 
No. 
Chair; DL? 
UA: 
TIl: 
NA: 
DL: 
Poll: AA, Yes; Ale, yes; AL, won't reduce; BN. yes; DL, yes; 
EA, yes; KC, yes; NA, yes; NH, yesj NY, yes; PI, yes; QU, yes; 
UR, yes; '!'W, not my number; UA, yes; RC. yeSj WA, yes. 
What would TW want in column G to go forward? 
52 is my number. 
(left meeting until 'l'W down.) Call me when it happens. 
NA holds key to DCA. Let's adjourn. TW, if I had to release 
12 I would leave too. 
(Much discussion among chair, Coleman, Crittenden. 
Coleman left meeting.) 
UA: TW has good point about slot releases. What was accomplished 
at special meeting in Mayor April was good. Even with TW at 
52. would be better than where we were. If NA would return __ 
some carriers have history of releasing slots. 
DL: How did NA vote on first poll? 
Chair: No. 
(.Just sitting. Meeting now about 2.5 hours old.) 
TW: AL up 2, BN up 4, comparing column G with July operations. 
QH: 
EA: 
c-u 
I have a fair proposal. Let each carrier be given 16 slots 
for openers. Those who want more can haggle. The rest can 
leave. It is not fair for small carriers without resources to 
spend time here, so give all a base and let those who want 
more stay. 
We signed~ agreement to give best efforts. My 142 just as 
important as someone else's 6. If we do this, let's do it 
for ORD. nyou submit number and you bargain from there. II 
QH: OK, but DCA is a public airport. EA has no higher interest 
thsn QH. 
EA: 
NB: 
EA: 
NB: 
UA: 
I need 140; could drop to that. 
Do you think you will keep 23 percent? No way. 
We will take our chances. Will be political pressure. 
Ted Kennedy gets what he wants. 
Goose and golden egg story again. 
Not time to come up with another system. We all start out 
at zero (EA said same). New carriers want in. If you want 
in you must sit here. We have procedure that has wo~ked for 
C-12 
UA: Not here for a crap game. 
NB: Just pointing out realities. 
UA: EA wants 140. This is their best effort. 
NB: How do yau determine best effort? EA said, if down to 1 or 2 
over, will consider a move. We gave up 25 percent of our 
slots. 
UA: (applauds) 
NB: 
DL: 
Chair; 
(quite heated) 
Without efforts of large carriers -- EAt UA, TW have given 
good efforts over years. Without that little guys wouldn I t 
be here. 
Tries to cool it. Too early to judge what are best efforts. 
AL: I take offense at a new carrier "assaulting" a carrier 
that has solved many problems over the years. Shouting not 
helpful. 
(Recess at 11:45 until 1:15) 
years. DCA AFI'ERNOON SESSION, JULY 23, 1919 
NB: Little guys have nothIng to lose. We will get it fr6nr FAA. 
EA says won't go below 23 percent. That is foolhardy. 
At: No. Will start there; not necessarily can live with it though. 
Chair: Need some suggestions. Have G. What do we do with it? 
Coleman: Let's see what hours they were. 
Chair: 
Chair: 
AL: 
Chair: 
Too early. 
(Asked AA, AL, BN for hours; said no.) 
Let's firm up: 
WA, yesi TWA, yes; PI, yes; NA, yes; DL, yes; AK, yes; 
UR, yes; RC, yes; NW, yes; KC, yes; DN, yes; M, yes; 
UA, yes; QII, yes; NB, yes; EA, yes; AL, no. 
If go with figures can live with, it will be 82. (This 
would raise to 662.) 
If AL at 82, will this change any votes? 
No. 
AL goes to 82. 
Chair asks for hours again. 
DL goes down I at 2100, 2200. 
NA goes down 1 at 1100, 1200j adds 1 at 1500; down 2 at 1600. 
1100; down 1 at 1900. 
AA goes down 1 at 1100 and 2200 
(Long pause) 
1:20 begin. Not all here waiting. NA back -- reading a 
book. The Salamander by Morris West. 
(Coleman trying to figure it out) 
2:00; Figures now add up to 662. (18 over between 
0700-2259) 
Coleman: Need deletions before slides. 
Chair: UA, can you help? 
UA: Working on it. Would like to see others. 
RC: Can't offer deletion. Looking at numbers of new carriers 
compared to last meeting -- new carriers 16 old plus 40. 
DL: No deletions. 
BN: 
NW: No reductions. 
AK: 
WA: 
NA: 
QH: 
M: 
PI: 
C-15 
EA: No 
Chair: Save TW for las t. 
1W: Down 2 at 2200 
(AL on phone -- to be called on next) 
KC: No. 
N8: No. 
UR: No. 4 is minimum. Would like to stick with that. 
UA: In hopes of getting participation of other carriers, 
drop 1 at 1300, 2200. 
Chair~ Thank you, Pete. 
(Now 34 in 0700; 17 in 2200) 
A1: No reduction at this time. 
NA: Goes to call office before closes. 
(2:20) 
Chair: EA? 
EA: Would look at dropping 1 at 2200; not clear does much good; 
but will go to 139. 
Schedule is such that it works (reference to odd number of slots). 
(l,15) 
(3:10) 
AL: Have plan that would reduce to 80. Office working on it. 
Won't know till tomorrow. 
Chair: Will probably he here tomorrow after LGA. 
QH: At an impasse. If all start naked and all have certificates, 
give everybody some minimum, e. g. 10-12. 16. Not fair for 
stnall carriers. For example, QH wants 10 and EA 142. 
QH doesn't want to sit here all day because EA wants 142. 
Proposes being given 10 slots; let others argue. 
NB: I second that. We are here because law changed. Don't say 
we are here because big carriers allowed us. We deserve to 
be here. 
Chair: Of course you deserve to be here. 
Counsel: Infonnation: This committee operates by agreement with FAA. 
QH: 
CAB approval gives antitrust exemptions. Earlier tried to 
have sharing (QH's suggestion) agreements. Didn't work 
because didn't agree. Wouldn't have mattered because CAD 
would never approve such an agreement. No criteria in 
agreement allowed. Can argue in best effort, but must do so. 
No labor-saving agreement possible. Would need CAB approval. 
Have reviewed agreement. Chair could sny at an impasse and 
propose a new way. .Just start with 10 each. Do it like a 
foothall rlraft. When satisfied, can leave. 
C-16 
Chair: 1W? 
1W: No. Can slide. 
Chair: It w111 take more than slides as all of you well know. 
Chair; BN? 
BN: No. 
Chair: AL? 
A1: 11m looking. 
Chair: Good. I hope the rest of you are too. 
(2:30) 
Chair: Do any east coast carriers want to call office? 
No. 
Chair: TW, you are smiling. Did you find something? 
1W: No. Just laughing at the mistakes I made. 
Chair: You discovered you can cancel moves? 
'TIl: No. 
(2:35) 
UR: I need to be in office tomorrow -- leaving -- just give 
enforce involuntarily without change in agreement. 
QH: Suggestion: Let's look at some number and get majority 
or quorum for it. 
RC: For same reason, against. 
EA: No. I'm here to bargain. No one is going to allot slots 
to us. EA looks out for EA as others look out for themselves. 
AK: Concerned with and do not support arrogance of new carriers. 
Just because new, doesn't mean should get what you want. 
QH: Regarding arrogance: Free country. Deregulation act makes 
it more so. All entitled to use DCA. QH wants 10. That's 
not too many. Just want fair share. 
NB: Says same thing. We aren't arrogant in requesting 6. New 
ball game--don't know rules. 6 of 640 isn't asking for a 
hell of a lot. Trying to serve area without service since 
At pulled out. 
A1: Will QH drop some of 10 to hl!lp? 
QH: No. 10 is not out of line. Hove slid already. Picked 1 at 
0700 and 1 at 2200. If had 82 slots I would slide I __ 10 percent 
EA: Only place to slide is out of DCA. Whole day is controlled; 
not like JFK, ORD where some hours not controlled. If expect us 
Chair: 
NB: 
C-19 
to drop around 10 slots, forget it. Won't happen. Might 
as well close the door. 
Still need deletions. 
Why 40 per hour slots or 160 operations? 
Counsel: Numbers chosen assuming an IFR day and 1 hour delay. 
NB: Controller capacity? 
Counsel: Largely. Newark, gates problem -- which has eased. 
DCA, also gates. 
LGA and JFK mostly airborne problems. 
NB: I personally fly in five days per week -- no density problem 
(he is a pilot). Some carriers had 3 to 5 sections per 
flight that aren't counted. Can't be density. 
Counsel: Tell it to FAA. 
NB: If FAA takes over, extra sections will be brought out in 
open and carriers will lose. 
FM: 
Chatr: 
M: 
NB: 
UA: 
Chair: 
If FAA gets in charge, some carriere w11l lose extra sections. 
We know about extra sections and keep count. 
(NA returns with newspaper) 
NA, good news? 
over -- 23 by old carriers. So we aren't the whole problem. 
Shift 15 to 22. 
(NA reading the newspaper)' 
Things aren' ~ as bad as seem. Have until September 22 for OAG. 
Canlt go below 66 without canceling other operations. Could 
slide if helped. Wish could get Borne "I will if you will." 
Hate to see default and see people still releasing slots. 
Our credibility will be zilch. 
Agree. Will be a shame. 
UA: We're better off getting what we have planned rather than 
gamble on a shift here or there later. That goes for everybody. 
(Silence) 
(~:05) 
AK: My schedule requires I leave now. Will be available by phone 
and in DC if needed. Thanks to all carriers that cooperated 
and the financial sacrifices. Allows AK to be here. Hope 
you resolve it. 
Chair: 
POSSible but not probable regarding slides. So few planes; 
will look and try. 
Any help? Btl? 
NA: 
Chair: 
TW: 
NB: 
TW: 
EA: 
M: 
Chair: 
NA: 
TW: 
NA: 
Chair: 
BN: 
Chair: 
NA: 
C-20 
No, down as far as I can go. 
(Mostly silence now) 
(3:~0) 
(Chair quietly checks with TW. No dice.) 
(3:~5) 
Letls get Borne bright ideas. Not much time left this week. 
Some time tomorrow after LGA. Rest of week full through 
Friday. TW, any ideas? 
It is a game being played on scheduled carriers. Charters, 
air taxis, -general aviation, plenty of stuff. FAA says even 
less. We should increase dots to 50 per hour. 
If FAA has records, would show scheduled carriers held d~wn 
needlessly. 
Would like to see DCA tower logs. 
It is nonsense to give slots to 20 seaters and old carriers 
reduce 125 or so seats per slot. 
BN in DC said CAB deregulating all best airports. Should open 
up airports. Markets will decide how much people want to be 
delayed. Also, parking capacity. 
Might be time for Borne kind of exercise. Has worked in past. 
Maybe some of you can get together and suggest some kind of 
exercise. 
Wants to see columna A-G. Shows NA operates 6 less than 
slots allocated. Says TIl must come down (they are + 8 over 
current position). 
Agrees but only if other carriers come down. 
AL + 4, BN + ~, EA + 2, NA + 6, UA + 4, CJ + 2, NB + 2, 
QH +~. KC + 6, TW + 6. 
Allover current position. Not just TW at fault. 
I explained why we doni t use all. NA down 20 frOID two years 
ago. If it weren I t for AA and NA, would have had trouble 
before. Won 1 t drop again. BN not using slots got last time. 
nN, why? 
Don't know. Don't work on domestic schedules. 
Ask office and teU ua. 
Attendance at meetings of people with authority was promised. 
BN should send Someone who can. He (BN) not involved with 
domestic schedules. 
UA: BN can ask office why got" slots in April and not used. 
C-23 
Chair: Other carriers in same boat. 
UA: No one else got extra slots in same meeting. To get +4 and 
not use them looks poor. 
Chair: Right. 
UA: That goes for everyone who has slots not scheduled. 
Chair: "Those days are over or should be over in light of the 
facts that are facing us now." 
(4:18) 
Chair: nl, can you propose a package? 
TIl: 
NA: 
TIl: 
NB: 
NA: 
Chair: 
Chair: 
PI: 
Chair: 
NB: 
UA: 
Chair: 
Anyone can do. We are below reques tB. Will have to go back 
and rework numbers. A lot of other carriers in same boat. 
Can I t delete 1 -- except for EA -- use an odd number. 
Amazing that TIl wants B more and would do -- knowing what's 
going on at DCA. 
We know the situation. Other guys can argue. Others have 
released. We pick up slots and use -- taking advantage of 
deregulation. 
(4:25) 
(4:30) 
(4: 33 -- take 10) 
(4: 50 -- reconvene) 
Have problem with CJ not showing. Waste time. If not 
willing to come, to hell with them. 
There usually are one or two no shows. 
Not always newcomers. 
(5:15) 
(5:20) 
PI, explain proposal again. With 4 carriers, get 8 slots. 
Then what? 
Make another sheet showing increases including 5 new 
carriers and others. 
As shown in Column A (submission) __ as amended __ noW' 
658. 14 over not counting 4 at 0600. 
Contact CJ. They are about 1/2 of the trouble. 
Trying another way. Column C, July 1979. Total of 631, 
includes J at 0600; leaves 9 to fill. Plus EA, UA (turns 
out he forgot KC and CJ; ends up 14 off). 
(5:32) 
(5:35) 
For the benefit of new members. Plenary session Thursday 
at 1:30. Deals with administrative and procedural matters. 
Reports of Finance, etc. committees. Exploration of new 
approaches. 
Coleman: Meeting site for January 1980. 
Chair: 
NA: 
Chair: 
NA: 
PI: 
AL: 
C-24 
Any new ideas? 
We lost one (BN, NB, AL absent). 
Schedule for tomorrow. After recess this evening -- LGA 8 :30. 
Hopefully DCA can reconvene around 1:30. 
Asks about time if adjournment today. Chair says around 6:00. 
To get started. At least 1/2 of meetings go back to status quo. 
If go back to July and PI drops 2, EA drops 2, and UA drops 2, 
would give 6 slots. How you divide up doesn't matter. 
At earlier sessions it took DL years to get up to just a few 
slots. At least 12 sessions have gone back to status quo. Also 
mentions AL -- is possible drop of 2. 
Not opposed to proposal if it would solve meeting. Will ~o to 
80 if needed. Thinks headquarters would go for it if no growth 
by others. 
EA.: OK. No t fair to new carriers. Wouldn't accept if in their 
UA: 
PI: 
UA: 
Chair: 
Chair: 
UA: 
RC: 
DL: 
8N: 
NW: 
!fA: 
NA: 
QH: 
M: 
PI: 
shoes. 
Committed to 66. Could go along and add 2, making 8 available. 
Don't think 640 will work as require 40 at 2200. 
Last time 34 slots in 2200. 
Need compromise. Is CJ here? (Told no -- can contact,:) 
Sixty to seventy carriers usually attend. Because of 
interna tional carriers. 
Let's go around the table. 
Think about being between columns Band C (July and last 
meeting) • 
Nothing. 
Feeling too much reference to old and new carriers. Have 
identified problem that needs to be solved. Too much reference 
to past. Are more increases in new carrier group than in old. 
Need for all to work on it. Someone with 4 may be key to it. 
No comment. 
Needs to be compromise (new carriers) and we old ones will 
have to give. 
AL: No commen t. 
C-27 
EA: Do all we can. Know we can slide. EA will go to 138 if 
necessary. Used 138 in July because of DC-lOs. Wants to 
work out schedule. 
TW: Columns Band C don't turn me on (TWA loses B here). 
KC: No couunen t. 
NB: 
UA: 
Points out that already down 25 percent and going to 4 (8 and 
C) -- not pleased. Will slide when close. 
Not saying all must be between Band C. Increases must 
come from compromise. Each must look at schedules. Carriers 
with slots not used should release now. 
Coleman: Went from 692 to 658 (really 14 over). Great progress. 
Last time this took three days. 
(out 5:50 -- recess) 
DCA AFTERNOON SESSION, JULY 24, 1979 
(1:38) 
Mississippi Valley -- observing. 
Coleman: Talked with CJ. Talked i~ general terms of the meeting. 
NA: 
Chair! 
PI: 
NA: 
Chair: 
PI: 
Chair: 
KC: 
Told 692 requests; got down to 658 by membership -- 14 over 
0700-2259. Told that no summer problem due to equipment 
delay at CJ. Asked to withdraw slot requests. Talked 
with executive vice president -- withdrew request' for 
(2:00) 
(NW doing crossword puzzle) 
PI? Want to try somethin~. Tried something yesterday. 
Well, it seemed like a ray of hope at the time, but not 
sure it was. 
Some of thinking expressed in DC two weeks ago. At some 
point won't be able to resolve. Why not give to FAA now? 
Maybe, I'm coming to agree. Don't know how NA would do. 
lIave had controls at DCA for eleven years and the number 
of slots the same. Staff (controllers) and equipment up. 
Conmuter and taxis have seniority system on slots. If 
legal for them why not for trunk lines? I believe Borne 
carriers in room willing to throw it in hands of FAA. 
Hope not. One year ago trouble at ORD -- trial exercise; 
what about it now? 
ORD different; only slot a few hours. 
Would we lose anything? 
Would be exercise without resolution. 
Chair: EA? 
EA: All mixed up until get 13 out -- could go back and help at 
1700 hour and foul up other hours. 
~; 
Requests: 
Hours: 
Requests: 
NA: 
Chair: 
KC: 
Chair: 
Status at Start of Session 
0600 0700 0800 0900 1000 llOO 1200 1300 
34 44 45 40 37 38 36 
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 
43 48 48 45 47 47 47 39 
Goes up 4 at 1200, 1300, 1600, 1700. 
Today it is for DCA. Tomorrow is ORO; also Thursday, 
and plenary session. Friday is ORO. 
If don't get it, what then? 
August 7 in Washington, D.C. Old Town Holiday Inn. 
(1:55) 
C-28 
1400 
40 
2300 
18 
Coleman: Need 13 deletions. Assuming 40 in 2200 hour. 
Chair: 
UA: 
Let's have some ideas. UA? 
Regrettable that NA is up 4. Solution near Band C in 
order to make room for new ones. Every carrier asking for 
increase will have to come down. Some carriers already have 
reduced requests. Don't know who holds key. 
Can 1 t go below 66 or have to cancel. This puts UA at -4 
from column C (last meeting) +4 from colunttl. B (to FAA as 
actual moves in July). 
Just thought exploring would help. Like to do something 
constructive. Hope there's no feeling here to want to give 
up. Will hurt. As long as spread out evenly. the pain 
should not be unbearable. Can I t believe there is nothing 
we can do at this time. Maybe can I t solve totally. but we 
can surely get closer. Then things happen. Go back to 
your offices and look again. + Some development may make 
solution possible. 
Counsel: Meeting that NA referred to: ATA met to conSider future 
of this mechanism. Some thought mechanism a burden. 
Most thought should keep control of own destiny. I didn't 
want to consider alternatives as may become self-fulfilling 
prophecy. No one knows what FAA will do. If think will 
like what FAA will do, then should get head examined. Just 
because the lines blow it, FAA won't stand aside. Board 
has stated won't abandon quotas. Notes suit at DCA seeking 
drop and curtailment at DCA of activities. If counting on 
better deal from FAA. should reconsider, even if it seems 
a good business decision. FAA said first come, first serve 
would be interim solution until system on Une. I believe 
him. Don't think you wIll win and others not. We don't know 
what FAA will do, but we won't like it. 
NA: Agree 
NB: Who is party to suit and what is the issue? 
C-31 
Chair: Noise, etc. 
NA: As someone at that meeting said. we are doing FAA's work and 
cutting our throats. Why not cut them now? 
Counsel: Can't accept that. 
Chair: Thank God Bober minds prevailed. 
NA: I hate to admit it, but this first meeting in ten years 
Chair: 
I am under explicit orders. Before I had latlt.ude. I have 
orders to come back with 38 slots. All I can do is tell 
them the problem and they know. Maybe need higher level 
management. 
No. Last time it set us back months. Keep them out. 
NA: If you talk around to people at higher levels and say DCA 
could go to FAA, they say maybe it' B best way. I don It 
know what the answer is. Some numbers have to come out. 
That' 8 all I know. 
(2:23) 
KC: Maybe more people than we care to admit are under orders. 
NA: I hate to admit it -- first time ever. 
Counsel: All under orders to use best efforts. This overrides 
higher orders. 
NA: Will you guarantee my income? 
BN: 
Chair: 
BN: 
NA: 
must grow. If government gives us 60 we will make it work. 
Am going to 138 because got a little greedy in the sunnner. 
I asked about going to 24 and told to go up. 
Why 4 released? 
Equipment problems. 
(2:40) 
How many flights to DCA eleven years ago when we started? 
Counsel: More than this. 
NA: 
Counsel: 
NA: 
ND: 
NA: 
Chair: 
PI: 
Then they canceled flights. Will happen here. 
Tvo airports at DC that can handle the types of planes that 
go into DCA. Not true at ORD. Some planes jus·t can't go 
to Midway. 
Expresses disgust with Dulles. 
Ever consider using Andrews as a reliever? Used to be flight 
instructor there -- much excess capacity. Run Metro buses out 
there. I -would fly there. 
Makes sense -- no wonder government wouldn t t consider. 
How about VA's column C suggestion? Any support? 
Good idea. Get carriers wanting an increase to do something. 
Cut it to 1 or 2 or 3. 
C-32 
Chair: We all agree that if such orders issued, COUldn't be at 
a worse time. Hope will retract. Don't put much faith 
in higher levels. 
DL: Most carriers have willingness to go with status quo or 
less; a small group asking for more. They say can't help 
it and status quo won't help unless those trying to expand 
do something. I won't do anything until numbers close. Won't 
slide. This applies to new carriers and old trying to expand. 
We are locked in until somebody does something. 
NA: All figures can be justified; we look up, but you know of 
DC-lOs. Look at last winter and we are at status quo I think. 
Chair: Uope somebody develops some kind of propos.sl so can get to 
east coast office before closes. It's 4;20 there. Can someone 
put together ~ propossl? 
UA: Look at column C. Let every carrier use column C or less for 
those that reduce. This would drop total to 623. This would 
leave 17 slots (at 2200) for increases. 
AL: Have instructions that can go to 80 if can work schedule. 
EA: 
UA: 
Chair: 
AA: 
So far haven't succeeded with getting it done. 
We will go down to 138 when close. Have problem with 
carrier (BN) that got 4 extra slots and then released slots. 
That's the problem. No problem with Ke. QH. NB. It's BN •. 
(Does arithmentic.) The question is -would that be a reference 
point to work from? 
And then the question of how to allocate. AA? How about it? 
OK, but you are counting 40 at 2200. Looks to me -we are 36 
slots over. Really 620 possible. 
EA: There are 28 at 2200. 
Chair: What about it? 
AL: OK. 
DL: OK. 
KC: Nothing in column C. OK, will play. 
BN: OK 
EA: OK 
NA: No, can't live with 34. 
Chair: This is no commitment; just a place to start. OK? 
NA: Nods. 
ND: Don't understand this. Start off duwn 2. Column C hurts me. 
Chair: Same boat as KC and NA, etc. -- just a reference. 
C-35 
NB: We 'Will march through the marshes but won't accept it. 
(phone for UA) 
NW: OK. 
QH: As a starting point but can't live with it. 
PI: OK. 
RC: OK. 
IIA: OK. 
TIl: OK. 
UA: OK. 
Chair: We have a reference point. We have done crazier things. 
TIl: Will get worse. 
N8: As exercise, let's try lottery just to see how it would 
work. 
Coleman: Don I t let CAB know we started it. 
Counsel: (Negative conunents regarding lottery) 
Chair.: Refers to drawing out of Levine's hat and Cohen's hat. 
NA: They don't wear hilts; just have bags over their heads. 
NA: Dan't ask people 
It's embarrassing for me. BN, TW, NA must come down. 
Maybe EA and some others. Don't think it will happen 
here. Should recess and talk to managements. Have ATA 
talk to our people. 
Chair: In due course~ 
NA: If 6 to B slots, someone may break. This will take major 
surgery. Home office hasn't accepted that yet. Someone may 
be willing to go to wall and take it to FAA. 
QH: Poll? lIow many feel we should go home and talk to management? 
I must leave in two and 1/2 hours. 1I0w many say go home and 
reconvene in DC? 
Chair: AA? 
AA: We have schedules for 60 slots. Can't help now. 
AL: 
NA: 
Chair: 
Staying. 
A suggestion. How many slots down to make it work and see 
"arbitrarily" what surgery is needed, e.g. AA drop 2, AL drop 2, 
BN drop 2 or 4, etc. What is on paper doesn't matter. The 
question is what will companies take? 
Can we agree on number over? 
NA: Not realistic to put 40 at 2200. 
C-36 
Coleman: That was in June. 
NW: Released through September 9. We are operating 2 at 2200. 
TW: So 2 is closer. 
Chair: 
UA: 
Chair: 
UA: 
AL: 
UA: 
Chair: 
Chair: 
NA: 
KC: 
QIl: 
(2:58) 
UA, all accept column C as a reference point with reduction 
as volunteered by EA, PI, UA. 
There are 30 s10 ts for 1 carriers -- 621 between 0700 and 2259. 
Ho\( to apportion the 30 slots'? Lottery? KC has none. Maybe 
should get first crack. Can any carriers come down frail 
column C? 
(llait) 
I guess there aren't any. 
AI. said would tty to drop. 
Did. 
Sorry. We could start off giving all who want to increase 1, 
but leaves KC out. 
(10 minute break at 3:03) 
(3:26 called back in) 
OK -- have 30 for 7 carriers. What do we do next? 
3 requests are at 0600 so 653 requests. 
Can we agree? 
Just an exercise. 
Who doesn't agree? 
Don't take 2 from all -- take percentage. 
NA: First take those offered. Then take increases away. 
KC: Disagree. 
NA: Not new carriers. 
KC: Agree now. 
NA: With increases and volunteers, how many more do we need? 
EA: These are tight, realistic numbers. Used to be slack in 
submissions. Not now. 
NA: Everyone goint to have to bite part of the bullet. EA __ big. 
EA: Everyone must get hurt a little. 
UA: 23 
KC: That is 3 1/2 percent. Suggest take 3 1/2 percent of requests 
of column A and round to nearest even number. 
QII: I second that. 
C-39 
Til, All carriers to participate. 
Coleman: Column G. Totals based on this exercise. 
M 58, AK 8, AL 80, BN 28, DL 32, EA 136, KC 10, NA 36. 
NB 6, NW 40, PI 68, QH 10,' RC 4. TW 58, UA 64, UR'4, WA 4. 
Coleman: Total 636 -- with J in 0600, so 633. Need 33 at 2200. 
Will call this the 3.5 system. 
Chair: What reaction? 
EA: If I were new, I would love it. 
NB, We're happy. 
TIl, I should have asked for 54. 
NA, My only problem with this is 111 increases. 
Chair: UA? 
UA: Won't work. We are dovn 4 already. Should do over again 
with new percentage and original submission. 
TIl: Potentially, all kinds of gimmicks; could base percent 
on seats. 
DL: Let's resurrect UA share of airport expenses. 
Chair: RC1 
are equal. 
EA, If you ask small, you get it. 
136 is needed for schedule. 
QH. 
If willing to live on $5000 per year, go on welfare. If want 
.$80,000 to $100,000, need to fight. EA wants to be big so 
must fight. 
EA, Let us get what we need. 
NA, It Won f t fit. 
HB: 
Why was ORD given 115, LGA 48, JFK 70, and DCA 40 per hour? 
Counsel: FAA did it, as I said yesterday. Assumed IFR and 1 hour delay. 
HB, 
Over ten year span, hasn't DCA's capability increased? 
Ask FAA to increase slots. Don't count nonscheduled and 
extra sections. 
Counsel: Have always tried to get FAA to go up. Now they want to go 
down. We have proposed an increase. Can't count on it. 
NB, 
We should be involved concerning Airport Access Task Force in OOT. 
Counsel; Refers to Low Capital Task Force; just said it exists; .and 
another one (the one NB referred to) made up to advise CAB about 
amendment no, 10 to something. Not seeking industry input. 
ND: Mad about not having input. 
BN: 
NIl, 
DL, 
IIA, 
NA, 
Chair: 
NA, 
Chair: 
QH' 
NA, 
QH' 
NB, 
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Agree with Re. 
Wontt support unless all other carriers do. 
Can I t support. 
No. 
Don't like result. Why does WA object? No coat to them. 
Based on principle. 
We need to do something. Someone has to come down. 
Yes. QH? 
I proposed it. I like it. It crystalizes the issue. I'm 
talking of a minimum of 2 slots. If QH drops 2 that is 20 
percent, and only 1 percent for EA. Somewhere between lies 
compromise. If give us 20 percent down, do same for all and 
cut operations to 25 per hour J FAA will be happy. Certificate 
guarantees minimuni number of slots. Let those who want more argue 
A lot will say new carriers have no right to operate. Refers 
to air taxi and commuter rule at DCA. 
As EA said yesterday, we all come· in naked. So why should 
I drop 20 percent and others 1 percent? Let's all lose 
_ equally (in percentage). It's just that EA is big. 
for antitrust. CAB now rethinking on this mechanism. 
Long speech: CAn said should discusa agreements and other 
ways of solving problem on less anticompetitive basis. 
ATA submitted arguments. Out of all that the Intra 
Government Task Force. Yesterday Aviation Press says 
CAB and FAA let a contract for August 15 from consulting 
finn to recommend to CAB about mechanism. CAB must 
issue order and ATA may fight legally. 
Freedom of information act may allow us to get information 
on stuff that may affect our economic welfare at DCA 
before it gets into CAB order. 
xc: Seems that the consensus against exercise. Can anyone try 
a new exercise? 
His figures show 8 carriers have dropped 2 and 1 has dropped 4. 
let t s poll and see how many can live with this. 
Chair: So far all but QH opposed. PI? 
PI: New carriers get more than deserve and sOlDe old carriers are up 
over July. 
Chair; Could you live with it? 
C-43 
PI: Yes. 
AL: No. 
LA: No. 
AA: No. And the reason is that base altered before 3.5 percent 
and Bome increased. Let's go back to July Bubmission. 
ltc: So you want 6927 
AA: OK, except for increases. 
Chair: TW? 
TWI In spite of going up, ~ opposes. Creates a precedent where 
new carriers get what they want. I w111 come in with 100 
slots and take my percent from that. 
This is what FAA Is doing, Regarding QU asking for 10 --
comes from zero. We have been here for years and haven't 
picked up 4 in 5 years. We have resources and facilities. 
NB: Comparing QH's and TWls requests is irrelevant. They would 
have asked for it if traffic there. 
TIl: In the past we have asked for slots and the meeting went 
to status quo. 
QII: The concept is the number of slots not the increases. 
AA: Same as 3.5. No. 
BII: No. 
EA: No. 
NA: (out) 
NW: No. 
AL: No. 
DL: No. 
KC: Yes. 
NB: Yes. 
PI: Yes. 
QII: 
RC: 
TIl: 
UA: 
WA: 
NB: 
No. 
Yes, but could be no. 
No. 
No, we are already down. But KC's suggestion is a bright 
spot. No one has a right to a slot. You come here and ask 
tor what you need. 
Yes., 
Let's adjourn -- no progress here now. 
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all asking for what we need. Won't fit. How to decrease 
in an equal and just manner. 
Chair: KC? 
ltc: Yes. 
NB: Yes. We wouldo't be here if At hadn't dropped service. 
Chair: Poll: 11 to 4 against 3.5 plan. 
QH: . Why not start over and use first Bubmission as a base. 
Question: This makes 8.6 percent reduction then? 
(Much figuring going on) 
Coleman: B.5 percent is 12 of 142. 
At: No. 
KC: I suggest each of those with 10 or more, except TW, drop 
2 and EA ~rop 4 I This includes KC and QU and are part 
of the problem. It's silly but we must proceed. 
QII: Can't take 20 percent down. 
KC: Don I t call it a percent then. 
Some are new. Need to sacrifice somewhere. We are all as 
equal as others. Must depend on service rendered to public. 
Chair: Does anyone feel we can do something today? 
NA: No sense in slides. 
Chair: I agree. 
NA: I must talk to Miami. 
Chair: 
QII. 
We are all here. We could stay to midnight. 
We should take secret poll if it is useful to continuei 
as, if publicly says OK, then shows can reduce. So, secret 
poll better. 
NA. How do you spell "No"? 
KC: 
Chair: 
Chair: 
UA: 
What will chair do with results? 
Face Mecca and hope. 
(Took secret pollan whether can continue usefully.) 
Poll: 3 yes; 12 no. 
Would like directions as to What you expect when you 
reconvene - shame to reconvene and be in same position. 
We are talking about 2 to 4 slots, depending on size of 
carrier. Need mandate from committee to members. 
A number of things given to committee head by Fr1day a 
week before meeting -- each carrier whElt number 18 if 
C-47 
below column A. Will go back to management and ask 
if wIll cancel Need indication of progress. 
Meeting with FAA that lays out problem. Can't certify 
carriers for DCA without more slots. Just asks old carriers 
to cancel. Should be penalty for those who don't use slots. 
Last sutmner slotted 634 and used 619. Can't go on. 
Can we go to FAA? 
Counsel: We can go to FAA, but hard to Bee much use. 
NB: How about seeking rea training order on CAB stopping 
certification of new committee. 
NA: Let' a get same rule for scheduled lines as for air taxis. 
(Exchange with counsel who says is irrelevant) 
N8: Sue FAA and say Deregulation Act can I t be enforced because 
of FAA rules. 
Counsel: This is a no-no. 
NB: Looking for a forum. I'm a lawyer. 
Counsel: No court I know of will help us. Must work it out. No new 
way will be found. Some new mechanism may come along. We 
must try. This afternoon has been useful. But new initiative 
tried. Will see and get insights. Don't think outside 
TW: 
forces can be. invoked. 
Don't get counsel heated up again. What about NB's suggestion 
about Andrews AFB? 
Counsel: Long range only. Look at the space at Dulles and Baltimore. 
Chair: By Friday August 3 advise Coleman of any changes in column A. 
Coleman: Three said could do something. Under what circumstances? 
(referring to secret poll). 
(discussion about reduction) 
NA: Ask bosses two questions: 
1. Will you reduce? 
2. Should we give the problem to FAA? 
Counsel: Need compromise -- long speech. 
Chair: 
(Threat of crash from counsel and chair) 
Backing off of suggestion of crashing -- only meant might 
delay meeting a couple of days. 
Anything else? 
(5:17) 
Until 1:30, August 7. 
Recess until 8:30 AM for ORO. 
QII: 
FAA: 
C-4B 
Sympathize with NB, but don't think courts the right approach. 
We should go home and check. Should get FAA involved so 
get appropriate people to sit in room. Invite FAA to next 
meeting. 
Quotas based on safety; go after CAB. 
NB: That's an insult to our intelligence - not baaed on safety. 
FAA: CAB certifies carriers and gives rights of access. 
Counsel: That could kill thia mechaniam. 
QII: 
UA: 
Let' a get them here. 
Offer FAA: 42 per hour between 0700 and 2259 would do it. 
What if we can I t? 
FAA: If we raise, then next year you will want more. 
NA: Airport limits numbers. 
Chair: Maybe Borne temporary exemption. 
Counsel: OK. Good if raise quotas. But no prospect that that maneuver 
will help. Hoping for more slots will paralyze this committee. 
NB: We have lots of political clout. Used to work for 
majority leader of House. Get lots of people to come down 
on FAA. 
so just sliding problem. 
Chair: Any deletions -- might as well go into sliding. 
EA: ], 0900 slide to 0800. 
Coleman: Well, EA took care of top row (referring to slide on screen). 
Chair: Who wants to do the bottom one? 
AA: 2, 1900 slide to 2000. 
AL: I, 1600 slide to 1500. 
DL l~ 1600 slide to 1500. 
TW I, 1900 slide to 2000 
DL: I, 1200 slide to 1100 (Does not help now but may be good.) 
EA: 2, 1700 slide to 1400, 1500. 
At: Will 1 from 0900 to 1000 help? 
AC: 2 at 1800, 1900, add 4 at 1400,1500. 
UA: 1 at 1500 slide to 1400. 
NE: Drop 2 at 1600 and 1 at 1200. 
NA: 1 at 1500, slide to 1400. 
DL Offers 1 at 1900. slide to ]800 (won't help at all). 
8N: 
NA: 
TIl: 
PI: 
TIl: 
UA: 
NA: 
NA: 
NAlUA: 
EA: 
AL: 
EA: 
M: 
NE: 
Chair: 
PI: 
EA: 
EA: 
Coleman: 
Chair: 
M: 
Chair: 
NIl: 
TIl: 
C-Sl 
Drop 2 at 2000. 
Orop 1 at 1100 (fOT hookkeeplng). 
Down 2 at 2300. 
1 at 1600 slide to 1500. 
1 at 1700 sUde to 1600. 
On December 13, slide 1 from 1800 to 2000 if helps. 
Asks what move was, 
Can pick up prior to Decemher 13, 1 from 1800 slide to 2000. 
1 at 1800 slide to 2000 (recorded as NA). 
(This is moving right along -- much helpfulness -- first name 
basis. ) 
(9:00) 
1 at 1800 slide to 1600. 
1 at 1700 slide to 1600 (note here using slack created to 
move back.) 
(9 to go -- all at 1700, 1800, 1900.) 
(No conversation now; all working on schedules.) 
1 at 1600 slide to 1300 (creates help at 1600.) 
1 at 1600 slide to 1200. 
1 at 1900 slide to 2000. 
(4 to go) 
Offers 1 at 1700 slide to ,1800. 
Any other possibilities? Even if doesn't seem to help, maybe 
can tie in with something else. 
1 at 1900 slide to 2000. 
1 at 2000 slide to 2100 (creates slack). 
1 at 1800 slide to 1900 if useful (treated as offer). 
1 at 1900 slide to 2000? 
AA, slide from 1900 to 2000? 
No. have .already done 3 of them. 
MI, can you help? 
Not at this time. 
1 at 1800 slide to 1900 and go down 1 at 0700 and 1 at 2200 
(latter for bookkeeping -- 1800 now works). 
Coleman: Need to slide 2 from 1900 to 2000. 
NA: If finish now, do we get off unttl 1:301 
Chair: Yes. 
Chair: 
BN: 
Chair: 
RC: 
1'1<: 
Chair: 
Dt: 
EA: 
M: 
M: 
TIl: 
Chair: 
BN: 
1'1<: 
UA: 
NA: 
NA: 
NA: 
NA: 
NIl: 
BN: 
Chair: 
Coleman: 
Chair: 
NA: 
Chair: 
UA: 
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BN, can you be of help? 
Let me do some juggling. 
Re, what about you? 
AU moves either compound problem or don I t affect it. 
If someone out of 0900, wUl slide 1 at 1600 to 0900. 
Can anyone IOOve out of 0900? 
1 at 0900 slide to 0800. (Both slides, TW and DL, tIIade.) 
1 at 1900 slide to 2000. 
Is 1900 correct? I show 50. 
I at 1800 slide to 1600. 
1 at 1900 slide to 2000. 
6 more slides. 
1 at 1800 slide to 1600. 
1 at 2000 sUde to 2100. } 
(Creates slack at 2000 -- now 46 
1 at 2000 slide to 2100 if helps. 
Wants door closed to outside because of glare. 
Drop 1 at 1500 all Beason. 
1 at 1900 from December 13. 
I at 2100 prior to December 13. 
Will call office. 
(ten minute break) 
Swap with UA. 
Drop 1 at 1900 through December 12. 
Bad news -- will tell at 1:30. 
1 at 1700 slide to 1600. 
offers 1 at 1700 slide to 1800. 
Thank you. BN. 
Is a weekend problem. 
Hunch that TW will get whitewhat award -- looking very hard. 
This is cutting into play time. 
OK. Slide from 1900 to 2000. 
Drop 1 at 1700 prior to December 3. 
OK. UA, your turn. 
Sorry. 2 out of 3 isn't bad. 
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(10:05) 
Chair: 1600 slide to 15001 (Trying to get deals started) 
(Then 1700 to 1600 would do it) 
Chair: M? 
M: Nothing to offer right now. 
Chair: Ladies and gentlemen: have made much progress this AM. 
Good workl 
NA: When went went from 1500 to 1400 should have been as of 
December 13. 
Coleman 
.!i Chair: No problem. 
Coleman: 23 over at start. This is nice work. 
Chair: 90 percent in firs t half hour. 
NA: Wants 2 at 1100 through December 12. Last fixes on schedule. 
Chair: John (N) are you about ready to make your move? 
TIl: No. (shakes head) 
Chair: Be sure to get that white hat for this session. 
M: Offers to slide 1 at 1600 to 1500 only if it helps. 
TIl: Slide 1 at 1900 
y.fI.~ 
Let's do something. AA? 
M: Nothing now. 
AL: Poll regarding going to status quo (last meeting). 
ZW: 
ShOUld spea"k up. Our submission is our schedule. FM granted 
more time on exemption. So In same position as last meeting. 
At mercy of committee for slots. Will change to reflect FM 
ruling. Saturday, same; Sunday through Friday: 
Drop 5 at 1500; drop 4 at 1600, 1700j drop 3 at lBOO, 
drop 4 at 1900. Saturday, same. Exemption expires March 31. 
Next time will be trouble. 
Chair: Thank you ZW. Excellent start. 
BN? 
BN: Not now. 
co: 
DL: No 
EA.: No. 
FL: 
At status quo. If any carriers playing games, come down now. 
Chair: Well said, FL. 
IT: Drop 2 at 1600 Tuesday-Friday. 
Chair: Fine. Just fine. 
BN: 
AC: 
EA: 
EA: 
C-56 
Slide 1 from 1700 to 1800. 
(done) 
May want 1100 or 1200. 
(Checking numbers. Much confusion. 
1500; meant to say 1400.) 
UA erred. Dropped 
Drop 1 at 1600, 1700, 1800; up 1 at 1500. 
Says to forget it -- will work it out with somebody. 
(10:25; adjourn until 1:30) 
ORD MORNING SESSION, JULY 25, 1979 
Coleman: 
NW: 
OZ: 
PI: 
(8:32) 
Roll called. 
We must do every day of week 1500-1900 for each month. 
Asked everyone to look over submission materials for 
inaccuracies. 
Coleman adjustments: 
MX drop 1 at 1500 
SAS drop 1 at 1700. 
says same boat as ZW. 
No, at this time. 
Agree with FL. Those with inflated numbers should go down. 
Not now. 
RC: Nothing to offer -- are down 2 from summer. 
TIl: Pass. 
UA: Our numbers are up. Schedule calls for more than 130. 
ORO is UA's life blood.as :1s Atlanta for Dt. Agree with AL; 
need something like status quo. There are slots coming 
available. When Ne merged into RC. gave up 2 and 4 others 
so are 6 slots for MVA and ZW plus seasonal needs of EA who 
helped a lot in past. 
AC: Nothing noW'. 
LA: Nothing. 
Chair: AL Buggested poll regarding status quo in !lsome formll as 
a basis. 
AL: Poll to see if willing to go back to last meeting __ below-
submissions -- EA has a problem as all know seasonal at ORD. 
Maybe should look at February 1979 meeting as status quo~ 
C-59 
Chair: Post meeting poll July 1979: 
ZW: We weren't there but will cooperate. 
UA: Pass. 
TW: Yes. 
RC:' Yes. 
PI: Yes. 
OZ: Yes. 
NIl: Yes. 
MVA: Yes. 
FT: Yes. 
FL: Yea 
EA: Yes. 
DL: Yes. 
CO: Yes. 
HN: No. 
1IL: Yes 
M: Yes. 
UJ\":. "No. 
HVA: 
NIl: Yes. 
RC: Yes. 
ZW: Yes. 
OZ: Yes. 
TW: Yes. 
M: Yes. 
PI: Yes. 
UA: Yes, as' an exercise. 
co: Yes, aa an exercise. 
IT: No. Will take column D, February 1979 (drop 2 for this; 
column C is drop J). 
TW: Is IT daily? 
FT: Tuesday-Friday. 
FT: Won't accept C even as an exercise. 
Chair: Will IT go along without commitment? 
IT: As long aa all understand is only an exercise. 
Chair: We understand. 
EA: Why donI t we do again with FT at 21 
Chair: 
BN: 
EA: 
C-60 
Will assume VA is yes for purpose of poll. 
Will go below 26, but not to 22. Will go to post July 1979. 
(This would be down 3 not down 4.) 
(Coleman I s slide) 
Will carriers accept July 19791 If all will accept, give me 
four hours and will tty. Need time to work out schedule 
(EA at 17, down 5 from submission of 22). 
Ai: Will go to February 1979 and let BN at 23 and EA at 22. 
AC: 
M: 
NA: 
Poll: BN at 23 and all at February 1979. 
Had poll one and about to have poll two. Would need time4 
If unanimous will try to make aomething work. 
Pas84 
Using postmeeting July 1979 or FAA July 1979 (Column C) 
with BN at 23 (for clarification). 
AL: Yes. 
BN; Yes. 
co: Pass 
DL: Yes. 
EA at 17, and FT at 2. 
(Note: PA not here -- for exercise cut 2. RC at 48. 
sn not herej gone from 0 to 1 -- shows 1. WO not here. 
ZW, 2.) 
ZW: MVA should be zero for exercise. 
MVA: OK. 
Coleman: Calculates -- gives total of 573. 
Fr.: Proposes that subject to international carriers' approval, we 
Chair: 
ZII: 
MVA: 
increase MVA and ZW to 1 which is solution. Gives each 
entrant 1. 
ZW? 
Have to make a call, but ••• answer lies with EA and AC. 
Whether I can go along must be seen. We are just putting 
off problem •. 
Agree. Came with 5 (absolute minimum); already at 4. 
Would have to make calL It aU depends on EA working 
out their schedule and dropping 5 to 17. 
EA: Will try; hate to hold up committee. Can't guarantee can do it. 
Could slide, etc. to get hours straight. 
C-63 
AC: Without doing the fine tuning my contribution 'Would be 
minimal. Won't take 4 hours. Will have to do scheduling. 
Ft.: Our proposal could be IWI. B.t. EA, MVA, ZW, AC. why not 
start sliding now? 
TW: PA and WO and S8 may not go along. 
Fl.: Would present strong front to them if In resolution and 
sliding when they show up. 
TW: Carriers here go to 1W1 -- should slide. 
Coleman: Can't slide until we know where hours come from. 
EA: Take drop of 1 each hour -- won't be right but will still 
be sliding when EA is finished checking schedule. 
Chair: 
ZII: 
MVA: 
Chair: 
OK? 
Will go to 3 without phone call. If get solution, will check 
with office. Easier to deal with higher ups if lImonkey is on 
our back. II 
WIll proceed 8S exercise before calling office. 
Let's start sliding. 
EA: Drop 1 at each hour -- down 17. 
Fl.: Question about what exercise. 
"~,,~, 
ZrI: 
Coleman: PI drop 1 at l~OO, 1900. 
AC: 
Chair: 
Couple of minutes. With extreme difficulty and reservations, 
will go to unworkable situation, but want 1 back. 
Drop 1 at 1500, 1900. (This puts them at 7 not 6 as agreed 
in column G.) Wants 1 at 1500 -- can't release third slot. 
The seventh slot is Wednesday-Friday. 
(Much conSUlting of schedules or just sitting and reading 
newspapers. ) 
Coleman puts up new slide showing daily totals. Change 
from 575. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday rhursday Friday Saturday 
-1 +6 -1 +1 +1 
(The question of WO comes up -- also not here.) 
Coleman will call those absent. No sense in sliding until 
get more information. 
(20 minute break -- be back at 10:50) 
(11:00) 
Coleman: SB. PA en route. WO en route but had not left. 
WO drops 1 at 1500 Monday and Wednesday; and drop 1 at 1600 Tuesday. 
Leaves +4. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
-2 +4 
-2 +1 +1 
from 575 over +2. 
0-64 
(10 minute break -- 9: 37) 
(9:55) 
Has slide on screen which shows: 
Deletions -- to get to column G. 
M: Five minutes. 
AL: Drop 1 at 1900. 
BN: Drop 1 at 1600, 1700, 1800. 
nL: Drop 1 at 1700, 1900. 
EA: (gone) 1 at each hour. 
M: Drop 1 at 1500, 1600, 1700, 1800. 
FT: Tuesday-Friday, 1 at 1500, 1900. 
(Pause while Coleman makes new slide.) 
MVA: We have deletions -- 1500, 1600, 1900 drop 1 (for exercise). 
Question of vltat for PA -- drop I at 1100, 1900 -- missing 
(lots of decisions being ~de for missing carriers). 
(PA -- set at 1 at 1800 all week.) 
PI: Looking at schedule. 
RC: Nothing, .:its ile are at 48. 
TW: 
Chair: 
AL: 
Chair: 
M: 
Chair: 
UA: 
TW: 
until 1 PH. Asks for guidance. 
EA and AC won't make all the slides. Should go ahead. 
Things may change after lunch, but will take slides now. 
Also EV has representation here -_ is a Saturday only 
submission. 
Can move but don't know if it will help. But don I t know 
what EA and AC will do; e.g. can go from 1 at 1700 to 
1800, but if EA puts something into 1700 makes a mess. 
M? 
Nothing to offer now -- should wait. 
UA? 
Should wait. Have a call in to be sure this will be more 
than an exercise. 
I'll do what people want. 
UA: (who was on phone awhile ago) Asks clarification as to slide 
being shown. 
Chair: OZ? 
PZ: Only a few minutes anyway. Should wait. 
Chair: 11:10 -- recess to. 1:00 PM. 
C"';7 
ORD AFTERNOON SESSION, JULy 25, 1979 
(l:03 PH) 
EA: Two carriers said need to make a call -- ZW and MVA. Are 
there any 0 thers? In the pas t some have gone along and 
said just an exercise. 'Are any carriers that will need 
to check with home offices? 
M: Nobody home. Can't call them, i.e. no need -- won't call. Yes. 
AL: No call. OK. 
BN: No. OK. 
0): No. OK. 
DL: OK. 
EA: Pass. 
FL: OK. 
IT: OK. 
HVA: Must ask. 
NIl: OK. 
OZ: OK. 
PI: Gone -- voted as OK. 
RC: OR. 
AL: Offer of ~ at 1800 slide to 1700. 
offer (offers shown on screen). 
RC: Can go from 1 at 1800 to 1700 and 1 at 1700 slide to 1600. 
This is an offer. Don't know if it helps. 
Coleman: We take 1 at 1700 slide to 1600. 
Chair: BN? 
BN: No. 
Chair: DL? 
DL: offers to slide 1 at 1800 to 1700. 
Chair: Fl.? 
FL: No. 
Chair: IT? 
IT: No. 
Chair: NIl? 
NIl: Not at this time. 
Chair: OZ? 
OZ: Would only undo ""hat you just did. 
Chair: 'm? 
'm: Pass. 
C"';B 
'm: OK. 
UA: Based on exercise, OK. 
EA: Will not live with 17 (some tension). 
EA: Carriers like UA have big investment at ORO. So EA drops 2 IDOl 
to 15. Ties this to DCA. EA has big investment at DCA. Wantl 
help there. Down 1 at 1600, 1800. Can't slide. 
Chair: Thank you. Confident that the understanding will last. 
Your colleagues will understand and help you in other areas. 
Chair: Act Good news? 
AC: Have given you all the good news that we can. 
TW: What about PA and SB? 
. Coleman: W~ put PA down 2 and held WO down 4 with approvaL 
So could be worse off by 2 if PA doesn't go along. 
MVA: This for exercise f we go along (laughs). 
TIl: Slide from 1 at 1800 to 1900; 1 from 1700 to 1500. 
Totals now! 
Sunday Honday 
-3 -3 
Tuesday 
+2 
co: I at 1800 slide to 1500. 
Wednesday Thursday 
-3 +1 
Friday 
-1 
Chair: Thank you. (1800 biggest problem; around 120 most days; 
1500 and 1900 slack.) AA? Help? 
UA: We are studying. 
Chair: AC? 
AC: Have done it already. 
ZW: I have 1 at 1800 slide to 1500 or 1900. 
Coleman: Slide 1 from 1800 to 1900. 
HVA? 
HVA: No. 
As I read the board, have open slots. I witt n.ove 1 from 
1800 to 1900 if I can get a 1500 on days open. 
Chair: 'ml 
'm: To hasten meeting, I have capability and everyone knows it. 
We have a serious problem at DCA. Need additionsl moves at 
DCA. I want you to hear me and know we need help. 
Drop 1 at 1800. 1 at 1700 slide to 1600. Add 2 at 1500. 
Chair: Thank you TWA. 
NY: 1 from 1800 to 1500. 
Chair: Thank you NW. 
Chair: UA? How is your studying coming along? 
UA: 11m waiting for a call from Chicago. 
C-71 
AL: Slide one from 1800 to 1900. 
Chair: Thank you. 
Update: 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
-4 -4 +l -4 -2 
OZ: Lees take MVA's move. 
Can go from" 1600 to 1700 or 1800. 
AL: To add to confusion, go back to 1800 -- checking to see if 
possible. 
MVA: 1800 to 1900. if add at 1500. 
'Ill: 1 from 1900 slide to 1800 snd drop or slide 1 at 1500. 
UA: Probably 2 at 1600 slide to 1500 Bnd 2 at 1700 to 1900. 
MVA: We sacrificed -- number of slota more important than hours. 
Will take 1 at 1600 and 1900 or 1500 and 1900 or 1700 and 1900. 
Chair: But you want extra slot. Don t t forget PA. 
MVA: This is all an exercise. 
ZW; I won't get OK to come out with 1 if MVA gets 2. 
Lets have MVA and I each take 1. Next meeting is going to 
be the bad one. 
MVA: ZW got 2 at ita first meeting and that is what I want. 
Coleman: Can we put- it down? . 
MVA: No, I will consider it later. 
Coleman: Don't forget it. 
MVA: I won't. 
UA: Offers to drop 1 at 1700 1 drop 1 at 1600 and add 2 at 1500. 
This is an offer -- wants to do it if possible. 
MVA: Sunday only, slide 1 at 1800 to 1900 if doesn't complicate things. 
Chair: Thank you. 
ZII: What was OA's question? I have 2 at 1500; could go to 1600 
or 1700, but not 1900. 
(So ZW down 2 at 1500, up 1 at 1600, 1700.) 
MVA: Wants to change his Sunday move to slide 1 at 1800 to 1700. 
Coleman: OK. 
RC: Can rescind earlier move if helps. Offers to slide 1 at 
1600 to 1700. 
1'\1: 1 from 1500 slide to 1900. 
Coleman: Gives sununary on sUde with the changes. 
EA IS, TW 84, ZW 4. MVA 2, international carriers 17. 
Total -- 577 (2 over). 
C-72 
ZII: t must make phone call before too late. 
(TW Bnd ZW in private talk) 
AL: Slide 1 from 1900 to 1800. 
Coleman: Blip at 1800 on Sunday is caused by EA, W0
1 
AT~ 
(2:08) 
(PA arrives.) 
Chair: Welcome PA. 1'm Bure you will be happy with our progress. 
PAl Will go along if an exercise. 
Chair: AL? 
AL: Nothing now. 
ZW: We need 1 tDOre at 1500 in order to continue with exercise. 
Chair: MVA, you want 2 slots also. Might as well not kid ourselves. 
MVA: I want 2 -- don't much care when. 1900 is all right. 
Chair: You can see what this is taking us to. OK, where do you 
want it? 1900 for exercise? 
MVA: Yes. 
Chair: 
Sunday Monday 
-2 -2 
(2:55) 
Tuesday Wednesday 
+3 -2 
Thursday 
+2 
Friday 
Can we get help in isolated hours?--if someone has capability. 
TW: If someone can lJUde from 1600 to 1500 at odd hours, will 
drop one at 1500. 
DL: 
AA: 
Chair: 
UA: 
AL: 
This is in spirit of cooperation, but I want cooperation 
at DCA. 
Sunday only. slide one at 1800 to 1900. 
Slide 1 from 1600 to 1500 -- (so TIl drops 1 at 1500). 
Sunday Monday 
-3 -3 
Thursday Friday 
+1 -1 
Tuesday Wednesday 
+2 -3 
OA? 
No. 
If it weren't for!W. EA. and AC, we wouldn't be where we 
are; ifZW andMVA hadn't put in for extra Blots. wouldn't 
have problem. Suggest they look closely at schedule to see 
if they can get problem resolved. 
Coleman: AA, Sunday and Monday J I less than other days? 
(A bookkeeping question) 
AA: Yes. 
Chair: Executive conunittee at 6:00 in 2120. 
(Some banter about cocktail hour) 
C-75 
OZ: Drop 1 at 1800 Sunday; Friday, slide I from 1800 to 1900. 
TW: What are the supplemental numbers? 
Coleman: Did not get much submission on that. CL chose to take it on 
an ad hoc basis. 
AL: Any use to ask MVA and ZW to cancel on days over and keep on 
others? 
Coleman: Good idea. 
ZW: No. Can't settle for that. 
HVA: You want us to drop one Tuesday and ZW drop 1 on Thursday? 
ZW: We discussed that before and can't. We are in connnuter 
slots and it creates chaos. 
HVA: How bad is it? 
ZW: What we get here requires dropping commuter slots. If we 
delete on a day to day basis, they (the cormouter people) 
can't handle it. Only one guy is running the show and he 
doesn't know that much. 
ZW: I would like to caucus with MVA. 
(10 minute break -- 3:10) 
(3:30) 
All'right .. Let's begin .. ~ flQ .... "fas the caucus"? 
No. 
FL: No. 
EA: No. 
DL: Not right now. 
co: No. 
8N: No. 
AL: No. 
AA: No. 
TW: No. 
TW: 
RC: 
TW: 
Can't see sitting here for two days 'to get 4 moves down. 
Are these overages all day, all season (nev person replaCing 
man who left). 
You look forward to next meeting. It's going to happen. 
Won't be all one carrier. I will take lumps now, but 
remember, at next ORD meeting __ 
Drop 1 at 1700. That's three already by me. 
Now have 116 at 1900 Tuesday and 1600 Thursday. All else 
works at 115 or less. 
Current tally; 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
-4 
-4 +1 
-4 
-2 
C-76 
Chair: Any hope? 
ZW: Not at this time. 
Chair: UA? 
UA: No. 
'llI: What about international carriers? 
Coleman: In the days we are over, some absent carriers could help. 
Thursday should be OK. 
Tuesday is less clear. 
(3:40) 
TW: Can you poll carriers to see ·if can go down on odd operations? 
ZW: No. 
UA: No. 
TW: Pass. 
RC: Not right now. 
PI: No. 
OZ: We have already. 
NY: No. 
EA: 
TW: 
Hopefully tomorrow when other carriers arrive, will set 
help. Nice if can put this in as an exercise that domestic 
carriers will live with. 
I would prefer it not an exercise. I'll finn it up. 
Earlier I said OK, could live with, and didn't have to phone. 
AL: Poll carriers. 
M: Absent -- voted yes. 
AL: Yes. 
BN: 
co: 
DL: 
EA: 
FL: 
FT: 
HVA: 
NW: 
oz: 
PA: I would like to say yes for meeting here, but to accelerate 
PI: 
RC: 
'lW: 
UA: 
ZW: 
AC: 
Chair: 
C-79 
international carriers, would like to make decision tomorrow. 
(Says international carriers think of PA as one of them.) 
Yes, 
OK, neat. I can't believe it. This is fantastic I We have 
a strong csse to present tomorrow. All of you should be 
congratulated. 
Any other comments? 
Recess util 8:30. 
I trust you are reviewing your records 
be of help. 
(Much individual talking -- Air France and two others confer 
with Walt Coleman, then return to places.) 
(Air France says to my neighbor that he made a proposal and 
Pan Am responded -- cannot hear whole· exchange.) 
(Ten minutes pass.) 
Nelson P.: Please take your seats. I understand there are some adjustments. 
Coleman: Icelandic has canceled at 1100 and 1900 on Mondays for the 
C-BO 
O'HARE SESSION, THURSDAY"" 
(8:38 -- call roll) 
Nelson P. Up to date at O'Hare. Will miracles never cease. Submissions 
for O'Hare were quite high -- total 63 [1, illegible] moveB~ 
After BOrne dedicated good work on part of domestic carriers
J 
the result is agreement for purposes of our exercise, the 
level was reduced to an acceptable figure, then made Bome 
PA: 
minor adjustments. 
The domestics signed of I. 
We are in the fortunate position of presenting an optimistic 
figure and picture. 
We are only a couple of moves over limits. 
I believe we can resolve O'Hare in very short order this 
morning. 
Our assumptions are: the figure for international operations 
Mexicana canceled at 1500 all Besson. 
SAS UKlved at 1700 from Thursday to Friday, 
In essence this is our position. We need help but it looks 
very very good. 
I believe we have what we did in the exercise -- all slots 
given up -- except the one in 1100. 
Coleman: At 1800. 
PA: OK. 
Nelson P.: You can see on Thursday we do have roolD. 
in the building, 
Nelson P: Agrees. 
AF: Suggests could move from Tuesday 1800 slot provided can move 
Thursday from 1700 to 1900. 
Coleman: Could World go to 1900? 
wo: No. 
Coleman: Can Bomeone? 
Eastern: Suggests MisSissippi Valley (MY) or Air Wisconsin (AW) JDOve 
because it wouldn't hurt them -- for them, it is not the 
timing of the slot but the total number that is important 
(reference is to holding commuter slots aa well). 
whole season. Coleman: Air France would delete Tuesday but needs a 1900 to move 
There is an internal swap. Pan Am prefers a daily 1900, to 1700. \/ho ,",uld like to participate in this rewarding 
with the approval of committee, Air Wisconsin takes the 1800 slot. 
exercise? 
This does not change the totals -- just the mix of carriers. 
MV: Dut continuous problem for commuter carriers, as Wayne 
But, there is still an overage at 1100 Tuesdays. And Thursday pointed out yesterday. 
we are one over but there is room to slide. If someone could AC: I want to comment on Mississippi Valley and Air Wisconsin. 
move 1600 to 1700, then perhaps there could be a slide from We are international. We have come forward with a bilateral 
1700 to lBOO. 
and require O'Hare alots, which we have rights to. We have 
RC:· Offers to alide, but would need to do so all week, so wouldn I t accepted these procedures to the utmost. If we don't get 
work well. 
slots, we hsve no options. We ask you to consider that you 
(Much informal intracarrier teaaing) have an exemption to act as an air taxi. If you don't 
consider this, we could si t here for daya. You could have 
WOo Moves slot, 1600 to 1800 to solve Thursday problem. housekeeping problems, I.e. allocation of air taxi slots between 
carriers. But for us, this is a question of landing at all. 
C-B3 C-84 
Nelson: Thanks, Air Canada. Nelson: Saturday has only isolated problems. 
Coleman: Accept AF move from Tuesday, 1900 and 1700 to 1900 Thursday. 
(Much individual pressure on AW and HV) 
And HV moves. 
Coleman: The offer on the table could solve Tuesday. Shall we open Nelson: Congratulations! We are in resolution. Will go to JFK next. 
there? Any response? All months look OK. 
m: Please review the proposal. Will talk to MV and AW on Saturday questions. They are not 
Coleman: (does so) at issue, so can handle privately. 
Therefore we need a move from 1900 to 1700. Totals would Chicago is solved; we can adjourn. 
be the same but with clean board. Could you moye from 
1900 to 1700? 
HV: We are here for the first time. We follow All. Their exemption 
is shorter than ours. We are not in the aame boat as All 
because of shorter exemption. AW is larger, and exemption 
runs out sooner; if we continue as we have here, we can fit 
into the carrier slots within the time the exemption runs out. 
AW needs many more slo ts, given their current capacity, etc. 
Majors have made heroic sacrifices. Don't think of us as 
the same as All -- for us, one is a lot of slots. I will 
move 1900 to 1700 but this would require a few minutes and 
a phone call to see if a slide can be made. 
Nelson: Urges coffee -- chat while waiting for MY. 
(Reconvene) 
Nelson: The white hat is still floating in the room. 
MV: We move 1900 to 1700, 
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ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 
Augus t 7 t 1979 
Call to order 1:35 PM 
Roll Call. Aeromech absent. 
Mr. Coleman: Old Town Alexandria Holiday Inn 
70J/5~9-6080. ext. l~~ 
Room 348 for phone calls. 
Refer to sheet HI. 656 is actual score. 
Progress was made in Denver. Started: 692, now at 660. 
Projection: Original 692 
End of Denver 656 
Now 660 because TW' sent wire changing 
50 + 5~. 
07-2259 hours (10 o'clock) There's room for 640 slots. 
We are 17 over total. 
Need to de-peak and delete. 
Call for offer of deletions. 
"We assume you've come prepared to offer such deletions." 
No volunteers. 
*These notes were taken by Debra Aron, staff economist, Office of 
Economic AnalYSis, CAB, at the slot allocation meetings for Washington, 
D.C. National Airport. Meetings were held in Alexandria, Virginia from 
August 7, 1979 until temporary recess on August 10, 1979. The notes 
are as close to verbatim as could be taken longhand, with every attempt 
made not to delete any ideas expressed (sometimes at the expense of 
redundancies or non-business related comments which weren't caught). 
0-2 
AA: HNo offer," 
AK: "Likewise." 
US: "No deletions. Hr. Chairman." 
BN: liND. II 
DL: "No." 
EA: "We made offer in Denver. 11 
"started at 1'12, came down to 138." 
Question: "Was that conditiona!?" 
Answer: "No. I just said I'd give them up," 
CII: We'll hold that in reserve. 
NA: "No deletions. II 
N8: "We made 2 in Denver--thae s all we can delete." 
Nli: "No deletions." 
PI: "We're down 2. We have sliding capabilities. No deletions." 
QII: 
RC: 
TIl: 
UA" 
UR: 
WA: 
CH: 
EA: 
Answer: 
ell: 
CH: 
NA: 
TIl: 
CII: 
"No. " 
"No--we all must cooperate." 
"We can I t--we' d have to cancel scheduled flights." 
"No." 
"No. " 
"Interesting poll. Most encouraging." 
Will Aeromech be here? 
lle expect so. 
He must all cooperate and contribute to this joint effort. 
Nothing wll1 happen by itself. We have commitment from FAL 
to reduce, 2 more moves but it will take at least 1/2 dozen 
NA. everyone but you is willing 
explore with management. 
"With the exception of llA and NA everyone has increased. 
We've done our share. More than our share. I goofed in 
Denver. I went to 34 then had to go back to 38. I won't 
come down more. AFLorida, small carriers are presumptuous 
to want 10. So is TW to go up 10 at a time like this." 
"Eight is better than nothing." "It's a start." 
We may have pOflsibility of 10, r figure. 
Allegheny, still consider this without National? 
AL: Yes. 
8N: 
Nli: 
AL: 
QII: 
NB: 
J-faybe. 
Maybe. 
Ask please QU, etc. if they will participate. They must 
cooperate. 
No. We understand need to compromise, but we only have 10. 
Dropping 2 Would be 20 percent of our slots. We'll Come 
down 3 percent like everyone else. We won't come down. 
We're all equal. If we all started out with 100, I'd 
come down too. I say everyone should start out with 10. 
People who want more can fight it out. 
I'll agree to any goddamn thing at this point. I already 
came down 2. Put me down yes. I'll do what I have to, 
CII: 
EA: 
EA: 
TIl: 
EA: 
CH: 
AL: 
BN: 
EA: 
NA: 
CII: 
AL: 
CH: 
AL: 
0-3 
more offers of 2 each 80 let's get on with it. 
Pause 4 Staring into space. 
Allegheny with printout, figuring. Talking only between 
associates from same carrier. 
Eastern, do you have any suggestions? 
What does TWA plan to do? 
We'll have to come down. We all know that. Dut it will 
happen 8S a group. Not just us. Propose 6 carriers drop 
2 each. These carriers have been returning slots month 
after month. AL, EA, BN, NA. NY, TIl -- they've been releaa!n! 
all summer. 
2 from my original 142? I'm already there. 
2 from 140. 
That's 4 for us. 
Request to put numbers on screen. 
Reaction to suggestion? 
Suggestion is correct. We've released 2, not 1. I'm under 
orders that we need 89. I'm stuck. I'd consider verifying 
with management if others will do the same. 
We need our 28. I have quite a lot of freedom. 
TWA has asked us to come down 2 more. We can do that. 
I'm willing to go to 138, as I sald in Denver. 
We pulled service from DCA due to grounding of DC-IO's. 
Side talk -- CHMN and Coleman. Coleman reseated. 
Silence. 
At, do you need some time to call? 
Won't be today. I'll try to get number down, but I must 
go back to office and talk to management. I don't know 
if I can do it. 
Can we take these oil a tentative basis, in form of exercise: 
Yes. 
nN OK. 
KC: 
m: 
Nli: 
CII: 
Yes. 
OK. 
OK. 
Let's make a new column (on screen). We're starting from 
post Denver numbers. 
AA 60 American 
AI( Altair 
-2 AL BO Allegheny 
-2 8N 26 Braniff 
CJ Colgan 
DL 34 Delta 
what I can. I'm flexible. -2 EA 138 Eastern 
KC: (entere,d) "I'd be w!lling to contribute a. deletion in the -2 KC Aerome-ch 
exercise. " NA 38 National 
D-6 
-2 NB New Haven 
-2 NY 40 North'W'est 
PI 70 Piedmont 
QII 10 Air Florida 
RC Republic 
-2 lVI 52 lVIA 
UA 66 United 
UR Empire 
IIA 4 Western 
646 
NB: I can't give up 2 because I don't have any place to put 
plane for 4 hours. I can do sliding. 
'IW: "We're making great progress. II 
CH; National, are you inspired to come down? 
NA: No. I can't come down any more. I've come down 16 since 
January. That' 9 enough. 
PI: JlWe canceled 2. We operate every slot we've ever held. 
We made 2 available since July. We will slide but can't 
come down. 1I 
UA; We're higher than sutmner, but that's due to strike. We 
use our slots. New carriers should participate. Air Florida 
QII: 
tIW: 
particularly has to give. They are asking for significant 
increase. I'll try to get an answer tomorrow, but Air Florida 
will have to come down. 
I'm still very firm. r'd like to help, but we don't have 
CHI New Haven? 
NB: 
CIl: 
KC: 
CH: 
FA: 
Not yet. 
Aeromech? 
Just for exercise. We must wait. 
Eastern -- you want to wait too? 
Nod (yes). 
CHI Braniff? 
BN: 
CHI 
lVI: 
CH, 
Can't finn yet. 
Only 2 can firm now, then. 
lVI? 
We can't move one more unless someone else does. 
So that's contingent on everyone else. 
TW: Yea. 
CH: 
\lA: 
CH, 
lVI: 
Silence. 
Eastern got up, sat next to TW. Talking. 
15 minutes. 
We need suggestions. WA? 
We're not in position to give anything up. We must cut 
by carriers with slots to give up, snd nobody wants to. 
But In a couple of hours we've made more progress than 
2 days in Denver. It's encouraging. 
lVI? 
Everyone's waiting on us. That's part of the problem. 
Someone else must move, and it's got to happen Sooner or 
later. 
have 138 and BO. We want a slim number of slots. If I 
had 66, I'd come down but I don't have anything to play 
with. There's no fat. We've done what we can do. 
10 minute break. 
Aeromech on phone. 
TW and Piedmont went outside for "a little talk" 
3:10 PM: Call to order (25 minutes later). 
CHI Where are we going to get extra help from? 
Pause. Silence. 
QH, can't you do anything? 
QH: We only have 10. 
CIl: What about the extra 41 
QH: We can't do anything. 10 isn't many compared to what 
the others have. 
Silence. 
TW and Piedmont 8 till talking. 
CU: IITW, any further suggestions?" 
lVI: No thing more than calling for further moves. 
CHI Would you be willing to firm yours up? 
lVI: 
UA: Nothing I can add. 
CHI 
lVI: 
CHI 
UN: 
We should try to put together a total package, so we'll 
all have something to study and think about. 
Can we firm up the other 101 
On last poll 2 carriers could firm. Braniff? 
We can firm. 
CH: Good. Aeromech? 
KC: We'll wait. 
CII: New Haven? 
NB: We'll wait too. 
KC: We're Willing to cooperate, but I notice lack of cooperation 
by some. 
CHI NY? 
NQ: 
CHI 
lVI: 
CII: 
lVI: 
FA: 
BN: 
CII: 
\lA: 
CH: 
We will have to wait. 
So we fim 6 moves. TW, do you want to firm or are you 
waiting on others? 
We're waiting on others -- only the 2. 
Well, how about it? 
2 deletions. No hours yet. 
2 deletions. 
2 deletions. 
OK. 6 down. 
"I suggest we take lower of columns Band E and use that as 
base to talk from. The silence is boring. 11 
Altair? What do you think? 
0-7 
AK: 
CH: 
EA: 
CH: 
NA: 
CH: 
TW: 
CH: 
NB: 
DL: 
NA: 
DL: 
CH: 
UA: 
I feel much as Air Florida. 
Eastern? 
OK. 
National? 
No sir. 
TW? 
No sir. 
New Haven. when do you think you 111 be able to move? 
Are you waiting for others or do you need to st~dy? 
0-10 
r'm thinking of taking a hard line. No one wants to 
cooperate. I don't want to be obnoxious. I'm thinking 
of upping my dosage of valium. 
Silence. 
Call by Delta for review. 
Aeromech is up by 4. NA is up 10. 
(mad) No. We're down 16. 
Don't compare us with June. 
Of all lines, FA is only one who is offering that was no t 
a probleDI to begin with. The others should come down. 
United? 
Barring strike, we would have scheduled 70. We'll fly 
66 in fall. Delta is on right track. But we have nothing 
more to offer. 
eH: TIl? Anything to say? 
'I'W! No. 
CH: I share your frustrations. But we can't 
now. It would be irresponsible. 
NB: 
WA: 
NB: 
CH: 
We can table my motion. 
I share New Haven's frustration. We are working contrary 
to our purposes. We must I try to reach some solution. It's 
going to be more frustrating than ever. 
It's harder -when -we're working at cross purposes -with the 
government. 
It can be solved but it's got to hurt a bit. It should hurt 
relatively equally. Others must join in. We will solve this 
airport. Unfortunately it takes so damn long. 
Silence. 
Break. 
5:15 Reconvene. 
CH: Let's go around the room and see if we come up with anything. 
UA: I sugges t we have each carrier consider reducing movements 
overnight. We must reach a realistic number. We can talk 
to the home office and see if there are opportunities for 
further action. I will talk to my office tomorrow morning 
and we'll see if there's anything we can do. 
NW': No comment. 
Ke: No cormnen t. 
A1<: No comment. 
UR; No comment. 
DL: No cOlmlent. 
CIl: 
Qn: 
NH: 
KC: 
Qn: 
NB: 
KC: 
QH: 
NB. 
Qn: 
NB: 
CH: 
NB. 
WA:: 
BN: 
M: 
NA: 
AL: 
PI: 
TW: 
D-ll 
Florida? 
I agree with Delta. Carriers must come off high numllers. 
10 isn't a high number. We've used all our slots. 
We're going to ask for our slots back. We've got flights 
waitlisted we were going to ignore. I can use my 8. If 
we're going to play hardball we have equipment we can use. 
What must we do for QH to contribute a deletion? 
Fair is fair. We all come in with nothing. Everyone should 
be given a minimum number. The large carriers should come 
down. I feel everyone should get 10 and fight for the rest. 
I'd like to operate 20 a day but I'm only Bsking for 1/64th 
of the pie. 
There are other airports available. We should be flexible. 
We all have the right to operate but not an inherent ~. 
So, again, what would it take for QH to contribute? 
I should have ssked for 14 originally and been a hero now 
and come down 4. Everyone would have taken me to dinner. 
Can you shift to another airport? 
No. 
Then I move we adjourn. We haven't progressed at all. 
This is important. 
I know. But how can we negotiate any more? Let's pitch 
in the towel and get roller skates and try again next time. 
Sessions are frustrating, but we must get it done. 
solve airport but we won't cut our own throats. We've 
invested a lot at DCA. 
No comment. 
No. 
We need everything we've got. We can only help in slides. 
Echo American 
No comment. 
We canceled 2 prime slots at O'Hare. We've tried for 5 years 
to increase slots here but they're not there. For new 
carriers: take a good look at what you're asking. We've 
always used out best efforts to solve these meetings but I 
question what has gone on today. 
We need group participation. We reduced movements at O'Hare. 
QU: No comment. 
NB: Just trying to work it out. 
CH: We've done as .much as we can today it seems. I trust you 
w1ll be able to use additional time constructively~ We can 
solve it. It takes cooperation. 
Coleman: I'd like to recap. 
Target is 640. In Denver we were 52 over. 
7/23 +52. 
B/7 1330 + 20. 
B/7 1700 + 14. 
possibly +6 
with 3 0600-0659 
+3 
AL: 
TW: 
AL: 
CH: 
AL: 
CH: 
NW: 
CH: 
KC: 
!>-14 
52 to 14 is considerable progress. The big price is behind you. 
Recess until B: 30 AM tomorrow. 
8/8/79: Call to order 8:35 AM. 
12 members present. 
We will continue with 82 as long 8S other carriers are 
requesting increases. Until all other carriers requesting 
increases decrease, we won't reduce. 
Did you say all carriers that have increased? 
All carriers that are asking for increases must participate 
in decreases. 
Alleghany, I trust you will come up with some proposal to 
encompass that. 
I'd like to think we would. 
Pause, 
NW, yesterday you indicated a willingness to delete 2 moves 
tor purposes of this exercise. How do you stand'l 
We will do what we must to come to a solution. We will 
delete. If the exercise fails we will reconsider. 
KC? 
We will continue to delete as a group effort. We feel some 
carriers are not giving their best effort. 
eH: 1 trust you've all given some thought to the proposal we'v~ 
EA: 
UA: 
KC: 
NA: 
CH: 
QH: 
been exploring here. What has happened? 
in these markets. Just because you've had them before. 
We should make it like a bidding -- start at zero and let 
everyone bid 2 at a time. This way it's unfair to the small 
carriers. 
If we're going to start that, I'd rather use Mr. Levine's 
method -- paying for slots. We'd come with a check for 
160 slots and let the QUI sand Ke's bid for them. r don't 
like it but if it comes to it we'll do it. 
The gentleman from QU thinks he has the answers but he is 
inexperienced and uninformed. We've always been open to 
new carriers. Deregulation didn't cause us to change. CAB 
has changed its approach to certification. We've always 
been cooperative to new carriers. 
The reality is 40 slots an hour. All must sacrifice. We 
can't solve this by changing the procedure. That's not in 
our control. 
Deregulation has not changed the structure of this committee. 
No ong· has ever been entitled to anything or forced to move 
anything. No matter what the system -- auction, charging for 
peak hours, dice -- most won't get.!!!! the slots they want. 
The committee should, of course, be open to new exercises 
and we can explore QH's suggestion. 
QH, did you intend to get us involved in this kind of 
exercise? 
At least we would be doing something. We must recognize 
certain things. DCA is a crowded airport and not everyone 
!>-15 
Pause. 
Newspaper reading, staring into space. Most members have 
by now arrived. 
20 minute pause. 
eH: TW? Pearls of wisdom? 
TW: 
CH: 
QH: 
CH: 
QH: 
UA: 
QH: 
CH: 
NB: 
QH: 
KC: 
NA: 
I have no other proposal than that I gave yesterday. I 
explained it then. If we can persuade QH to join, we'd 
have unanimous participation and weld have 18 moves. 
QH? Care to participate? 
No. I have no good news, and may have bad news later on 
in day. 
Now I know how the captain of the Titanic must have felt. 
We may be getting more equipment and need more slots. 
Many of carriers could say -what QH haa -- they have reconsidered 
and -want more slots. But we're trying to reach a solution. 
To say "we're getting another airplane so it may get worsel! 
is really unfair to the coUlbtittee. 
In my opinion the problem is one of concept. Who has rights 
and all that. Maybe the way we should have started should 
have been to start everyone with 100 slots and let everyone 
come down, going around the table, rather than giving preference 
to larger carriers. They feel they've been operating with 
these slots and thus have a right to hold onto theta and no one 
airport. Everyone with a certificate should be guaranteed 
a minimum number of slots. Why should r give up 20 percent 
of my slots when a major competitor is sitting with 13B1 
I only want 10. I'm just as good a carrier. We should 
recognize that no one has a right to anything. We should 
all start at zero. 
It's aU relative. 10 slots in relation to your corporate 
structure may mean the same as 13B elsewhere. It's a 
proportionate thing. 
My experience here is limited. But my experience has been 
a lot of give and take, even from the smaller carriers who 
were brand new then. NOW, aU have made an effort but QH 
SO we're where we were in Denver. I can see taking a hard 
line when there is no spirit of cooperation -- the spirit 
which has saved us from CAB and FAA in the past. It would 
start the ball rolling if QU would move. 
r asked for an absolute skeleton number of Blots. Had I 
known better I'd have asked for everything we wanted, then 
come down to 12 or 10. This is the bare minimum -- 5 lousy 
flights. 
I take offense at that. This isn't a game of cat and mouse. 
We're all asking for bare bones. We're not trying to look 
good on paper. It's not a game. 
11m concerned that someone qualified to make decisions is 
not here. 
1>-18 
QH: I am qualified to decide. I'm involved in the scheduling 
cormnittee. We all use the phone to call the management. 
UA: We are here due to route authority we hold in and out of the 
Washington area. The only rea eon a carrier like EA is 
asking for 138 slots is due to the fact that they have that 
route authority which Is because there are people who want 
to fill those plane,s. They have a larger system to support. 
NB: Why don t t we go through exercise, "what iflr QH had asked for 
8 rather than 101 Where would we have come out? Perhaps 
that would bring us to solution. 
TW: That's the proposai I made yesterday. 
QII: Any exercise is fine. But I need 10 slots. I understand 
that the larger carriers have more extensive route structure. 
rid be happy to justify slots based on load factors. I'm 
sorry but 1 need 10 slots. 
AL: There is a way that requires cooperation. We will end up 
at 640. Perhaps it's worth pursuing. It won't be acceptable 
to some. All carriers won't get all they want. QH has asked 
for 66.6 percent increase, if we want to talk percentages. 
Maybe we should start from proposal to FAA. 
AA 
AI{ 
AL 
60 
82 
BN 26 
DL J4' 
QH: No. 
RC: Yes. 
TIl: No. 
UA: Yes. 
UR: Yes. 
WA: Fine. 
TW: The reason we oppose is that we built a schedule and I'm 
NA: 
QH: 
NA: 
QH: 
CH: 
NA: 
CH: 
TIl: 
at 52. I can't live with 48. Allegheny is coming out with 
an increase and they weren't using what they had. BN is 
picking up slots they didn't use. Same for NA -- they picked 
up 8 slots they didn't use. If carriers would release slots 
they weren't using we could go home. 
Break. 
10: 15 Reconvene 
I can't accept. I've come down 10. That's all r'll do. 
I have a suggestion. QH will move one of our 0700 flights 
if it wIll solve the meeting. 
Can't if it's a jet. Not at 7 AM. 
Scratch that. 
The regular carriers: on what basis would you accept the 
proposal? National? What would your figure be? 
38, We've come down 10. I don't know what TW wants. They're 
being more ridiculous than QH. 
TW? How many? 
52. \Ie need 52 slots. I'm not waiting on nny particular 
carrier. We need 52. 
M: 
AL: 
BN: 
nL: 
EM 
KC: 
NB: 
QH: 
NA: 
QH: 
CH: 
QH: 
NA: 
CH: 
EA 138 
NA 36 
KC 
NIl 40 
PI 70 
QH 
RC 
TIl 48 
UA 66 
UR 
IIA 
NB 
This gives everyone an increase that is asking for one. 
It also reduces those who said they would. We won't all 
get what we want. But we must resolve the meeting. 
OK. 
OK 
OK. 
OK. 
OK. 
Yes. 
Yes 
The slots in question are departure and arrival times, right? 
The rule is no jets before 0700 or after 2200. 
Suppose we schedule for 6:59 and take off after 0700? 
It's logical and possible. I'll speak informally to FAA on it 
Could we poll informally as to who would move into 06001 
We won't get 40 there but if 10 people will move there, it 
might be -worth exploring. 
You don't think there's any chance of relief from FAA do you? 
I don't think so. But it's worth exploring. Which carriers 
could be pushed back? 
DL: Delta could probably help. 
QH: We could. 
EA: We might be able to. 
PI: Piedmont would consider that. 
IIA: We would be unable to do that. 
AA: No. 
AL: No. 
NIl: It I S conceivable. 
UA: No. 
TIl: We'll look at it. 
UN: Uo. 
ell: So we have 6 possibilities. 
TIl: Who could move to 2200 hours? 
M: No. I would be unable to. 
AK: No. 
0-22 
AL: Yes. 
BN: No. 
DL: No .. 
EA; Yes. 
Ke: No. 
NA: We would try. I don't know. 
NB: Can't. 
NW: No. 
PI; Unable. 
QIl: No. 
Re: No. 
TIl: Maybe. 
UA: 
UR: 
\lA: 
TIl: 
UA: 
Haybe. 
No. 
No. 
So we're kidding ourselves. We need many more deletions. 
Pause. 25 minutes. 
rid like to propose an exercise. Use column D aa a base. 
M 60 
AI< 
AL 80 
BN 24 They dido' t use the last 
DL J4 
EA 138 
PI: Yes. 
QIl: Possible. 
RC: 4. 
TW: No. 
UA: Yes. 
\lA: 
ell: 
AL: 
BN: 
NA: 
ell: 
NA: 
CIl: 
NA: 
eH: 
TIl: 
ell: 
TIl: 
eH; 
TIl: 
Yes. 
Allegheny, -what would you need to live with this? 
As long as every carrier i8 asking for an increase we will 
ask for an increase also. I agree. We should be at 80 but 
until I think it over, we.'ll stay at 82. That's our schedule. 
We'll go if it's unanimous. 
No. We need 38. 
Is there some other level of participation that would change 
your mind? 
No. Other people's moves don't matter. We've reduced more 
than anyone. 
Others have reduced flights actually operating. 
So have we, 
TIl? 
We need 52. 
I suppose you appreciate that everyone is making sacrifices. 
No one is dropping slots they were actually using. 
But many carriers are not increasing from June levels, This 
itself is a sacrifice. 
Year after year slots go unused. It will happen again this 
year. It should be proposed that any slot not used must be 
returned and you wouldn't get it again. 
0-23 
Ke 
NA JO 
NB 
NIl 40 
PI 70 
QIl 
BC 
TIl 46 
UA 64 
UR 
\lA 
-.i 
626 
Any carrier wanting an increase above that would take slots 
in 2200. 
CH: Let's poll carriers on the United proposal: 
M: Yes. 
AK: Yes. 
AL: No. 
DN: No. 
DL: Yes 
EA: Yes 
KC: Yes 
AL: 
BN: 
QIl: 
NA: 
TIl: 
EA: 
AL: 
NA: 
CIl: 
M: 
AK: 
AL: 
it in during that hour. 
Pause. 
Lunch. 
1: 15 PH. Reconvene. 
We will accept exercise II (United proposal) if it Is agreed 
to by all carriers present. 
We will accept under Same conditions as Allegheny. 
We could effectively go down to 8 if we slid one to 0600 slot 
and 2200 slot if we could operate jet equipment as we said 
before. 
No. I need 38 slots. 
We need 52 slots. I'll go to 50 knowing I can pick two up 
at 2200. 
Yeaterday several carriers said they could go down 2 each. 
If they did EA would go down to 137 t bringing the number to 
640. 
We will only reduce to 80 contingent upon the numbers in 
exercise II. That is the only way we will accept 80. 
I can assure you National will not accept exercise II. 
If TW's and NA' s figures were different t who could go along 
with the balance of them? (in exercise II). 
OK. 
OK. 
No. 
BN: 
·DL: 
EA: 
NB: 
NW: 
No. 
Yes, 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
D-26 
PI: Yes. 
QH: Maybe. 
RC: Yes, 
VA: No. 
WA: No. 
KC: No. 
EA: 
TIl: 
UA: 
F.A: 
AL, BN, EA, NY, TW, KC said they'd come down 2 each yesterday, 
TW said today they would come down 2 more, We would come 
down to 137 to reach 640. But r won't do it if no one else 
will come down. 
It's apparent that we're at the point where carriers can do 
certain things. Carriers have said they can come down so if 
it depends on what's on the board it's a game. You can either 
do it or not. We're wasting time now. There are certain 
numbers you can live with. Now we're just playing a waiting 
game. 
We're not playing a game. I was willing to take 64 because 
it left slots open at 2200. Giving VA 64 and using. up 640, 
we can't accept. 
Can KC come Lo 61 
II 401 .. 
Nil 
Yes. 
Yea. 
ell: National, what would you think of 361 
NA: 
AL: 
CH: 
TIl: 
CH: 
QH: 
CIl: 
QH: 
CH: 
QH: 
No. 
Do we have any hope of being able to publish schedules at 
0650 and taking off after 0700? 
I've tried to reach FAA but couldn't. I would be astounded 
if they allowed it. 
FM can control takeoff. But can they control what we put 
on schedule? 
The restriction is keyed to scheduling. That's the word they use. 
There's nothing written about operations before 0700. What is 
it, a law, a rule? 
The nighttime restriction takes the form of FAA unwillingness 
to allow jet craft to be scheduled between 2200 and 0700. 
They've made this clear. It is in our interest to not have a 
formal curfew. 
But if it were written, it would restrict takeoff and landing 
if not scheduling. 
We should do what we can to help the curfew from being formal. 
Other airports would immediately follow suit. 
In any case, it I S worth looking into whether we can schedule 
at end of 0600. It's worth looking into. 
Pause .. 
Coleman: There are slots available for O'Hare. You'll get notes on it. 
They'll be offered on co-equal basis. 
Break. 
NA: 
TIl: 
UA: 
1M: 
EA: 
BN: 
NB: 
KC: 
UA: 
AL: 
UA: 
TIl: 
NA: 
TIl: 
NA: 
TIl: 
NW: 
BN come to 261 
EA 
AL 
1371 
801 
Yes. 
Yes. 
No, unless we get to exercise It. 
You can wait forever. I won't come to 30. No way. 
I suggest: 
KC -2 
NB -2 
BN -2 
EA 2 + 1 - -3 
1M -2 
TIl -4 
UA -2 
D-27 
Based on yesterday's conversation. That brings us to 640. 
I can't take the risk of losing the 2 slots, hoping to get 
them back at 2200 later. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
No. We can't go to 4. 
Yes, to 8. 
Can't. accept if total is 640 without our 66. 
Pause. 
I guess UA wouldn't can me if I came back with an additional 
one at 2200. This proposal has mer~t. 
No, but 11m working on it. 
Back to exercise II. I'm looking for a compromise between 
it and exercise I. What I need is a firm feeling from NA, 
TIl, and At -- what their bottom number is and if they accept 
each other. I might be able to convince United of a firm 64. 
We're not waiting on anyone. We can't go lower than 50. 
We're not waiting for anyone either. lie need 38. We've come 
down from 48. You can read it as an increase from summer 
but I've explained that. I say we've come down 10. We will 
not come down more. 38 is the bottom number. We don't care 
wha t a thera do. 
TW has been operating with 40 slots. "Need II doesn't 
mean anything. We all must pull in at DCA to accofmlOdate the 
new carriers. TW has not been cooperative. 
We can't contract when we have new routes. 
Take off flights from old routes. 111 is being irresponsible. 
We helped at O'Hare. Now we need help at DCA. That's all ther 
is to it. 
I must leave. I'll be back Friday of Monday. I leave you 
with the 2 we dropped yesterday. 
BN: I'll go with 24. 
AL: We will accept column A at this time. If it is unacceptable, 
then the minimum is 82. 
CH: Can we put you at 80 then? 
AL: Yes. For column A only. Otherwise 82. 
D-30 
UA: I propose we change column B (exercise I) and call it 
exercise III. 
AL 82 
BN 24 
~ 
Total 643 
with 3 slots at 0600 that would give us 640. But sliding 
would be difficult. 
Coleman: It's an approach that's better than the rest. 
AL: 
eN: 
AL: 
CN: 
We could probably adjust to the 0600 if we' could take 
the Toronto (schedule 0600, take off 0700) approach. 
What if we resolve with 40 movements in 2200 hour? 
I I d rather not. But there will be a lot of talk about it. 
It appears we're not going to get to 626. So it looks like 
this Is the way to go. 
Let's see if we can fim up exercise III. Does anyone have 
problems with accepting it 8S it stands? Good. No problems. 
Let's start identifying the hOUTS. 
February 1980 
0600 0700 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 
34 "'!. !!2 40 37 39 37 40 
1500 1600 1700 1300 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 
i;! 1'! 1'! !!2 !;2 47 39 20 
BN: I'll give you 1 in 12 and 1 in 13. The other 2 I'll have 
to check~ 
'E.I\! l~a!la. 
EA: Take J at 11. 
eN: OK. Let's begin. Let's get into some sliding. Eastern? 
EA: +1 at 7, -1 at 9, +2 at 10, +2 at II, +1 at 13, -1 at 16, 
-1 at 17, -2 at 18, -1 at 19, -3 at 20, +2 at 21, +1 at 22. 
TIl: +1 at 7, -2 at 8, -t at 9, +3 at 10, -1 at 11. 
CII: Who else is ready? 
NA: +1 at 7, -1 at 8, -1 at 12, -1 at 13, +2 at 11. 
M: 
-1 at 16, +1 at 15. 
TIl: 
-1 at 12, +1 at 11. 
PI: 
-1 at 8, +1 at 7. 
KC: 
-1 at 9, +1 at 11, -1 at 14, +1 at 12. 
UA: -1 at 19, +1 at 22. 
AL: I'm waiting on a phone call. I may. 
DN: No moves. 
DL: 17 -+ 16, 12 -+ II, 19 -+ 22, if it helps. I can do this at 
any time. 
Break. 
We should make immediate plans. Should we recess until 
tOlDOrrow? Tonight? 
EA: Either way. 
CII: Let's just continue for awhile then. 
At: 20 -+ 21 ia my adjustment. 
NA: My 8 -+ 7 move has a problem. I can't make it good till 
December 12. Can anyone cover it till then? 
AL: We can. 
TW: 
UA: 
Pass for now. 
Minus 11 and minus 13. 
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TW: 1 11, 12, 2 at 22. 
N8: 164-17'. 
NA: 16 + lB. 
AL: 9 + 8, 
NA: Effective December 13 I can move 20 + 21. 
CN: Can anybody move 20 + 21 until December 13? 
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NA: We're up 22 in I through 21. New carriers don't take up 22. 
So we can't blame it all on the new carriers. It's the old 
carriers who have increased those hours and they're not 
operating and they've got to come out. 
TW: 16 + 14. 
NA: USAir will take the whole B + 7 move we were going to do join1 
More private talk between EA, NA, and AL. 
CII: Any more slides? 
EA: Checking. 
AL: Looking. 
NB: Looking. 
NA: Welre waiting for TW to move. They have 12 in the red hours. 
AA: Nothing. 
8N: Nothing. 
UA: Nothing. 
AL: 6+7. 
I move we adjourn for the day. 
We will reconvene at 9 AM. 
NA: 
TW: 
PI: 
QH: 
CH: 
RC: 
UA: 
CH: 
NA: 
AL: 
DL: 
eH: 
D-34 
8/9/79. Call to order 9:10 AM. 15 members present. 
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8/9/79. Reconvene (9:15) 
40 
39 
40 
41 
42 
44 
43 
44 
43 
41 
40 
40 
Unless TW makes a substantial move out of 15-21 hours, 
we will not participate in the meeting. They are up in those 
hours and down in 22. 
·1 won l t move all my slots out of these hours. We all must 
participate. I made a summary of who is up: 
AA +17 +20 -22 
AK +16 +19 
AL +15 +16 -22 
BN +16 
DL +21 -22 
I will go 20 ..,. 21. 
1 will offer 10"" 9. Also we can change a 15 ..,. 16 or vice 
versa. 
I don't know if that will help. We will note it and see if 
we can use it later. 
No change. 
I have one I would make but I don't know if it will help: 
17 ..,. 19. 
Yes. It has got to go that way. 
Eastern and National conversing privately. 
20 ..,. 21 (also a switching arrangement with Eas tern until 
December) • 
16 ..... 14. 
We still offer 17 ..... 16 if it helps. 
It means ttlQre now because of Aeromech deletion than it 
did before. 
Phone rings for Eastern. He takes it, speaks about 2 minutes, 
sits down, gets up to talk to TW, and sits down again. 
Long pause (15 minutes). 
TIl: We will go 21 ..,. 13. 
PI: I will offer a 16 7 17. 
eH: I think everything from 17 can move to the left. Delta 
17 .... 16, QH 16 .... 15. Net i8 17 ..... 15 -- we will take these. 
NA: 
EA +16 +17 -15 -14 
NA +15,17 +2 at 18,19, 2 at 21 
NB +2 at 17, -1 at 18,19 
NW None 
PI -16 +17 +20 -21 -2 at 22. 
QH +19 +20 
RC +2 at 19 -2 at 20 
TW 2 at 15, 16, 17, 18 1 at 20 -3 at 22 
UA -3 at 17 +1 at 18, -2 at 19, -1 at 21 
UR +19 -20 
KC +15, 18, 19 
lolA None 
Still, unless TW comes off a substantial part of that 
increase, there is no point to this meeting. 
D-35 
ell: We all must participate. 
TIl 
CH: 
AA: 
TIL: 
BN: 
EA: 
DL: 
Ke: 
AL: 
CH: 
CH: 
PI: 
TIl: 
-19 and 20, + 2 at 22. 
American? 
Nothing. 
Nothing. 
Nothing. 
We're going to delete 2 slots. I hope you think they are 
helpful. I will delete one in 11 and one in 12. That-'s 
We may have. to undo 
that but it depeaks 17. 
I would like to move a 12 ..,. 7. 
That's good. 16 I 17 is still the dividing line. 16 and 
below should move to the left <=!nd above 16 to the right. 
Piedmont? 
No. Sorry. 
21..,. 14. 7 hours is the last move I ma.ke until other carrier~ 
start to participate. 
PI: We'll go 14 .. 17 then. 
eH: That's counterproductive. Let's scratch that and keep it 
for use later J maybe. 
AA: 14 .. 13. 
EA: I could go 18 ..... 19. 
How about 19 ..... 20 instead. 
CH: Any further moves? 
AL: No. 
NA: No. 
AA: No. 
8N: No. 
\lA: No. 
VA: No. 
Break. Aeromech had to leave. 
eH: It has been suggested that we reconvene in a couple of weeks. 
I think it is inappropriate. 
DL: 
'l\I: 
DL: 
UA: 
CH: 
DL: 
AL: 
DL: 
CH: 
NA: 
eH: 
NA: 
D-38 
We think a recess is appropriate. 40 slots in the 2200 slot 
is unrealistic. Carriers are shifting around!£. prime time 
slots. We don't think anything is going to happen. TW is up 
7 in the· prime time spo ts. Any increases over 2 should 
automatically go in 22QO. 
Many carriers are up. 
But no one is up 7. All the 0 ther carriers 'Would have to screw 
their schedules up to acconnnorlate these increases. 
My proposal for 626 total was not accepted. We got to 640. 
TItere hasn't been sufficient toovement into 2~OO. There must be 
at least JB slots there or we're not going to resolve. Unless 
there1 s some quick movement we may have to recess. I tend to 
agree with Delta. Unless there's a quick movement into 22 
we will have to recess. 
Let's wait and see. Once we start talking about recess, no one 
will do anything. 
Would AL, 'N, and EA be willing to move all but 2 of their 
increases in 16-20 into 22? 
We're not up in 16-22. 
But you are up total. More than is realistic. 
National, any help from you? 
No. 
Waiting on anything? 
No. The problem isn't our fault. We are not going to move 
unlpss there are some deletions. 
TW: If we pulled 5 out, whIch won't happen, what lJnuld happen? 
Let1 s hear HUm!! moVClU: 
NA: There "is still a possibility for us. 
'l\I: 
AA: 
CH: 
CH: 
NB: 
CH: 
NB: 
CH: 
PI: 
CH: 
'l\I: 
CH: 
EA: 
We already moved 2 to 2200. 
TW is actually down in 2200 and is up 6 slots. 
It's fine to be pointing fingers at each other. But we 
need additional moves. That's what it's going to take. 
Lunch. 
Reconvened l: 20 PM. 
New Haven, can you be of some help? The cutoff is between 
16 and 17. Everything below 16 should go to left, 17 and 
up to right. 
We have flexibility between 17, lB, 19 but I don't know 
if it w11l help. 
Any movement to right would help. 
How about 17 -+ 18? 
That would help. Piedmont? 
-1 at It. and 1 to 20. 
TWA? 
I have offered 21 -+ 14. I still think eventually that's 
the direction you will want to go. You can't fill 2200. 
Eastern? 
Someone has to move to 22 or move out. Seems like no one 
wants to do that. We are just fiddling around with the 
middle of the day. 
CH: USAir? 
AL: None a t this moment. 
CIi: 
UA: 
AK: 
NB: 
AL: 
CH: 
AL: 
AA: 
'l\I: 
AA: 
'l\I: 
ell: 
AK: 
'l\I: 
AK: 
'l\I: 
AA: 
CII: 
NA: 
CH: 
AA: 
CH: 
Long pause. 
United? You are working hard. 
Nothing 
Where are Air Florida and NeW" Haven? 
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New Haven is being represented by Altair. QH will be back. 
They're all part of the problem. 
The problem is not so much the peak hours but how we solved 
the MO slots. I'm not about to change my schedule until I 
see some big movement. 
The meeting is not going to be resolved if we can 1 t make 
moves. AA is up in 17 and down in 22. That's part of the 
problem. 
It's not the major problem. 
One's and two's add up. 
Altair? 
No? 
Altair is up 2 elots. Where are they going to come"i~om? 
Half our slots are in the gutter ends. 
Half are in controlled times. 
I don't feel the problem is in the peak hours. It is what 
can you move out. We should take a poll to see who can go 
to 22. If no one can, we wll1 have to go back to totals. 
No sir. 
American? 
Nothing. 
Western? 
WA: Nothing. 
ClI: Delta? 
DA: Nothing. ThOBe with increases above 2 should slide into 
22 hOUTS. 
CH: 
BN: 
RC: 
CH: 
UA: 
'l\I: 
BN? 
No. 
No. 
United? 
I canlt offer changes without dramatically altering my 
schedule. I can't do that here. Last February between 0700 
and 2159 there were 29 open slots. There are new carriers 
now -- Altair with 8, New Haven with 6, Air Florida with 10, 
Republic. with 4, Empire with t., Western with 4, Aeromech with 
6, so that's t.2, in addition to older carriers. We need 
reductions or wholesale movement into 22. I've moved to 22. 
That's all I can do. 
I will move 15 -+ 13. 
United speaking privately with Coleman: they leave room, 
reenter a few minutes later. 
Silence. 
D-42 
Break. 
Reconvene at 2:30 PM 
cn: Staying until tomorrow? We intend to reconvene. 
AA: Yes. 
BN: No. 
DL: No. 
EA: Yes, but I have to leave in the morning. I'll be calling in. 
NA: Yes. 
PI: Yes. 
TW: Yes. 
UA: No. I will be available by phone. 
NA: Yes. 
AL: I'll go 19 .... 20 if it w111 be beneficial. 
cn: We'll take it. 
TW: I can go 13 .... 11 if someone can go 11 -+ 12. 
NA: I can go 11 .... 12. 
EA: Move us 13 .... 12. 
'N: I can't do anything more at DCA. I can't make any more 
deletions. I've checked with the management. They say we're 
TIl: 
NA: 
M: 
NA: 
AL: 
BN: 
DL: 
EA: 
NB: 
PI: 
RC: 
UA: 
WA: 
nI: 
in dire need of additional slots at DCA. They say we can offer 
to soften at O'Hare. We would consider, if we could obtain 
slots at DCA, to release slots at O'Hare. I've been asked to 
ask the carriers if this would be possible -- if they're 
interested. I know the other carriers are waiting to some 
extent on TWA hut we're not the only ones. 
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Take them off across. 15"" 19. 
Take off a 17 and lB. 
Take off a 20. 
Have 9 .... 10, 14 .... 13. That's all I could do. 
We can't do anything. 
No. 
No. 
I could go lR .... 19. 
No. 
Nothing. 
Nothing. 
Nothing. 
No sir. 
This shows what I said all along. They're not waiting on TWA. 
Only one carrier made any significant change. My 0 'Hare 
suggestion seems to he the only solution. Can we have some 
conversation on thil'>? 
ell: 
1>-43 
Any O'Hare adjustment would require contact with other 
O'Hare carriers. The DCA committee could not do anything 
about O'Hare. However, there is nothing wrong with contacting 
the O'Hare carriers and perhaps reconvening the O'Hare meeting. 
The 0 'Hare meeting is only technically in reces~ because 
these meetings are joint and not adjourned until all air.ports 
are solved. 
N: I suggest we explore it. 
eH: There is no reason that the carriers here who also serve 
O'Hare can't consider it. 
NA: When TW can swap OIHare for DCA slots and the DCA slots are 
reduced", I will be available by phone. 
CH; There are no "swaps. II We doni t have freedom to "swap" 
because no one owns anything. 
NA: I know. TW has no further contributions to Washington session 
so I have no point in being here. I'm going home tonight. 
TW: What if we come down? What would you do? NA, you're up 7 slot! 
NA: We are not. 
TW: You are too. You're at 34. 
NA: I had 26 slots in those hours last winter. I'm not going to 
move out to let TWA come in. 
CH: Let's do this as an exercise with hypothetical totals. 
TW: Take the 5 slots out and see what happens. I think they're 
just using it (blaming TWA) as a disguise. 
done everything I can. The suggestion is very appealing 
to UA. We've always needed additional movements at O'Hare. 
But this would require considerable work by the management. 
I'll take TWA's message with me and see if it can work. I 
don't know if we can do anything. 
NB: I don't think we should talk about O'Hare at this meeting. 
CHI 
NA: 
TIl: 
NA: 
PI: 
We didn't come here to discuss O'Hare. You can't compare 
O'Hare and DCA. They're apples and oranges. It's out of line. 
This is technically correct. This is not a matter for 
DCA meeting. 
What happened with TWA's exercise shows this wouldn t t solve 
our problem. The representatives here today I don't think 
have authority to cancel already operating flights. I certainly 
can't. I don't want to reconvene. I don't want the FAA to 
schedule for us. But we have to cancel flights. I suggest 
we reconvene later, after we have had a chance to talk to 
management. Flights simply have to be pulled out. We can't 
do anything about the new carriers. They'll get slots. 
He's right. We're going to need deletions. 
And those who have are going to give to those Who don't have. 
Over the years we have reduced frol1l 78 to 70 to make room 
for new carriers. I can't go any farther without consulting 
management. I would like to take the O'Hare suggestion to 
management. 
NA: It hoils down to hoW" much we want to give up to keep the right 
0-46 
to schedule what we have left. That's the bottom line. NA: 
eH: I would sincerely hope that after all these years that no one CH: 
came here without considering that movement to Dulles or 
Baltimore might be necessary. If not, we came unprepared to 
, 
use our best efforts. I suggest that before we consider QH: 
adjourning we explore other alternatives. 
NA: I agree with what you have said. But logic does not always 
apply. When you say we should all come prepared for this 
but it's not the way it is. 
ell: In my wildest dreams I never imagined this meeting was held 
together by logic. The agreement is too henign. I have 
trouble convincing other lawyers that it's really an agreement. 
But there are things we can do. We can call our managements. AL: 
There are things we can do on the phone without going home. 
At: There were 2 proposals made in the last couple of days -- one 
of which had 3 no's, one had 5. We would participate in 
either now. 
ell: Let's look at the United proposal again. 
NA: The only carrier who has come down to any extent on this 
proposal is National. 
eH: Is that column beginning to look any better to you? 
NA: No way is that how it's going to end up. Even with this we 
couldn't get any slides. We were already at 631 before .a~d 
couldn't get any. 
Pause. 
VA 64 
VR 
IIA 
NO OL: 
Total is 635, includin~ 0600. So it's 632. And everybody 
(but EA) gets an increase. QH: 
NA: So what? It' B no better than what we had. No one would 
move then. either. 
CH: Do you have a proposal New Haven? 
NB: Not at this time. We're working on it. CH~ 
eH: We're now 32 over. We started at 70 over. In the exercise 
\Ie were 25 over. 32 isn't all that bad. All the moves are 
solved by moving one hour to the next. That's the way it goes. NB: 
VA, There has been a lot of progress made. I don't think it's 
hurting enough to cause enough movement to solve the meeting. 
It is not hurting enough yet. It's a very difficult situation. 
One agency is certifying new carriers that needn't be certified CH: 
into DCA and the other not able to make room for them. 
'lV: (to VA) I'd like you to talk to your management about the 
O'Hare proposal. It may be a solution. 
VA: I will bring everything back fto the management] that's gone 
on here. 
OL: Air Florida, is it hopeful that you will go to Baltimore? 
QH: The prohlem \lith serving two airports if> an economic problem. NB: 
It is in thE' hands of our economic people. With regard to 
CH: 
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Did you ever hear from FM on the 0600 question? 
No, but I'm even more pessimistic. 
Break. 
Our schedule reflects 14 slots from some airport in Washington. 
Because we have limited aircraft and certification we can't 
put more into 2200. I'm trying to put 4 slots into Baltimore. 
We started at another airport but we had to cancel flights 
because we couldn't get fuel. We would rather be at Dulles. 
But we can't do anything more. We're at bare bones. Any 
other slides would make it impossible to have a feasible 
schedule. 
The other proposal was as follows: 
AA 
AK 
AL 
BN 
'lV 
OL 
EA 
NA 
KC 
NW 
PI 
60 
82 This was before BN went to 24 and TW to 46. 
26 
48 
34 
137 
36 
40 
70 
might consider it more seriously also. Why are you (DL) pull! 
out of Dulles? 
We simply canceled the flight. We couldn't get fuel. The 
flight dido't roove anywhere. 
It irritates me that FAA does nothing at all to improve Bervic 
metro service, parking, etc. at other airports. We get no 
cooperation at all. My disenchantment is with them making 
no long-range plans to help us out. 
Even if the administrator himself were here, it is unlikely 
he would address these ques tions in the context of these 
meetinga. 
We explored these posaibilities also. Dulles wasn l t interested 
and Baltimore welcomed us with open arms. We are trying to 
resolve this but we get no help from the FAA. It's very 
frustrating. They don't do anyting. 
Dulles certainly appears to have the capacity. We must accept 
that FAA iB not going to accept expansion at DCA. There 18 
a serious noise problem. We have petitioned FAA proposing 
an increase in daylight hours. The ambient noise level is 
higher then t making disturbance factors lower. But FAA is 
moving in opposite direction 'because of noise and to transfer 
4 slots from the 40 to give to air taxi's. 
There are a lot of turbojets that make less noise than the 
Piper Navajos. 
The district court just ruled to uphold the right of 
Santa Monica airport to have single event limitation. This 
AL: 
NA: 
TIl, 
CH: 
NA: 
eH: 
NA: 
EA: 
QII: 
EA: 
ell: 
M: 
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could be relevant at Baltimore. The best way to put pressure 
on FAA is to move more and more to Dulles. Then they can I t 
resist us. 
Congress won I t like to see movement to Dulles. 
Dulles is the most inefficient airport I have seen anywhere 
in the world. 
Anyway, we~ re not going to get relief from any government 
agency. So what are we going to do with these numbers? 
What do we do? 
I don't think there is any way in the world we can hope to 
do anything tomorrow with four of the biggest carriers gone. 
I don't know what to do. I hate to reconvene. 
What would change by then anyway? 
Everyone is going to come down. It has to happen. Only the 
new carriers stand to gain by going to FAA. 
We will not cut our throats here. If they (the other carriers) 
want to sell the slots, fine. We will buy. But we are not 
going to come down any more slots. 
Our people feel the same way. 
People with authority don't even come to these meetings any more. 
Failure to attend meetings and have authority is a breach of 
the contract, which says we must put forth our best efforts. 
I believe a lot of success has been reached. The problem is that 
a reevaluation has to be explored with management by each carrier. 
I have been doing it every day by phone. But I don't think 
Call to order 8:20 AM 8/10/79 
M, PI, TIl, AL, WA, DL, AK (also representing NB), NA present. 
eH: 
TIl: 
AL~ 
NA: 
ell: 
AL: 
M: 
IIA: 
TIl: 
AK: 
pl.: 
TIl? 
My hands are tied. When I go home I will try my best to convince 
management that we have to come down. I don't know what else to 
do -- perhaps this proposal of softening one airport for another. 
It bothers me that the exercise we did with TWA moving still 
didn't come close. 
Nothing to offer -- except we will stay as long as the meeting 
lasts. I may have a proposal later this morning but I have 
to call before I try it out. Other than that I have nothing 
to offer. 
Nothing. 
When, Allegheny, can you make this proposal? 
After 9. 
I have nothing to offer. I think we will see a solution 
but not today. 
Not much we can do with our 4 slots, one in each hour. I 
would like to comment on TW's suggestion. Those carriers who 
don't have slots in both airports won l t have as much to bargain 
with. Also, if a carrier can delete to get spots at O'Hare, 
why can't they delete anyway? 
It's fI market shift. 
Nothing. 
Nothing. 
QH: 
OL: 
TIl: 
OL: 
QH: 
NA: 
DL: 
Qn: 
DL: 
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I think we need 10 to 15 days. 
A minimum of 10 slots have to simply come out and 8 more 
moved to 22. AFL, TWA, and Allegheny are all up tnc?re than 2. 
This is unrealistic. 
We did an exercise where we were down 8 and no one would 
move. 
It would be a psychological impetus. 
I'm amazed that an increase of 2 by smaller carriers can be 
looked at the same as that by carriers with lots of slots. 
No one has any more right than anyone else to these flights. 
Piedmont, for example, used to have many more flights than 
they did, and spent a lot of money to improve their ground 
facilities. Now it is quite possible that they wUl continue 
to deteriorate and what will he get for the investment? 
We built DCA. That is why we resent the smaller carriers. 
If my throat is going to be cut, it is not going to be by tie. 
The government talks out of both sides of its mouth. I wish 
we could shut down operations at DCA completely for a month 
and let these idiots see what would happen without air 
transportation. 
To elaborate on what I was saying, the new carriers are 
getting some slots in prime time, and the new slots for old 
carriers are also in critical times. 
If we pulled 2 out of peaks for 4 more In nonpeak period? 
would be the total? 
At: 628. It 'WOuld put us at BO. If a carrier wanted more slots 
than they are getting, they would have to get them at 2200. 
CH: Letls talk about a reconvened session. We generally hold these 
every other week but EA wouldn f t be able to attend the week 
of the 20th. Suppose we reconvene the end of next week? 
Decision: 1 PM Wednesday. 
. TIl: 
M: 
eH: 
TIl: 
Not counting N, there were 34 additional movements requested 
at DCA. There is not even enough room for this. If the 
new c.arriers won't move into 2200, the existing carriers have 
to move operations already running. When we went through the 
exercise, no one wants to move. Unless they're all here a 
strong message should go out' that the new carriers have to 
move to 2200. Carriers are going to have to be prepared to 
delete existing schedules. And that doesn't include the 
numbers from TW. 
I suggest that when we start next week, we look at a total 
without 2200. Then we are looking at true totals. 'Right now 
we Ire at 641. Maybe we should start at 620 before we even 
start the slides. 
The problem appears to be not the total number but lack of 
movement into 2200. 
lie struggled for two weeks to get to 640. You (M) are going 
to have to come down too. 
M: 
eH: 
TW: 
ClI: 
PI: 
D-5, 
I don't deny that. It is going to hurt had. 
TW, recognizing that this is the DCA meeting nnd not O'Hare, 
with respect to your proposal regarding O'Hare, do you 
envision thiR being explored by carriers with managements, 
Dr did you have somethin'g else in mind? 
I guess they will have to explore it with management. We have 
tried many ways to solve meetings. This may be another way, 
if we are not blocked by legalities. If 80, it's a dead 
issue. Whatever you think is the best way is OK. 
Any carrier can be the requesting party for a new meeting. 
But these meetings would have to be run separately. I don't 
know if this would be productive. It's up to you. Meetings 
are generally called because there are more demands than 
slots. But that doesn't mean we can't call a meeting for 
readjustment. 
We have tried to increase our slots for several years at 
Chicago. From our standpoint this may be a way to increase 
our slots at Chicago. This doesn't mean we have surplus at 
Nationa1. It would take major reworking of our schedule. 
But it would be a way to incresse our position at O'Hare. 
I'm not even sure we can do it. We certainly don't have 
surplus at DCA. 
CH: So you would like the chair to cormnunicste to other ORn 
carriers shou t this. 
TW: It sounds to me like a general interest. 
M: It Rounds 1 i1<:e the only way it will work is with direct 
TW: 
PI: 
NA: 
M: 
IIA: 
OL: 
AK: 
DL: 
AL: 
TW: 
AL: 
TW: 
AL: 
TW: 
DL: 
TW: 
I don't knoW" what Allegheny's position will be 
regarding O'Hare. 
It looks like most everybody has already agreed to those 
numbers. I can't agree to that number. I'll have to talk 
to the management. 
No problem. 
We might go aiong with it. 
Fine. 
Fine. 
We support it. 
Agreeable. 
We have one problem Air Florida. 
I get upset with Air Florida. They haven't cooperated yet. 
We all have to expect to get less than we want~ 
I had 44 before. 3 were in 2200. So I had 41 in 0700-2200. 
So I would get an increase of 5? 
No. You can only have an increase of 2. 
So I'd only get 43. 
I guess it would be 46. I'm not sure. Let's say 46 in those 
areas in addition to your 3 in 2200. 
So everyone would keep their 2200 slots and add any additional 
they want. 
So this gets us down some. Then we still have to shift some. 
The numbers don't work out on this propoBal~ Everybody isn't 
treated the same. 
TW: 
eH: 
M: 
eH: 
TW: 
CH: 
AL: 
AL: 
AL: 
NA: 
TW: 
DL: 
M: 
TW: 
NA: 
AL: 
OL: 
M: 
NA: 
AL: 
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between TW and another carrier. 
It doesn't have to be a swap. We don't have any right to 
swap. We just reduce at one airport and give others the 
opportunity to gain those slots. 
We don t t have the right to swap. 
Exactly. So the slots reduced at ORD may not serve DCA 
and may do no good to us here. 
This is true. We should not view this possibility 89 8 sign 
that we don t t have to do anything at DCA next week. 
I don't see any further value in sitting here. I would be 
of greater value going home. 
Allegheny, could you advance your proposal? 
If we take a break so I can cal1. 
Break. 
The proposal is as follows: 
AA 60 KC IJR 
AK BO NIl ,0 IIA 
AL BO PI 70 ~ 
BN 24 QH 631 
DL 3, RC 
....::l at 0600 
EA 137 TIl 46 62B 
NA 36 UA 64 
Part II: if any carrier wants to increase over this, they 
maximum number, then it treats each carrier differently. 
No. I'm not deducting anything. 
I don't buy it. If those numbers include what they're 
operating at 2200, OK. But otherwise there won't be any 
slots in 2200. If you've got the 27 in the 2200 back in 
there, you will only be one away from 28 In 2200 which is 
what we need. 
Under the proposal, how many would you have in 2200? 
So there is a discrepancy. I have currently 44 operations. 
If I get my requested 50, 6 will be in 2200. 
So you have 44, 41 in prime hours. You would get an increase 
of 2 in peak hours and 3 in 2200. Then any further increase 
would also go in 2200. You would have 43 total in the prime 
hours. 
It needs to be thought out a little more. But that's 
baSically it. It's a step in the right direction. 
TW, Delta, and American, do you agree to this basically? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
The problem will be with Air Florida. 
Air Florida will have to participate in this and it's not 
going to work. They're getting an increage~ That's as 
good as gold. 
0-56 
01.: Everyone Js getting at l('ast 2 increases that wanted it. 
Could vou talk to Air Florida and Jet them know we feel we 
are on the verge of a '!lolution and it hinges on them? 
CII: We will reconvene 15 August at 1300, 
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